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Executive Summary  
The European Commission estimates that approximately one third of the 145 power 
reactors currently operating in the European Union will need to be shut down by 2025. 
This will result in the need to dismantle, decontaminate and demolish these nuclear 
facilities as well as to undertake processing, conditioning and disposal of nuclear waste 
and spent fuel (‘decommissioning’). It is of paramount importance that the funding of 
these decommissioning activities will be adequate and available when needed in 
order to avoid negatively affecting the safety of EU citizens. Nuclear operators are ex-
pected to accumulate all the necessary funds during the operating life of facilities.  
Member States oversee different regimes for estimating, collecting and managing de-
commissioning costs and there are significant differences in the operation, governance, 
investment and accessibility of the existing funds across the EU. 
This report has undertaken an assessment of the different regimes and noted the fol-
lowing: 
• The Polluter pays principle for decommissioning is widely accepted and needs to 
be the fundamental basis of the granting an operating license, as occurs in Finland 
and Sweden. 
• The discussions on decommissioning funds have focused on nuclear power plants. 
Decommissioning of other facilities must not be overlooked, in particular for high 
cost facilities, such as reprocessing plants or facilities having experienced incidents 
or accidents. 
• Costs estimates are subject to high degree of risks and uncertainties; expected 
costs have risen significantly in a number of countries while many estimates still 
contain a considerable range of possible costs.  
• Differences in reported cost estimates occur due to varying discounting mecha-
nisms and the timing of dismantling. 
• Not all Member States require that funds be managed externally and segregated 
from the operator.  
• A number of Member States seem to be moving towards the increased restric-
tion of funds. This development might be further accelerated by pressure from the 
financial markets (analysts and auditors) 
• In most countries there are only limited rights for the public to access information 
on decommissioning costs and funds. 
• Many operating companies and governments are satisfied with the current situa-
tion and have concerns towards an EU harmonization process of nuclear de-
commissioning financing. 
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A comprehensive assessment of the financial consequences and risks of the de-
commissioning funds from governance, accounting, valuation and investment perspec-
tives has been undertaken in the course of this study. 
From a governance perspective, the higher the potential conflict of interests within 
a particular decommissioning methodology, the greater the need for additional checks 
and balances. Externally managed funds have a lower risk of conflicts of interest.  
Given the many conflicts of interests embedded in decommissioning and the impor-
tance of the health and safety aspect over a long time horizon, a framework for best 
practice of decommissioning financing should be introduced, which goes beyond mere 
legal requirements. Therefore decommissioning financing projects should focus on the 
independence of the involved parties, avoid situations where the operator has power 
of authority to dispose of the decommissioning funds and aim at reducing any possible 
situation where financial funds obtained by the operator can be used for different pur-
poses. 
Using the accounting perspective leads to the conclusion that the International Fi-
nancial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) should be applied together with clarifications 
(EU interpretations and guidance) to improve reliability and comparability. Applying the 
“current budget” methodology doesn’t meet the qualitative characteristics of modern 
accounting and is a possible source of failure in decommissioning financing. 
The valuation perspective is particularly important to investors. A reliable valuation 
has to allow a comprehensive risk assessment. To enable this to happen transpar-
ency is paramount. 
The incentive to finance part of future decommissioning costs through a high invest-
ment performance is evident. However, high performance investments can conflict 
with the prudence principle, which plays an important role in the field of financial as-
set management. It is therefore recommended that guidelines are established.  The 
long time scales potentially allow more allocating to shares (with a higher expected 
return) than shorter term portfolios, a process know as asset and liability manage-
ment. However, this approach requires the establishment of a guarantee scheme.  
The legal aspects of the report suggest that the legislative proposals and recommen-
dations on the European level on the structure and availability of decommissioning 
funds in the respective Member States should not be solely based on the EURATOM 
Treaty but have to be based on the Treaty of the European Communities, especially 
Article 95 together with Article 175 on environmental grounds.  
Based on the findings of the report a number of recommendations are made on how 
to ensure that adequate funds are available when necessary. These recommendations 
are made to Member States and to actions that could be undertaken now on the 
European level. Furthermore, the report makes suggestions on how further harmoni-
zation of could be achieved on the EU level if necessary. Along with these recommen-
dations are suggestions for information sharing and reporting that should be 
undertaken across the EU to increase transparency. 
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Extended summary 
Introduction 
The European Commission estimates that approximately one third of the 145 power 
reactors currently operating in the European Union will need to be shut down by 2025. 
This will result in the need to dismantle, decontaminate and demolish these nuclear 
facilities as well as to undertake processing, conditioning and disposal of nuclear waste 
and spent fuel (‘decommissioning’). It is of paramount importance that the funding of 
these decommissioning activities will be adequate and available when needed in 
order to avoid negatively affecting the safety of EU citizens. Nuclear operators are ex-
pected to accumulate all the necessary funds during the operating life of facilities.  
The European Council, Commission and Parliament have highlighted the importance of 
decommissioning funds in a joint statement noted that “separated management of 
decommissioning funds is essential to secure both the availability of funds to pay for 
decommissioning and radioactive waste management and in order to prevent market 
distortion”. While the European Commission published in October 2006 a recommen-
dation for Member States that stated  ‘A segregated fund with appropriate control on 
prudent use should be the preferred option for all nuclear installations’ and ‘Financial 
resources should be used only for the purposes for which they have been established 
and managed. In this context, due consideration should be given to transparency’.  
While the EU institutions have noted the importance of the correct management of de-
commissioning funds, Member States oversee different regimes for estimating, collect-
ing and managing decommissioning costs. Furthermore, there are significant 
differences in the operation, governance, investment and accessibility of the existing 
funds across the EU. 
This report reviews the different approaches taken by Member States and assesses 
the risks associated with the different methodologies. The report is divided into four 
main parts: Current decommissioning financing approaches from those Member 
States that have or have had commercial nuclear power facilities; Analysis of the finan-
cial consequences and risks of the different decommissioning financing schemes in 
place; Legal framework for dealing with these financial risks; Conclusions and Recom-
mendations for action on the EU and Member State level. The study does not analyse 
how far the differences in decommissioning financing methodologies distort the single 
market for electricity nor to assess the validity of the cost estimates given.  
 
Decommissioning Financing Schemes in Member States 
The first main part of the report covers the analysis of current decommissioning fi-
nancing approaches (Chapter 3). It includes a comprehensive analysis of the current 
(and planned) approaches for financing nuclear decommissioning in the 16 relevant 
countries (i.e. those EU Member States that have or have had a commercial nuclear 
power programme). Also undertaken in the context of the study, and included in the 
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Annex, is a technical overview of the dismantling of nuclear facilities. The analysis of 
current decommissioning financing schemes involved an assessment of:  
• the decommissioning liabilities, strategies and time schedules,  
• the approaches to quantifying the decommissioning costs,  
• the different methods for setting aside and managing funds including the accessibil-
ity of the operators of the nuclear installations to these funds,  
• how the funding schemes deal with early plant closure or other unforeseen events,  
• transparency of the schemes to the public, and  
• stakeholders’ opinion on the funding schemes in their countries.  
The complete country and stakeholder reports are included in the annex to the report. 
Nuclear decommissioning liabilities include dismantling, decontamination, demolition 
and site clearance of the nuclear facilities at the end of their lifetime as well as for the 
storage, processing, conditioning and disposal of nuclear waste and spent fuel. A main 
imperative for the distribution of liabilities is the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ which is 
broadly accepted but not fully implemented in every country. Only in some countries 
(e.g. Finland, Sweden), the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ is a legal requirement. The princi-
ple assumes the operator of the nuclear facility to be the ‘polluter’ and to have the re-
sponsibility to finance and implement all decommissioning activities including nuclear 
waste management and final disposal operations. Furthermore, it implicitly assumes 
that the generation benefiting from a nuclear facility’s production should pay for the 
decommissioning. 
Analysis has shown that the estimates of decommissioning costs varies according to a 
number of factors including: the decommissioning strategy chosen; the cost items 
taken into account; the origin of the cost estimate; the methodology applied; the politi-
cal-administrative framework; and the way risks and uncertainties are included. 
Operators and decommissioning authorities in Member States deploy and propose 
different strategies for decommissioning, including: 
• Immediate dismantling after the operational period until no more regulatory control 
is required; this is proposed in a number of countries, including France, Italy, Ger-
many and Slovenia.  
• Deferred dismantling requires that the facility is kept intact and placed in a protec-
tive storage state to enable the radionuclides to decay prior to eventual dismantle-
ment. A number of countries have adopted this approach with the delay ranging 
from between 10 - 40 years in Sweden, to around 100 years in the UK. 
• Entombment involves encasing the radioactive structures, systems and compo-
nents in long lived substances, while ongoing monitoring is maintained. Currently, 
the approach is not proposed or undertaken by any Member State. 
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Some Member States have yet to determine their definite choice of strategy, e.g. Slo-
vak Republic and Romania. 
The strategy chosen will be impacted by and in turn affects the levels of: radiation pro-
tection; employment; financial and engineering costs; and the financial risks and uncer-
tainties involved.  
The cost estimates, for any decommissioning strategy, are arrived at by either making 
an estimate based on a generic rule (e.g., the cost of construction is used to estimate 
dismantling costs) or by making a more detailed ‘bottom up’ assessment, taking into 
account expected material, labour, engineering costs etc. Most Member States have 
moved or are moving towards the ‘bottom-up’ approach, with only Bulgaria currently 
fully formulating its decommissioning costs through the generic rule. The cost estimate 
methodologies and scope vary from country to country and even within countries. In 
general, the accuracy of cost estimates for the decommissioning of nuclear power 
plants is likely to increase over time as more facilities are decommissioned. However, 
currently, large risks and uncertainties remain, particularly with cost estimates for less 
standardized plants, such as reprocessing facilities. The cost estimates are based on 
technical and economic assumptions of future activities and therefore risks and uncer-
tainties must be considered. Some of these uncertainties can have huge implications 
for the final cost.  For example depending on the decommissioning strategy, some ma-
terial which are not classified as waste today may in the future have to be disposed of, 
e.g. plutonium or depleted uranium.    
Expected costs have risen significantly in a number of countries, for example the UK, 
while in others, for example France, there is still a considerable range of possible 
costs. Further costs adjustments are expected particularly for the dismantling of large 
facilities and with construction of final waste disposal facilities, due to the lack of expe-
rience in this field. 
The scope of cost assessments must also be considered as it can vary between 
Member States, for example the decommissioning cost estimates for research facilities 
in Germany do not include the costs of final disposal. While some costs estimates for 
nuclear power plant decommissioning do not include costs of pre-decommissioning 
and facility shutdown activities. 
The discussions on decommissioning funds have focused on nuclear power plants. 
Decommissioning of other facilities must not be overlooked, in particular for high cost 
facilities, such as reprocessing plants (the estimated cost of decommissioning the Sel-
lafield plant in the UK is  58 billion) or facilities having experienced incidents or acci-
dents (e.g. the A1 unit at Jaslovske Bohunice, in Slovak Republic). 
The long time scales involved, between estimating the expected cost of decommission-
ing activities and carrying out the actual work, increase the need to consider the impact 
of risks. For commercial nuclear power plants, the highest risks and uncertainties for 
decommissioning costs include; incidents and accidents during operating and during 
decommissioning; political decisions which change the framework conditions; availabil-
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ity of nuclear knowledge at the time of the decommissioning activities; unexpected evo-
lution of radioactive waste management, storage and disposal costs; and the general 
economic development. Decommissioning projects ‘regularly produce the unex-
pected’.  
Consequently, it might be assumed that analysis would be based on decisions not only 
on one deterministic cost estimate, but instead sensitivity or scenario analyses or simu-
lations carried out in order to identify the least-cost solution. However, such analyses 
are either not been published, with some exceptions, or they do not exist. 
The funding schemes usually require the operator to set aside an amount according 
to the years of operation and/or the electrical energy produced.  However, in Sweden 
and Finland, the full undiscounted decommissioning costs have to be provided for or to 
be guaranteed from the beginning of operation of a facility. While in France, a system 
has been recently introduced which requires the operator to provide for the full amount 
of undiscounted decontamination and dismantling costs, after a five years transition 
period.   
A fundamental methodological difference between Member States is whether or not 
future decommissioning provisions are based on undiscounted costs (whereby the full 
estimated costs must be accrued) or on discounted costs (whereby funds are assumed 
to grow, though investment, over and above the rate of expected inflation). Given the 
long timescales involved this makes a significant difference to the funds that the opera-
tors must set aside. For some nuclear installations in Germany, Czech Republic, Slo-
vak Republic, Italy, Finland and Lithuania, no discounting occurs. In those Member 
States that discount expected costs, the real discount rate ranges from 1.5% in Spain 
to 5.5% for some NPP in Germany. In the UK, for the Magnox plants a ‘on budget’ 
scheme is adopted (the Government uses its annual budget for expenditures) and in 
Romania no fund has been established. 
Decommissioning funds are either managed internally or externally to the operator’s 
accounts. External funds differ in regard to their degree of independence from the op-
erator and/or Government. For example, in the UK and Spain a public sector company 
manages the fund, while in the Slovak Republic a fund is managed by a Board of Trus-
tees appointed by the Ministry of Economy. 
 
Payment from 
current budget 
Internal External 
 Unrestricted Restricted  Unrestricted Restricted 
UK (NDA) D, B, NL,  
IT (SOGIN-ENEL), 
CZ  
F, CZ IT (CCSE) FIN, LT, S, UK (NLF: 
British Energy), SK, E, 
BG, HU, SI 
 
Further restrictions are placed upon the mechanism by which the funds are accumu-
lated, the types of investments and the oversight mechanisms also display consider-
able difference between Member States. In Sweden, for example, assets must be 
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deposited in interest bearing accounts at the National Debt office or invested in prom-
issory notes issued by the State, while in Spain there are only general guiding princi-
ples. The table above indicates the range of mechanisms used for decommissioning 
funds for different Member State’s NPPs. 
It is therefore clear that there are very different governance schemes of fund manage-
ment, different investment rules, and variable access of operators of nuclear facilities to 
the funds. However, a number of Member States seem to be moving towards the in-
creased restriction of funds. This development might be further accelerated by pres-
sure from the financial markets (analysts and auditors). 
Recent legislation in some Member States, e.g. Czech Republic or UK, has increased 
citizens access to information in general and this has been applied to decommission-
ing and radioactive waste management issues. However, in general, information to the 
public is restricted in a number of key areas, including: estimates of total decommis-
sioning costs; details of cost estimation methodology; provisions accumulated per 
plant; investment strategy of decommissioning funds; and details of payments from 
decommissioning funds for decommissioning activities. 
Many stakeholders, largely operating companies and Governments, are quite satisfied 
with the present situation in their countries and believe that adequate funds will be 
available when necessary. Furthermore, they largely have concerns about a process of 
harmonizing decommissioning financing on the European level and substantially 
changing the present system. However, some of these stakeholders stressed the im-
portance of introducing some kind of general requirements or common criteria on pro-
ducers of nuclear energy to ensure a level playing field in the EU. 
 
Analysis of Financial Consequences and Risks 
The second main part of the report includes a comprehensive assessment of the 
financial consequences of the decommissioning funding schemes from accounting, 
valuation, governance and investment perspectives (Chapter 4). This is necessary to 
take into account both the economic pressure from the liberalized energy markets and 
financial markets and the nuclear safety requirements.      
There are three underlying principles governing the financial risk analysis which are: 
the ‘polluter pays principle’ must apply as far as possible, with the operators of the nu-
clear installation regarded as the polluter; that ‘transparency is an important require-
ment’; and a high level of quality (best practice) of fund management is vital. 
Governance Perspective 
This section of the study has analysed and assessed the different financial risks relat-
ing to the various methods to set aside and manage the financial resources for de-
commissioning. The ideal outcome would have been to identify a preferred 
methodology. 
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However, a perfect solution which can be recommended to all countries and facilities 
does not exist, but it can be concluded that the current budget methodology has many 
shortcoming and cannot be regarded to be an appropriate solution. Different strengths 
and weaknesses can be attributed to internal and external decommissioning method-
ologies. Therefore, it is possible to define the important criteria which characterise a 
preferred solution, which should: 
• Ensure that decommissioning funds should not be in the general accounts of 
the operator, be they private or government authorities. Funds assets should be 
separated or legally separated from other assets and liabilities. 
• Focus and increase the independence of the seven elements identified in the 
Governance chain namely, the parties responsible for: regulating and monitor-
ing decommissioning finances; paying for decommissioning activities; holding 
the funds in the general accounts; creating the investment policy and guide-
lines; managing the fund; authorising the payments for decommissioning; and 
the party who monitors and controls the decommissioning finance and can 
authorise sanctions in the case of non-compliance. 
• Avoid situations where the operator has the power of authority to dispose of de-
commissioning funds. 
Almost all weaknesses of the specific funding systems are linked to the potential de-
gree of the conflicts of interests and occur in both internal and external funding 
methodologies as well for private or public operators. Conflicts of interests do not 
automatically disqualify a solution. However, they necessitate accompanying control 
measures, in order to avoid negative effects stemming from conflicts of interests. In 
governance language, “checks and balances” have to be established.  
As a general rule, it can be said that the higher the possible conflict of interests linked 
to a particular decommissioning methodology, the higher the need for additional 
checks and balances or measures. This should assure good decommissioning practice 
by providing appropriate fences (as „risk reducers“). The need for additional checks 
and balances increases with internal solutions. 
The higher weight of conflicts of interests in the case of internal methodologies to-
gether with the higher barriers for beneficiaries to legally claim assets when necessary 
are the main arguments, which speak for preferring external solutions where assets 
are separately accumulated and managed. 
In order to ensure that a specific level and quality of generally agreed and monitored 
principles of additional measures (“risk reducers”, “fences”) will be applied, it would be 
reasonable to create a kind of European “oversight board” or at least a kind of “de-
commissioning financing committee” or “council’”. Such a public board or committee or 
council would set principles and framework guidelines and would also monitor them. 
The general principles and framework guidelines should improve the well functioning of 
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systems. Moreover, the board or committee could propose methodology-specific addi-
tional measures (fences). 
Accounting Perspective 
Accounting frameworks are arranged in a pyramid hierarchy. On the top is the objec-
tive of accounting principles, followed by underlying assumptions, qualitative character-
istics, elements of financial statements and the criteria for recognition, measurement 
and disclosure. The accounting approach defines which costs have to be recognised 
and measured and is the over-riding perspective. Different sets of accounting stan-
dards already exist which address the key issues for decommissioning activities; of 
particular relevance are the EU Directives (the Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 
25 July 1978 and the Seventh Council Directive 83/349 EEC of 13 June 1983) or the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). From the accounting per-
spective, there should be common “Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP)” applied to every installation. Therefore, it is not only a question of which in-
ternationally accepted standards should be applied but that all operators consistently 
apply the same GAAP and that this will be confirmed in the auditors’ report to increase 
transparency. The report recommends to apply IFRSs together with clarifications (EU 
interpretations and guidance) in order to improve reliability and comparability. Applying 
the “current budget” methodology as it is done, e.g. for research facilities in many 
countries, does not meet the qualitative characteristics of modern accounting and is a 
possible source of failure in decommissioning financing. 
Valuation Perspective 
A reliable valuation has to allow a comprehensive risk assessment (of all risks linked to 
the investment).Decommissioning funds methodologies are not the key driver for the 
financial value and valuation process as long as appropriate information is given. 
Transparency is paramount as key to minimising all effects linked to various factors of 
uncertainty and to assuring that investors receive a true and fair view of the financial 
position and performance. Transparency helps to prevent wrong investment decisions 
and thus inefficient allocation of financial resources. 
The most important issue from the valuation perspective it the disclosure of both, dis-
counted and undiscounted amounts of decommissioning provisions/debts. All other 
issues relating to valuation are already included in the governance and accounting per-
spectives. 
Investment Perspective 
Decommissioning costs affect the competitive position of an operator in the energy 
market as they create potentially large and possibly unexpected expenditures. There-
fore the incentive to finance part of future decommissioning costs through a high in-
vestment performance is evident. However, high performance investments can 
conflict with the prudence principle, which plays an important role in the field of finan-
cial asset management. Due to the scale of the funds involved and the long time peri-
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ods it is recommended that ‘guidelines’ be established that describe the framework for 
investments as well as required qualifications of the investment managers, to ensure 
they have a sufficient track record and that they are independent from the operator. In 
this context, an oversight board or decommissioning financing committee could provide 
such guidance. 
The long time scales potentially allow more allocating to shares (with a higher expected 
return) than shorter term portfolios, a process known as asset and liability manage-
ment. However, this approach requires the establishment of a guarantee scheme to 
cover decommissioning costs in the event of early closure of the facility or other unex-
pected cost increase. 
 
Legal Aspects 
Chapter 5 of the report looks at the legal aspects of decommissioning and future legis-
lation. The chapter shows that past and current efforts of the European Commission to 
harmonize the system of decommissioning funding regulations were and are all based 
on articles of the EURATOM treaty, especially article 31.  
This creates a dilemma for a real regulatory process in the European Union, as the 
EURATOM Treaty does not provide any direct legal bases for legislative action in the 
field of financing of decommissioning. Consequently, it conflicts with international rules 
of general interpretation to extend the competences of the EURATOM treaty beyond 
the limits the treaty founder have given to it. It is especially invalid to try to extent by the 
simple means of interpretation a new competence to EURATOM which is clearly regu-
lated under the Treaty of the European Communities but which is not coved by the 
EURATOM treaty. 
Therefore all legislative proposals and recommendations on the structure and availabil-
ity of decommissioning funds in the respective Member States cannot be based on the 
EURATOM treaty but need to be based on the Treaty of the European Communities, 
especially Article 95 together with Article 175 on environmental grounds. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
How can Member States improve their decommissioning financing systems?  
Member States must ensure that adequate funds will be available when necessary, 
and that – using the ‚Polluter Pays Principle’ – risks and uncertainties are eliminated as 
far as possible. These steps are outlined in Chapter 6 and include: 
• The identification of risks such as the changing of ownership of utilities or the 
existence of two or more different decommissioning financing schemes in one mar-
ket. 
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• Increasing transparency; experience shows that transparency is a key issue for 
any internal or external fund. Given this, an operator has to define and establish a 
procedure which is effective, clear and transparent.    
• Assuring a high degree of independence between actors in the governance chain 
is crucial. This must include organisational and structural independence of the dif-
ferent organisation as well as personal independence. 
– The independence of the licensing authority is central. In this context, it is rec-
ommended that there will be cooling off periods for employees transferring be-
tween the licensing authority and other actors in the governance chain. 
– It is recommended that there is full independence of the decommissioning fund 
manager from the operator. Analysis shows that internal and external funds 
need different checks and balances. Additional measures can cause additional 
costs and carry inherent risks of inefficiency. In principle external funds ensur-
ing the independence of decommissioning fund management from the operator 
reduce the need for additional checks and balances. 
– Internal unrestricted decommissioning financing schemes, public or private, do 
not secure the minimum degree of independence necessary and increase the 
likelihood of a conflict of interest. 
– Internal unrestricted financing schemes should be changed into restricted 
funds, with a measurable degree of separation. 
• It is necessary to separate the power of authority of the bodies responsible for 
collection from that of disposal of the funds, while at the same time not reducing 
any incentive to reduce costs of decommissioning activities.    
• Introduction of a uniform accounting system, ideally one based on the Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) for both public and private licen-
sees is necessary. Applying the ‘current budget’ methodology doesn’t meet the 
qualitative characteristics of modern accounting and is a possible source of failure 
in decommissioning financing. Therefore, public licensees should not pay de-
commissioning costs from the current budget, but build up separated provisions. 
• Additional guarantees to cover unplanned eventualities to ensure that under all 
circumstances the polluter pays principle is adhered too should be undertaken. This 
would require: 
– The relationship between mother and daughter companies has to be clarified, 
so that the corporate group will cover all liabilities of the limited company in any 
case of bankruptcy of the daughter company („deep pocket liability“) 
– Guarantees should be introduced that cover the financial risk of an early shut 
down.   
– Guarantees to cover the eventuality of insufficient funds available after final 
shutdown, due to unexpected cost increases or fund mismanagement. 
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Such guarantees could be achieved through the pooling between licensees within a 
country or region, thus creating a collective financial guarantee fund, as with addi-
tional insurance or bank guarantee. 
• Establishment of investment guidelines to address the trade-off between high per-
formance and high security of funds and describing the required qualifications of 
investment managers. A professional asset & liability management framework 
should be implemented for all private and public facilities, with matching durations 
of liabilities and assets. A periodic evaluation of the financial risks rating of the op-
erator (for both the mother and subsidiary company) should be undertaken. 
Audits by certified auditors on the state of the provisions, the state of the decom-
missioning funds and the investment policy should be undertaken. 
 
Increasing transparency and oversight - First steps proposed at EU level 
Action will also be needed on the EU level to increase both transparency and over-
sight. It is recognised a number of processes already existing such; within the Coun-
cil’s working group and the Decommissioning Funding Group; the implementation of 
the October 2006 recommendation on Decommissioning from the European Commis-
sion. 
However, in order to further improve transparency regular uniform reports should be 
produced by Member States. The transparency process should be further enhanced 
by the establishment of a Council (of trustees) of European Nuclear Decommis-
sioning Funds (CENDF) on the European Level. This independent body should: - 
• Act as a focal point for contacts between Member States on decommissioning is-
sues. 
• Become an interface on the European Level between Member States and the EU 
institutions. 
• Agree on best practice and consequently contribute to improving the existing sys-
tems. 
• Contribute to a higher degree of harmonisation of decommissioning financing 
methodologies in the EU. 
 
Regulation of decommissioning financing at EU level? – Outlook on possible 
future steps 
According to the experiences with the European Commission’s draft directives of 2003 
under Article 31 of the EURATOM Treaty on nuclear safety and radioactive waste 
management (the “nuclear package”) and discussions with stakeholders in the course 
of this project, further legal steps on the European level are not envisaged at the mo-
ment. 
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However, if the European institutions considered using the Treaty of the European 
Communities, as argued in chapter 5, as a legal base for potential action, further 
regulation of decommissioning financing at EU level would be justified. Further har-
monisation in the EU would be achieved by the introduction and implementation of 
binding legislation by Member States. Its legal base could focus on the impact of dif-
ferences in decommissioning financing schemes on the energy market and/or envi-
ronmental protection, neither of which are adequately addressed through the 
EURATOM Treaty.  
Such a directive would only be necessary if the current processes were not fully im-
plemented.  
Further legislation harmonisation would be achieved through the establishment of a 
European Nuclear Decommissioning Oversight Board (ENDOB) replacing or com-
plementing the Council (of trustees) of European Nuclear Decommissioning Funds 
(CENDF). Contrary to the CENDF that concentrates on increasing transparency and 
recommending best practice, the ENDOB would have authority to introduce general 
principles and guidelines as well as the ability to monitor their implementation.  
 
Reporting requirements to increase transparency across the EU 
To increase transparency across the EU Chapter 7 makes precise recommendations 
of the reporting that should be undertaken to the European Commission so that a de-
tailed annual report to the Parliament and Council can be undertaken. This reporting 
would require three levels of information: 
Primary level: Comprising of five indicators which reflect the overall financing of de-
commissioning and waste management activities in each Member State. These are 
the: sum of the estimated undiscounted decommissioning costs for all installations; 
sum of the provisions for decommissioning; sum of possible costs covered by guaran-
tees; sum of assets in separate dedicated funds; and the average sum of payments per 
year for decommissioning over the previous three years. This would enable compari-
son between Member States as to the degree to which funds are been collected and 
guarantees provided as well as indicators of the measures taken to ensure separation 
of the funds from the regular activities of the utility. 
Secondary level: Will demonstrate the state of financing for each individual nuclear 
facility (which should have been gathered in collecting the primary level information).  
This should reflect both the differences between different types of facility and between 
different designs and become the basis for facility type specific benchmarking. 
Tertiary level: This will provide more detailed information on the framework, procedure 
and rules for the financing of decommissioning. 

Final Report – EU Decommissioning Funding Methodologies TREN/05/NUCL/S07.55436 
Wuppertal Institute et al. 1 
1 Introduction and overview 
1.1 Background of the study 
The liabilities of operators of nuclear installations for the storage, processing, condi-
tioning and disposal of nuclear waste and spent fuel, as well as for the dismantling, 
decontamination and demolition of their nuclear facilities at the end of their lifetime are 
substantial and require carefully planned advance arrangements. This has to be done 
in order to ensure nuclear safety, and according to the broadly accepted ‘Polluter Pays 
Principle’.  
Furthermore, as the number of nuclear power plants (NPPs), research reactors and 
other nuclear facilities that are closed and are undergoing dismantling and decontami-
nation or are planned to close is steadily increasing, nuclear decommissioning has 
become an increasingly important issue and will become even more so in the years 
ahead. The European Commission estimate that approximately one third of the 145 
power reactors currently operating in the European Union will need to be shut down by 
2025. 
There are different methodologies deployed in the EU Member States for estimating 
costs and financially providing for future decommissioning including nuclear waste 
management and management of radioactive waste from dismantling. Moreover, there 
are significant differences in the operation, governance, investment and accessibility of 
the existing decommissioning and waste management funds in Europe. These dif-
ferences can lead to the following problems: 
• First, not all the existing financing methodologies can reliably ensure that funds for 
decommissioning purposes are available when needed and adequate enough in 
order to avoid negatively affecting the safety of EU citizens. The safety of the citi-
zen is of paramount importance. Therefore, the availability of adequate financial re-
sources, by the time the nuclear facility is permanently shut down, overshadows 
other concerns by the European Commission with regard to the decommissioning 
of nuclear installations. 
• Second, not all the existing decommissioning financing systems ensure that the 
‘Polluter Pays Principle’ is applied as far as it is possible to foresee future costs 
and possible financial risks and uncertainties. The decommissioning financing sys-
tem principally determines who has to pay for safe decommissioning at the time 
needed: the generation benefiting from the nuclear energy produced or future gen-
erations, when the decommissioning activities occur, the future taxpayers or the 
current operators (“polluters”). 
• And third, in 1998, the European Commission identified the issue of decommission-
ing funds as one, which could potentially lead to a distortion of the single market 
for electricity.  
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In part as a result of the latter, the European Parliament passed an amendment in its 
first reading of the Electricity Market Directive in 2002 calling for the separation of de-
commissioning and radioactive waste management funds from the accounts of utilities. 
This amendment was subsequently overturned, but resulted in a joint institutional 
statement, which called for the separate management of decommissioning and waste 
management funds (OJ 2003): 
„The three institutions are strongly committed to the principal that the funds 
collected for the decommissioning and management for nuclear waste 
should be separated from the normal accounts and cash flow of an under-
taking. Separated management of decommissioning funds is essential to 
secure both the availability of funds to pay for decommissioning and radio-
active waste management and in order to prevent market distortion by us-
ing the cash flow of or the more favourable financial ratings due to potential 
access to the decommissioning funds for competitive purposes in the en-
ergy market.“  
This statement in turn led to the European Commission preparing a draft directive 
under Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty on nuclear safety, which included recommen-
dations on the financial management of decommissioning funds, with the main objec-
tive of ensuring safe decommissioning. 
If adopted these would have required that the operators of nuclear facilities ensure that 
there were adequate funds to cover their future decommissioning activities and that 
under normal circumstances these should be retained in legally separate accounts 
from that of the operator and only used for the purpose for which they were accumu-
lated. The European Parliament largely agreed with the recommendation of the 
Commission. However, discussions in the European Council’s Atomic Questions 
Working Group resulted in the altering of the proposals so that the recommendation 
from the Council.  These were subsequently adopted by the Commission in its re-
drafted directives in 2003, called for operators to ensure that there were adequate 
funds for decommissioning and waste management activities, but gave no recommen-
dations on the ownership or management of these funds. 
However, there was insufficient support from Member States to have the nuclear 
safety directive, which included the proposed text on decommissioning funds, (and a 
linked directive on nuclear waste management) adopted and the directive is now on 
hold within the institutions. As a consequence the European Council has established 
three working groups, including one on decommissioning funds, to the development of 
the pertinent policy initiatives.  
Interest groups representing the major electricity producers and the nuclear sec-
tor lobbied to have the Commission’s original proposal for legally separate decommis-
sioning and waste management funds abandoned instead calling for Member States to 
decide the most appropriate mechanisms for fund management. 
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Member States representatives are also involved in an informal group organised by the 
European Commission called the Decommissioning Funding Group (DFG). This 
group advises the Commission and shares information on the funding of decommis-
sioning activities.  
Against this background, based on previous studies and reports, and in addition to the 
work done in the groups mentioned above and in other projects initiated by the Com-
mission, the European Commission initiated this study on the different decommis-
sioning financing methodologies for nuclear installations within the Member 
States of the European Union (including Bulgaria and Romania). The information gath-
ered and the analysis undergone for this project shall form one of the bases for future 
decisions in this area. 
In addition, the study might also contribute to the discussion on decommissioning fi-
nancing methodologies on the national level. The existing schemes and possible im-
provements have been increasingly discussed in Member States. In some countries, 
this discussion has already led to substantial changes of the decommissioning financ-
ing systems.  
1.2 Objectives of the study 
The main objectives of this project were: 
• to increase transparency by taking stock of the approaches to quantify decommis-
sioning costs and to finance decommissioning in Member States, based on existing 
documents and further data and information gathered in the course of this study; 
• to analyse the risks relating to the various methods to set aside and manage finan-
cial resources for decommissioning purposes, in particular from the financial point 
of view; 
• to identify the stakeholders, their roles and motivations with regard to the existing 
methodologies on quantifying decommissioning costs as well as constituting and 
managing decommissioning funds; 
• to propose feasible steps of optimising decommissioning financing methodologies 
in the different Member States so that financial security is increased, i.e. that the fi-
nancial risks identified are reduced; 
• to discuss the role of the European Commission with regard to decommissioning 
financing in the Member States, to analyse how far the different financing method-
ologies deployed in the European Union should be harmonised; 
• to propose indicators describing the differences and common features of the dif-
ferent national approaches and allowing a user-friendly comparison between them, 
which may subsequently be used for reporting purposes on the European level. 
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A central question of the country analyses and financial risk analysis on which the 
development of proposals for optimising decommissioning financing systems should 
be:  
Is decommissioning financing (a) adequate, (b) available when needed,  
(c) secure and (d) well-managed in (e) a transparent way to ensure safe 
decommissioning based upon the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’, i. e. that the 
generation and actors benefiting from the nuclear energy produced will fully 
pay for safe decommissioning?  
The study does not analyse how far the differences in decommissioning financing 
methodologies distort the single market for electricity. However, if adequate de-
commissioning funding for a safe decommissioning and implementation of the ‘Polluter 
Pays Principle’ is ensured for all nuclear facilities throughout the European Union, this 
would reduce such possible distortions.  
In principle, all types of existing civil nuclear facilities in the EU Member States 
were subject to the study. However, the focus of the study remained on major installa-
tions, from the point of view of decommissioning costs. Furthermore, due to the limited 
scope of the study and limited data and information available not all nuclear installa-
tions could be analysed in detail.  
A main additional value of this study is a comprehensive analysis of financial con-
sequences and risks of the existing decommissioning financing schemes from the 
perspective of an experienced financial expert. 
Furthermore, the consortium established for this study was able to link the knowl-
edge and experiences of 
• national experts on nuclear energy  
• specialists in financial risk assessment and 
• legal experts 
to carry out the study and to derive conclusions and recommendations from it. 
1.3 Overview of the final report 
In order to achieve these objectives, the final report of this study on decommissioning 
financing presented here on behalf of the European Commission includes  
• Technical and financial definitions used for the purpose of this report (Chapter 2). 
• The results of a comprehensive and deep analysis of the current (and planned) 
approaches of financing nuclear decommissioning of nuclear installations in those 
16 countries in the EU-27 in which nuclear installations are currently operated 
(Chapter 3). This analysis took systematically stock of 
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– the various general technical options and strategies of decommissioning nu-
clear facilities, 
– the approaches to quantify decommissioning costs, 
– the different methods of setting aside funds, 
– the different fund management practices, 
– the relevant stakeholders, their role and their motivations with regard to the ex-
isting decommissioning funding approaches and to the existing proposals of fur-
ther developing them in the different Member States and on EU level. 
• Based on these country analyses, the results of the analysis of financial conse-
quences and risks of the different decommissioning financing schemes imple-
mented (Chapter 4). The financial consequences can be divided into  
– the risks related to governance issues,  
– the risks related to accounting issues,  
– the risks related to financial valuation issues, and 
– the risks related to the investment policy.  
• An overview of the legal framework for dealing with these financial risks in the 
European Union (Chapter 5). This chapter particularly gives an answer to the 
question on which legal basis the activities by the European Commission with re-
spect to decommissioning financing systems in the Member States are justified. 
• Conclusions and recommendations for the Member States and the European Union 
that are based on the analysis of financial consequences and risks of the existing 
decommissioning financing schemes, taking into account the legal possibilities for 
dealing with these risks, and what can be learned from non-EU countries and non-
nuclear areas (Chapter 6). 
• As a specific recommendation, a proposal for the future collection of data (indica-
tors) and further information needed for the comparison of the different decommis-
sioning financing approaches in place. This could form the basis of reporting 
requirements set by the European Commission to the Member States and to its 
own facilities (Chapter 7). 
The appendix of this final report contains 
• a stakeholder analysis on the European level; 
• 16 country reports describing the different approaches to decommissioning fi-
nancing and the views of the different stakeholders in the respective countries in 
detail; 
• a description of decommissioning financing schemes in selected non-EU 
countries and in non-nuclear areas. Examples described here are regulations on 
nuclear decommissioning financing in Canada, Switzerland, and the US, as well as 
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decommissioning financing rules for conventional waste disposal in Germany, coal 
mining and offshore petroleum sites in several countries; 
• a technical overview on decommissioning of nuclear facilities in Europe, with a 
special focus on dismantling and decontamination; 
The flow of work in this project and how the different chapters are interlinked within this 
final report is depicted in the following figure. 
Figure 1: Flow of work and how chapters of this final report are interlinked 
 
1.4 Roles of the project partners and subcontractors 
The project team having developed this final report presented was a consortium 
headed by the Wuppertal Institute (project co-ordinator). The analysis of the framework 
conditions, decommissioning financing methodologies and stakeholder views on de-
commissioning financing in the different countries was split among the partners and 
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subcontractors. The following table shows the roles and responsibilities of the different 
experts. The respective country reports (including stakeholder reports) are attached to 
this final report. The main results are summarised in Chapter 3 of this final report. 
Table 1: Experts/Organisations responsible for the country analyses 
Country Expert / Organisation 
Germany, The Netherlands, Italy 
and Slovenia 
Wuppertal Institute, Germany 
UK PSIRU/University of Greenwich, UK 
Finland, Sweden VTT, Finland 
France, Belgium, Spain Mycle Schneider Consulting, France 
Hungary AEKI, Hungary 
Lithuania AAPC, Lithuania 
Czech Republic Öko-Institut e.V., Germany 
Slovak Republic Energia 2000 and its partner organisations Energia tretieho tisicrocia 
and Za Matku Zem, and with support from Luba Kupke-Siposova, 
Slovak Republic / Austria 
Romania, Bulgaria Ian Smith, Private Consultant, UK/Romania 
 
In addition to the country analyses, the private consultant Antony Froggatt was respon-
sible for the stakeholder analysis on the European level attached to this final report. 
The main results of this analysis are included in Chapter 1 of this final report. 
Ameur Sciences et Techniques contributed to the technical nuclear aspects of the 
study and gave an overview on dismantling and decontamination techniques in the 
European Union, that has been attached to this final report. 
Ellipson AG was mainly responsible for the analysis of financial consequences and 
risks based on the country analyses (Chapter 4). 
Kuhbier Law Firms described the legal framework for dealing with these financial risks 
(Chapter 5). 
Wuppertal Institute and Antony Froggatt were mainly responsible for the sections on 
decommissioning financing systems in non-European countries and non-nuclear areas 
that has been attached to this final report.  
Furthermore, Wuppertal Institute and Antony Froggatt summarised the conclusions and 
recommendations (Chapter 6 and 7), and the executive summary and the extended 
summary of this final report.  
The conclusions and recommendations were discussed with all partners and subcon-
tractors, and with the European Commission. The project team is grateful to any com-
ments and suggestions by other scientists, financial experts, operators of nuclear 
facilities, decommissioning fund managers and further stakeholders. 
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2 Technical and financial definitions used for the purpose of 
this report 
In order to consistently and precisely analyse decommissioning financing, it is neces-
sary to firstly describe in detail the definitions and implied understandings of different 
technical and financial key terms within the project. It should be noted that these defini-
tions are not all assumed to be generally accepted ones but have been set in a practi-
cal way for the purpose of this report. With regard to the definition of 
“decommissioning” and “decommissioning fund”, unnecessary ambiguities could be 
avoided and transparency improved in case a more comprehensive terminology could 
later be adopted, such as “decommissioning and waste management funds” in accor-
dance with Commission’s statement in (OJ 2003).  
The definitions used in this report, particularly the definition of “decommissioning”, are 
mainly based on definitions currently used by the European Commission, DG TREN, 
Unit H2. Other sources used for this list of definitions are the technical overview by 
Ameur Sciences et Techniques in the appendix to this report, and (BMU 2001).  
Decommissioning All activities covering the technical decommissioning of the nuclear installation 
(decontamination, dismantling and demolition) and waste management (man-
agement and disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel) leading to the re-
lease of the nuclear installations from radiological restrictions.  
Decommissioning 
Fund 
Any type of financial resources intended specifically to cover the expenditure 
necessary for decommissioning nuclear installations. 
Decontamination Removal of fixed radionuclides. This serves radiation protection and is an im-
portant prerequisite for the eventual recycling of residual materials after clear-
ance. 
Demolition Technical decommissioning concerning buildings. 
Dismantling Equipment disassembly. 
Disposal / Repository Waste/Material packages holding radioactive waste or other radioactive materi-
als (e.g., spent fuel elements) are reliably isolated from the biosphere over very 
long periods of time. 
Earmarking Earmarked assets can only be used for a specific purpose, i.e. the fund man-
ager is restricted in his/her investment decisions. A restriction (earmark) limits 
or directs the use or distribution of an asset. This wording is usually used with 
internally managed funds. Cf. also ‚Restricted Fund. 
Internal / External 
Fund 
Internal means that the fund is part of the organisation operating the nuclear 
installation. External means that the fund is not part of the respective operating 
organisation. An internal/external fund can be a restricted or an unrestricted 
one. An external fund (i.e. not managed internally by the operator) can exist 
with or without transfer of liabilities (or transfer of ownership of radioactive 
waste or radioactive 'products') to the fund organisation, and with or without a 
short-fall guarantee by the operator or a group of operators. 
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Nuclear Facility / 
Nuclear Installation 
Any civilian facility and its land, buildings and equipment in which radioactive 
materials are produced, processed, used, handled, stored or disposed, e.g. 
uranium mines or mills, enrichment facilities, conversion plants, fuel fabrication 
plants, nuclear power plants, research reactors and other research facilities, 
reprocessing plants, conditioning facilities, interim storages or final disposal 
facilities. 
Operator The legal person who operates the nuclear installation and has the prime re-
sponsibility for nuclear safety. 
Public / Private In the case of nuclear liabilities, public means that the state, a public entity or a 
state-governed organisation is responsible for covering them, and private 
means that an organisation owned by private owners has to deal with them. 
In the case of legal context, public means that an organisation has to comply 
with “public law”, and private means that an organisation has to comply with 
“private law”. 
In the case of ownership, public means that the organisation is owned by public 
entities (government, state-governed organisation), and private means that the 
organisation is owned by private owners (be it a quoted or an unquoted organi-
sation). 
In the case of fund management, public means that a public entity (govern-
ment, state-governed organisation) manages the decommissioning fund, and 
private means that the management is with an organisation owned by private 
owners. 
Restricted Fund The liable organisation responsible for decommissioning financing is not fully 
free in using the money accumulated, i. e. that specific legal requirements for 
nuclear decommissioning funds exist that go beyond general rules like general 
accounting principles, general tax law, etc. Restrictions by the state, state-
governed organisations or other third parties can be imposed with respect to 
the accumulation, management and investment of the means of finance. In 
addition, restrictions can exist with regard to the payment of decommissioning 
activities. A restricted fund can be either internally or externally managed. Cf. 
segregated fund for one out of several possible restrictions. 
Segregated fund A decommissioning fund, either internal or external, which is identified sepa-
rately. Segregation can be one out of several possible restrictions to a decom-
missioning fund. 
Storage Interim solution until the materials/waste can be disposed of in a suitable re-
pository. 
TREN/05/NUCL/S07.55436 Final Report – EU Decommissioning Funding Methodologies 
10 Wuppertal Institute et al. 
 
Waste A widely used classification system separates radioactive waste into three 
classes: low-level waste (LLW), intermediate-level waste (ILW) and high-level 
waste (HLW). HLW is highly radioactive material arising from nuclear fission. 
LLW is mildly radioactive material, which does not require shielding during 
normal handling and transportation. ILW waste is waste exceeding the upper 
boundaries for low-level waste but which do not need heat to be taken into 
account in the design of storage or disposal facility.  
It should be noted, that some materials not classified as waste today might 
have to be managed as waste in the future, for example, uranium extracted in 
reprocessing and depleted uranium, a portion of separated plutonium and spent 
fuel (in some countries high-level waste is recovered from reprocessing spent 
fuel, while other countries regard spent fuel itself as high-level waste). This has 
to be taken into account in the context of decommissioning financing which 
includes financing of radioactive waste management according to the defini-
tions set for the purpose of this report. 
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3 Financing decommissioning in the EU-27 
3.1 Current approaches in the EU Member States 
3.1.1 Scope of analysis 
The analysis covers the existing nuclear decommissioning financing schemes for all 
types of nuclear facilities in those 16 European Member States which have nuclear 
installations under operation (including Bulgaria and Romania). As far as information 
was available, recent or planned changes in these financing systems have been taken 
into account up to October 2006. 
While taking all types of nuclear installations into account, the focus remains on ma-
jor installations, from the point of view of decommissioning costs. Furthermore, due to 
the limited budget of the study and limited data and information available, decommis-
sioning financing systems are analysed in detail only for some of the nuclear installa-
tions in more detail. 
While the study analyses decommissioning financing schemes it has to take into ac-
count existing cost estimates and cost estimation methodologies because they deter-
mine financing needs. However, it is not within the scope of this study to analyse 
and judge how far existing cost estimates are realistic or not. This study can just 
report existing cost estimation figures and their relations to provisions made, and docu-
ment the different cost estimation methodologies. 
An important basis for the country analyses in this project were the questionnaires of 
the DG TREN project „Analysis of the factors influencing the selection of strategies for 
decommissioning of nuclear installations“ (Contract Number TREN/04/NUCL/S07. 
40075) carried out by Colenco and Iberinco. They were available for all of the countries 
analysed except Bulgaria. However, the level of details provided differs from country to 
country. Furthermore, the level of co-operation with operators of nuclear facilities, 
managers of decommissioning funds and other relevant stakeholders varied from 
country to country, and thus the possibilities to receive data and information beyond 
the Colenco/Iberinco questionnaires. In conclusion, the level of data availability differed 
between the countries, which made the analysis and the comparability of results be-
tween the countries partly difficult.  
Therefore, additional information was gathered and stakeholders interviewed. The in-
formation from the Colenco/Iberinco questionnaires and further literature formed the 
empirical basis to answer the following main questions and a list of sub questions re-
lated to them, developed at the start of the project as a kind of questionnaire or tem-
plate to be filled in by every country expert of the consortium: 
• Who is liable for decommissioning activities to what extent? 
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• What are the technical options used and the current and expected future strategies 
for decommissioning nuclear facilities in the respective countries? 
• How are decommissioning costs quantified, and what are the costs estimated? 
• What methods are used to set aside funds, and what are the funds provided? 
• How is fund management implemented in practice, and what is the return on in-
vestment? 
• In particular, how does the decommissioning financing system provides for unex-
pected events like early closure or transfer of ownership? 
• Is the decommissioning financing system transparent to the public, and does the 
public have rights to information on decommissioning financing? 
• Who are the relevant stakeholders, and what are their roles and motivations with 
regard to the existing decommissioning funding approaches and to the existing 
proposals of further developing them in the different Member States and on EU 
level? 
3.1.2 Decommissioning liabilities 
Nuclear liabilities include liabilities for the dismantling, decontamination, demolition 
and site clearance of the nuclear facilities at the end of their lifetime as well as for the 
storage, processing, conditioning and disposal of nuclear waste and spent fuel. They 
arise with the start of operation of a nuclear facility, i. e. as the first activation or con-
tamination takes place, and usually increases with operation. 
A main principle with regard to the distribution of liabilities is the ‘Polluter Pays Prin-
ciple’ which is broadly accepted but not fully implemented in every country. In some 
countries (e.g., Finland, Sweden), the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ is a legal requirement. 
The principle assumes the operator of the nuclear facility to be the ‘polluter’ requiring a 
clearly defined and full responsibility to plan, implement and finance all decommission-
ing including nuclear waste management and final disposal operations.  This including 
being responsible for the coverage of associated costs, and with the producers’ re-
sponsibility not ending until all waste has been finally disposed of and the safety 
authorities have accepted that the final closure of the final disposal facility has been 
concluded fulfilling the pertinent safety requirements for final closure. The operator can 
be  
• a company owned by private shareholders from inside and/or outside the country,  
• a company owned by the public, a public agency or another institution which is 
100% owned by the state in which the facility is located or from another country, or 
• a company with mixed public-private ownership. 
However, it should be noted that full implementation of the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ 
cannot be 100% secured in any decommissioning financing scheme, because 
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even after the closure of the last final disposal facility, after all decommissioning activi-
ties have been carried out, there still remains a risk that radioactive materials can es-
cape into the environment and induce environmental and health problems and costs to 
future generations. 
Furthermore, according to international law, the state has the responsibility for final 
disposal of radioactive waste. Therefore, financial liabilities for final disposal (and part-
ly waste management, too) are not always with the ‘polluters’ but in some cases 
transferred to a state-governed organisation after transferring the responsibility for ra-
dioactive waste to this organisation. For example, in the Netherlands and in Slovenia, 
the fees the operator pays for dealing with radioactive waste include the cost of final 
disposal and discharge the operator from any waste management and disposal liability. 
In the Dutch case, this also includes dealing with waste products returning to the Neth-
erlands after spent fuel has been reprocessed and with final disposal (plutonium from 
reprocessing remains in France with AREVA). According to the law of April 2003, a 
similar regulation is in place for LLW and ILW waste in Belgium, but not for spent fuel 
disposal. 
In other cases, the state has partly taken over the liabilities of the operators, for 
example: 
• Responsibility of the state for all decommissioning activities in Spain  
In Spain, the state-governed radioactive waste management agency, ENRESA, is 
responsible for all decommissioning activities of nuclear facilities in Spain (except 
uranium mines started up after the foundation of ENRESA in 1984, research reac-
tors and other research facilities) three years after the shut down of the nuclear in-
stallation, i. e. after removal of spent fuel. After this transfer of liabilities, the former 
operators do not have to further contribute to the decommissioning fund even if de-
commissioning costs exceed the provisions made. 
• Nuclear phase-out: Former ENEL and ENEA facilities in Italy  
After the decision to close all nuclear power plants, and in the context of privatisa-
tion and liberalisation of the electricity market, liabilities of ENEL and ENEA facili-
ties have been transferred to the company SOGIN which in turn has been 
transferred 100% to the Italian Ministry of Treasury.  
• German unification  
In the course of German reunification the federal government has taken over de-
commissioning responsibilities for the nuclear facilities in the former German De-
mocratic Republic. 
• Privatisation in the Slovak Republic  
ENEL has not taken over any responsibility for decommissioning when taking over 
66% of the power generating company in the Slovak Republic. 
• Pilot projects like the reprocessing plant WAK, Karlsruhe, Germany  
Although the energy companies were the ones which aimed at benefiting from the 
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reprocessing plant in Karlsruhe, Germany, they only contributed to part of its de-
commissioning costs. 
Finally, it should be noted that the organisation being principally liable is not al-
ways the organisation which fully pays for decommissioning activities which is 
demonstrated by the following examples: 
• Early shut-down  
An example for a NPP with early shut-down is the THTR-300 in Hamm-
Uentrop/Germany: The operating company does not possess the financial means 
to pay for decommissioning.  Therefore,  a special financing agreement between 
the federal government, the state of North Rhine-Westphalia where the site is situ-
ated, and the energy companies ensures that decommissioning costs of safe stor-
age can be paid. However, this agreement is only valid until 2009, it is still not clear 
who will finance decommissioning activities after 2009. 
• Accession to the European Union  
In the case of Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovak Republic, there are agreements be-
tween the state governments, the European Union and some Member States about 
European contributions to financing decommissioning of the nuclear power plants 
in the context of the countries’ accession to the European Union.  
• Joint binational ownership  
There is the special case of Slovenia, where the Krsko NPP belongs jointly to a 
Slovenian and a Croatian company. In this case, formally, the liabilities are fully 
with the Slovenian operator of Krsko NPP because the plant is situated on Slove-
nian ground, while in practice - due to a Slovenian-Croatian contract – decommis-
sioning is a bilateral obligation. 
For a very few publicly owned nuclear installations and the majority of nuclear research 
facilities, it is not decided yet who will have to pay for future decommissioning 
activities. This is because for research reactors it is assumed that  
• the state will have to pay  
• contributions collected from industry for specific research projects carried out in the 
facility are not calculated in such a way that future decommissioning activities are 
taken into account, and 
• the research organisations (universities) themselves will not possess the financial 
means to substantially contribute to decommissioning activities. 
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3.1.3 Technical decommissioning strategies and time schedules 
In principle, there are three technical decommissioning (decontamination and disman-
tling) strategies (for more information see the technical overview in the appendix to this 
report): 
• Immediate decontamination and dismantling  
Decontamination and dismantling immediately after operation period. All contami-
nated material is cleaned until no more regulatory control is required. It is then dis-
mantled as soon as the end of operation period. 
• Deferred decontamination and dismantling (safe enclosure / safe storage)  
The nuclear plant is kept intact and placed in protective storage to enable the radi-
onuclides activity to decay until it reaches levels that reduce difficulties of handling. 
First, spent fuel is removed from the facility. The plant is then put and kept in a safe 
and stable state, until actual decontamination and dismantling. During this period, 
all remaining fluids are drained from the systems and adequately treated.  
• Entombment  
This option involves encasing radioactive structures, systems and components in a 
long-lived substance, such as concrete. The encased plant would be appropriately 
maintained, and surveillance would continue until the radioactivity decays to a level 
that permits termination of the plant's license and end any regulatory control. Most 
nuclear plants will have radionuclide concentrations exceeding the limits for unre-
stricted use even after 100 years. Therefore, special provisions would be needed 
for the extended monitoring period this option requires. To date, no facility owners 
have proposed the entombment option for any nuclear power plants undergoing 
decommissioning. In fact, this is more an emergency option than a strategy option, 
so far used only in the case of Chernobyl.  
A mix of parts of these strategies is, however, possible in practice. For example, 
starting the technical decommissioning activities immediately after the end of operation 
but spreading the decontamination, dismantling and demolition phases over several 
decades. 
The choice of strategy depends on several parameters and framework conditions, the 
decontamination, dismantling and demolition stage aimed at, and the planning for the 
future use of the site. Operators of nuclear facilities usually take into account the fol-
lowing criteria when deciding on a dismantling strategy (cf. also NEA 2006): 
• Radiation protection  
From the perspective of radiation protection, there is one major argument for de-
ferred decontamination and dismantling which is radioactivity decay, as it will en-
sure lower dose rates for workers. 
• Employment  
From the perspective of employment, there are major arguments for immediate de-
contamination and dismantling which is to use the knowledge of the employees 
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having operated and designed the facility, and to ease a socially acceptable reduc-
tion in employed and contracted staff at the site of the nuclear facility after the in-
stallation has been shut down (cf. Irrek 2005 for an example of an employment 
scenario for an immediate decommissioning strategy in Germany). On the other 
hand, deferred decontamination and dismantling might make it easier to outsource 
dismantling activities at cheap labour costs because of existing wage differentials 
between employees in the nuclear sector and employees of contractors. 
• Financial benefits  
From the perspective of income there is a major argument for deferred decontami-
nation and dismantling: The longer the provisions accumulated can be invested be-
fore the money is used to pay for decommissioning activities, the longer this money 
can yield interest, thereby either increasing the operator’s profits or reducing re-
quirements of further contributions to the fund or credit borrowing for investments. 
• Costs  
A thorough evaluation and comparison of different strategies is needed in order to 
assess which strategy will be the least-cost while achieving all the nuclear safety 
obligations. For example, for the deferred decontamination and dismantling strat-
egy, it has to be taken into account in how far ancillary equipment can be used for 
decommissioning activities decades after the end of operation. A general question 
is how much cheaper is it to outsource decontamination and dismantling activities 
or to carry them out in-house. Furthermore, total costs also depend on the availabil-
ity of waste management, storage and disposal options, and on the decision about 
the use of the site for other purposes after its release from radiological restrictions. 
However, such cost estimation is not an easy task. Different assumptions on the 
underlying decontamination and dismantling processes, on the technical feasibility 
of possible technical solutions and technical developments, on person-years 
needed, on labour, material/equipment and capital costs, on time horizons, and on 
developments of the labour market and the general economic environment can 
lead to different strategic choices. 
• Financial risk aspects  
Risks and uncertainties of changes in benefits and costs have to be adequately 
taken into account because of all these possible influences, time horizons of sev-
eral decades are considered. For example, a long period of deferment not only 
gives the chance to yield interest over a longer period of time, but includes also a 
higher risk that the funds will be lost or will significantly lose value. 
In most cases, economic arguments with respect to expected financial benefits and 
costs as well as perceived financial risks are the decisive arguments for the operators 
to choose a specific decommissioning strategy, particularly for privately owned facili-
ties. However, there are also strategic or tactical arguments for particular decom-
missioning strategies. One example is the announcement by operators of NPP in 
Germany to switch from the currently preferred immediate dismantling option to de-
ferred dismantling if the government does not decide on a final disposal site for HLW 
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soon enough. This will put pressure on the government to choose the Gorleben site as 
final repository instead of evaluating other possible sites according to (AKEnd 2002).  
The preferred decommissioning strategy can differ from case to case, even within the 
same country. In addition, while decommissioning strategies for NPPs are often widely 
discussed, decommissioning strategies for other facilities are usually not a topic of dis-
cussion at all. For several research reactors (e. g., FRM-II/Germany), no decommis-
sioning plans or cost estimates exist. In the case of uranium mines and mills, other 
front-end and back-end facilities of the nuclear fuel chain, decommissioning strategies 
usually depend on the owner of the facility. With regard to reprocessing plants, site 
restoration of the complex Sellafield site is scheduled to be completed in 2120; the La 
Hague plants UP2-800 and UP 3 are expected to be shut down in 2025 and decom-
missioned between 2040 and 2060. 
Table 2: Overview on strategies currently preferred for future decontamination and dismantling of com-
mercial nuclear power plants in the EU Member States  
Immediate dismantling Deferred dismantling No preference yet 
Countries Countries Duration of safe enclosure  Countries 
B1 
D1 
E 
F2 
FIN (Loviisa) 
IT3 
LT 
NL (Borssele) 
SI5 
BG 
CZ 
FIN (Olkiluoto) 
HU 
NL (Dodewaard) 
S 
UK 
35 years 
35 – 50 years 
30 years 
70 years 
40 years 
10 – 40 years 
up to > 100 years 
SK 
RO4 
1 However, deferred dismantling has not been ruled out, at least for some facilities. Furthermore, 
mixed strategies are discussed, too, in order to optimise employment of labour and costs. 
2 Until the end of the 1990s, deferred dismantling was the preferred option (30 to 50 years).  
3 In fact, there is a delay of more than 15 years since the last shut-down of NPPs in 1987. This 
delay is due to the change in strategy from deferred dismantling to immediate dismantling de-
cided on in 1999. Decommissioning shall now be completed by 2024. 
4 Agreement on decommissioning strategies for the CANDU type reactors planned to be reached 
by end of 2006. 
5 Decommissioning of Krsko NPP starts immediately after its shutdown. However, dry storage of 
spent fuel elements will last for around 60 years, and the time period of storing activated com-
ponents until 2119. 
Table 2 shows which strategies are currently preferred for future decontamination and 
dismantling of commercial nuclear power plants in the countries analysed. It should 
be noted that this overview does not take into account the different reactor types. 
On the one hand, a trend towards immediate or accelerated deferred dismantling 
of commercial NPPs can be perceived in some countries (cf., e.g., the discussions in 
France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands or in Bulgaria, the latter being influenced by the 
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European Commission) (cf. also NEA 2006). Even the discussion in the UK goes into 
such a direction (25 years after shut down of a NPP as suggested by NDA, compared 
to about 100 years as it has been assumed so far). Nuclear safety authorities are 
mostly in favour of immediate dismantling. The reasons given for this include the con-
sideration that the risk of the loss of memory on the conception and operation of a facil-
ity are significant.  
While on the other hand, operators and governments in some other countries do not 
seem to question long term timeframes for decommissioning. Therefore, the ten-
dency reported above is not one which can be generally perceived. 
3.1.4 Estimating decommissioning costs 
3.1.4.1 Identifying future decommissioning costs 
In 1999, NEA/IAEA/EC published “A Proposed Standardised List of Items for Costing 
Purposes in the Decommissioning of Nuclear Installations”. This interim technical 
document recommends categorising the cost items (restricted to decontamination and 
dismantling stage and the management and disposal of wastes arising from these 
stages) into the following eleven groups (NEA/IAEA/EC 1999): 
• Pre-decommissioning actions 
• Facility shutdown activities 
• Procurement of general equipment and material 
• Dismantling activities 
• Waste processing, storage and disposal 
• Site security, surveillance and maintenance 
• Site restoration, cleanup and landscaping 
• Project management, engineering and site support 
• Research and development 
• Fuel and nuclear material 
• Other costs. 
However, the cost estimation methodologies applied for the different nuclear facilities 
analysed for this report mostly do not follow this classification. This will be mainly due 
to the fact that the decision on the cost estimation methodology of the facilities ana-
lysed is mostly older than this standardised list. For example, at Delft University in the 
Netherlands, they have just started developing cost estimates, and there, it is planned 
to follow this NEA/IAEA/EC list. As another example, in Slovenia, a scenario study on 
cost estimates of the year 2004 recommends to follow this list in the future. 
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Furthermore, not all the cost items of the NEA/IAEA/EC list are considered in all the 
cost estimates available. Therefore, a more comprehensive cost estimation for the 
whole of decommissioning needs to cover stages other than decontamination and dis-
mantling (e.g. management and disposal of HLW or spent nuclear fuel). 
The ‘scope’ of cost items taken into account differs from facility to facility. For example, 
the official tables of decommissioning cost estimates of research facilities in Germany 
partly do not include the costs of final disposal. Some cost estimates for NPP do not 
include costs of pre-decommissioning and facility shutdown activities, or they are only 
added if explicitly asked for. Another example is that depending on the decommission-
ing strategy, some nuclear materials which are not classified as waste today are not 
taken into account in some decommissioning cost estimates. However, they might 
have to be managed as waste in the future, for example, uranium extracted in reproc-
essing and depleted uranium, a portion of separated plutonium and spent fuel (in some 
countries high-level waste is recovered from reprocessing spent fuel, while other coun-
tries regard spent fuel itself as high-level waste). In contrast, in Lithuania, cost esti-
mates exist for Ignalina NPP which do not only consider the NEA/IAEA/EC items 
mentioned above but also costs for social measures, costs for regional development, 
and indirect losses of approximately 8 billion Euro. 
In conclusion, the differences in the cost items taken into account in cost estimates 
make a comparison of cost estimates between facilities quite difficult. 
3.1.4.2 Methodologies of estimating future decommissioning costs 
Not only does the ‘scope’ of cost items taken into account differ between facilities but 
also the methodologies of estimating the costs, which further hampers comparability. 
The following table tries to give an overview on the different types of cost estimation 
methodologies for future decommissioning of commercial nuclear power plants in 
the different countries. It should be noted that the level of detail of information gained 
on these methodologies differs between the countries. For single installations, devia-
tions from the approaches presented here might be possible. Furthermore, the way 
decommissioning costs of other nuclear installations are estimated often differ from the 
methodologies used to estimate costs of commercial NPP. Finally, as soon as the 
shutdown of a plant becomes clear, the cost estimation methodologies become more 
sophisticated (‘definitive estimates’ according to the categories in IAEA 2005). 
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Table 3: Overview on accessible information on cost estimation methodologies currently applied for 
estimating decommissioning costs of operating commercial nuclear power plants in the EU 
Member States 
Country Type of cost estimate1 Remarks 
B Budgetary estimate According to art.12 of law of April 2003, Synatom and the NPP 
operator have to provide the monitoring committee with a pro-
posal on revision of methodology for provision of decommis-
sioning, including scenario for decommissioning of NPPs and 
management of spent fissile materials, a detailed cost estima-
tion and planning of expenses (article 12.2). However, so far, 
cost estimates have not been made publicly available. 
BG Order-of-magnitude esti-
mate 
Deterministic cost estimate based on study in 1994-95, com-
parison with similar studies in countries operating WWER-440 
reactors and international figures from (NEA 2003). 
CZ Budgetary estimate Deterministic cost estimates based on standardised work 
breakdown, price lists, catalogue prices, data provided by con-
tractors and expert estimates. Estimates done by engineering 
companies commissioned by CEZ. Revised every five years. 
Approval by RAWRA needed. 
D Budgetary estimate  For dismantling/decontamination/demolition and management 
of waste from dismantling, as far as known, use of NIS-
STILLKO software, with estimates in analogy to a detailed 
deterministic cost estimate of a BWR and a PWR, further de-
veloped taking experiences with decommissioning activities in 
practice and site-specific design aspects into account. 
For other radioactive waste and spent fuel management activi-
ties, cost estimates are mainly based on existing contracts with 
reprocessing or storage facilities, and contracts with transport 
firms. Furthermore, expected costs of conditioning and packag-
ing and contributions to the construction and operation of final 
disposal facilities according to the operators share in expected 
waste volumes have to be taken into account. 
E Budgetary estimate Accessible information on decommissioning costs and cost 
estimation methodologies is limited. Deterministic cost esti-
mates are based on reference cases (anterior projects), studies 
of ENRESA, comparison of calculations made with those in 
other countries or by international organisations. Estimates of 
final disposal costs based on conceptual engineering project. 
No algorithms or special software used. 
F Used to be order-of-
magnitude estimates (15% 
of construction costs); 
some budgetary estimates 
since the 1990s 
Accessible information on decommissioning costs and cost 
estimation methodologies is limited. EDF bases provisions on 
unpublished exemplary cost study for one reactor site. CEAs 
statutory auditors have repeatedly attracted attention to a lack 
of concordance between technical and financial planning of 
CEAs decommissioning projects. 
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Table 3 (continued): Overview on accessible information on cost estimation methodologies currently ap-
plied for estimating decommissioning costs of operating commercial nuclear power plants in the 
EU Member States 
Country Type of cost estimate1 Remarks 
FIN Budgetary estimate Deterministic cost estimates on the basis of proposed plans 
and estimates of workload. Purchasing costs are estimated 
based on empirical data gathering and cost estimates obtained 
from equipment suppliers. Cost estimates have to be confirmed 
by Ministry for Trade and Industry (setting the fund target) on 
the basis of evaluations commissioned by the ministry. 
HU Previous order-of-
magnitude estimate modi-
fied to budgetary estimate 
Before 2003: Just analogies and expert opinion based on (NEA 
1993) and (NEA 1994). Temporary decommissioning plan 
elaborated in 2003 by DECOM company (SK) contains cost 
estimation by the same methodology as applied for Slovak 
Republic Accuracy and precision of data are not known. 
IT Budgetary estimate, partly 
defined estimates 
(no NPP under operation) 
Yearly updated decommissioning plans and deterministic cost 
estimates by SOGIN on the basis of achieved goals and pro-
jected technical activities in compliance with guidelines pro-
vided by Ministry of Productive Activities and controlled by the 
National Authority for Electricity and Gas. 
LT Budgetary estimate Deterministic cost estimates based on a PHARE project in 
2001, updated by local and foreign experts. Two scenarios for 
different labour cost increases. NIS-CALCOM tool used. 
NL Budgetary estimate Deterministic cost estimates based on studies commissioned 
by the operators (e.g., for Dodewaard carried out by NIS and 
Delft University). Price basis is updated regularly. 
RO Budgetary estimate 
planned for end of 2006 
Will be based on technical and economic studies by Nu-
clearElectrica and reference cases from Canada (CANDU 
reactor waste profiles) and (NEA 2003).  
S Budgetary estimate Deterministic cost estimated based on fixed assumptions, with 
differentiation into quantity-related costs (based on design 
specifications, unit prices, etc.), non-quantity related costs 
(based on experience with other projects) and secondary costs 
(based on experiences in construction phase). In addition, 
probabilistic cost estimates are performed to analyse the uncer-
tainties involved. 
SI Budgetary estimate Deterministic cost estimates for seven decommissioning sce-
narios, of which two were singled out. Evaluation of negative 
and positive risks identified. First calculations by NIS. 
SK Budgetary estimate There are algorithms and generally accepted software for the 
deterministic decommissioning cost estimates by the state fund 
for disposal of nuclear facilities 
UK Budgetary estimate There has not been any accessible information on decommis-
sioning cost estimation methodologies in UK. 
1 Categories of cost estimation methodologies according to (IAEA 2005) 
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International studies by OECD-NEA are often used for comparison purposes. As can 
be seen from the table, in few cases they are even the main basis for cost estimates. 
The budgetary, deterministic cost estimates are usually bottom-up ones based, among 
others, on an estimation of workload. 
3.1.4.3 Validity of cost estimates: dealing with economic risks and uncertainties 
As with other complex construction or deconstruction or other engineering projects, 
cost estimates are based on a number of technical and economic assumptions, and on 
assumptions influenced by the political-administrative framework conditions. Therefore, 
there are, of course, financial risks to be taken into account in any ex ante-evaluation 
of decommissioning project costs. In order to provide for this, for example, in France, 
national regulation demands dismantling cost estimates to be conservative ones.  
However, there are further extraordinary economic risks and uncertainties which are 
specific to the nuclear industry, and which are explained in the following. For commer-
cial NPPs and partly also research reactors and uranium mines, the validity of cost 
estimates increases over time, with more and more facilities being decommissioned, 
with the list of cost items included in the cost estimates becoming more and more 
complete, and, recently, with even larger commercial NPPs being in the process of 
decommissioning. For these installations, the highest risks and uncertainties with re-
gard to decommissioning costs remain those  
• of incidents and accidents during operation and during decommissioning, 
• of wrong pre-evaluation of contamination levels of facility components and the envi-
ronment, 
• of political decisions which change the framework conditions for decommissioning 
activities,  
• of the availability of nuclear knowledge at the time decommissioning activities 
should be implemented,  
• of unexpected evolution of radioactive waste management, storage and disposal 
costs, and 
• of general economic development. 
(Pfeifer/Gordelier/Drake 2004) expect that such risks, for which probabilities are known 
or can be estimated, and uncertainties, which cannot be estimated, regularly appear in 
decommissioning projects: Decommissioning projects would “regularly produce the 
unexpected”.  
In this context, it should be noted that political decisions and expectations cannot only 
increase but also reduce economic uncertainties and risks. For example, in Italy, the 
decision to complete dismantling of all NPPs by 2024 sets a clear timeframe for de-
commissioning activities and respective cost estimates. Another example is the deci-
sion in Germany to phase-out nuclear energy and the limitation of nuclear energy 
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allowed to be produced by each NPP, and in Belgium after a limited operational life-
time. The mutual agreement between the German government and the energy compa-
nies - combined with the current preference for the immediate dismantling solution - 
narrows the possible timeframes for the start of dismantling activities. The situation is 
similar in Belgium. 
However, for many other facility types, economic risks and uncertainties are substan-
tially higher, particularly since there is little experience with plants already being de-
commissioned or currently undergoing decommissioning. This is particularly true for 
cost estimates of (decommissioning of) back-end facilities like reprocessing plants, 
conditioning plants or the installation of final disposal facilities for which various techni-
cal options are still under discussion.  
Again, political decisions can contribute to an increase or reduction in such financial 
risks and uncertainties. For example, the German decision not to allow the reprocess-
ing option for spent fuel after 1 July 2005 not only directly reduced back-end costs in 
Germany but also the large financial uncertainties and risks associated with the re-
processing option. This decision was part of the agreement between the federal gov-
ernment and the energy companies of 14 June 2000. Another example is the decision 
in Italy to move away from the previous waste management strategy of performing the 
interim dry storage of the spent fuel on the plant sites, waiting for the availability of a 
national repository. A decree in the year 2004 now gives SOGIN, the state-owned 
company in charge of dismantling all NPP and five fuel cycle plants, the freedom to 
consider the reprocessing option. This increases the range of possible cost estimates 
and risks and uncertainties linked to them. 
Risks and uncertainties not dealt with in available cost estimates are risks of terrorist 
assaults on nuclear facilities under decommissioning, or of transport of radioactive 
waste. 
Against this background, it is surprising that hardly any of the existing cost estimates of 
decommissioning of nuclear facilities in Europe deals with economic risks and uncer-
tainties, at least not explicitly and not in an appropriate way. In few cases, there are 
sensitivity or scenario analyses with respect to different input factors or framework 
conditions. Examples are  
• the case of Lithuania where different wage levels have been assumed for 
decommissioning workers in two different scenarios,   
• the above mentioned case of ANDRA’s scenario calculation of geological disposal 
costs in France, 
• EDF’s and CEA’s separate estimates of Marcoule decommissioning costs in 
France where the differences could well be due to different company interests in 
the cost evaluation, 
• Probabilistic cost estimates performed in Sweden in addition to deterministic ones. 
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However, it might be assumed that, in a competitive environment, many decision mak-
ers in operating companies will base their decisions not only on one deterministic cost 
estimate. Instead, they will more and more have to carry out sensitivity or scenario 
analyses or even simulations in order to identify the least-cost solutions. However, 
such analyses are either not published (except for some installations like the ones 
listed above), or they do not exist.  
3.1.4.4 Decommissioning cost estimates in practice 
The analysis has shown that decommissioning cost estimates differ according to  
• the political-administrative framework for decommissioning, 
• the decommissioning strategy chosen, 
• the cost items taken into account (‘scope’ of the cost estimate), 
• the origin of the cost estimate, 
• the methodology applied, and 
• the way risks and uncertainties are taken into account. 
Another problem of comparability between cost estimation figures published is that 
some of them are undiscounted costs, some are discounted cost estimates. 
Although the numbers are hardly comparable with each other, the decommissioning 
cost estimates collected in the course of the country analyses are listed in Table 6 (for 
other cost estimates, cf., e.g., NEA 2003 which was already mentioned as a basis used 
for analogy cost estimation techniques in few countries; for more details cf. the country 
reports in the Appendix to this final report). It is not within the scope of this study to 
compare and evaluate these cost estimates with respect to the question in how far they 
are realistic or appropriate.  
However, the following examples give an impression of the broad range of available 
cost estimates: 
• Decommissioning of the research reactor TR Budapest in Hungary is expected to 
cost 1 million Euro. 
• Decommissioning of the uranium mill Saelices el Chico in Spain is expected to cost 
5.5 million Euro. 
• On average, undiscounted decommissioning costs for the four NPPs in Dukovany, 
Czech Republic, are estimated at 145 million Euro2003 per plant, not including spent 
fuel and radioactive waste management. 
• According to information by the operator E.ON of 2004 and 2006, decommissioning 
of the German NPP Würgassen will probably cost about 700 million Euro in total, 
not including radioactive waste and spent fuel management during operation. 
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• On average, discounted decommissioning costs for the NPPs in Doel, Tihange, 
Belgium, are estimated at 1,393 million Euro per plant, including spent fuel man-
agement. 
• On average, undiscounted decommissioning costs for the two INPP units in Lithua-
nia are estimated at 1,8502003 million Euro per plant, not including final disposal 
costs. 
• Decommissioning of the uranium mine Wismut in Germany is expected to cost 
about 6.2 billion Euro, not including any compensation for cancer of uranium min-
ers. 
• Remaining decommissioning costs of the complex Sellafield site, UK, are expected 
to amount to more than 52 billion Euro. 
With respect to the decommissioning financing system, it is important to keep in mind 
the different factors influencing the cost estimates, and the large risks and uncertainties 
associated at least with part of them. 
3.1.5 Setting aside funds 
After the costs have been estimated, it has to be determined, if, when and how funds 
should be set aside before and/or during plant operation.  
Accruals are usually set up in regular instalments or according to the electrical energy 
produced. However, in France, with the new legislation of June 2006, provisions for 
dismantling and decontamination (technical decommissioning in a narrow sense) of a 
nuclear facility have to be fully collected already with start of operation. However, EDF 
is granted a transition period until 2010 to build up provisions according to this legisla-
tion. In Sweden and Finland, special requirements exist which demand to cover full 
liabilities already at the start of operation by special financial securities (cf. Chapter 
3.1.7.1). 
How the provisions are collected, when the option ‘regular instalments’ is used, de-
pends, among other things, on the assumptions (expectations) about the lifetime of a 
nuclear installation during which revenues can be generated and provisions set up, 
and, most important, on the discount rate used.  
With the net present value method, a positive discount rate is used, with the current 
value method, the discount rate is assumed to be zero. The determination of the rate of 
discount is a central problem of any kind of project evaluation (cf., e.g., [Oel-
ert/Auer/Pertz 1988] or [Hennicke/Becker 1995]). Depending on the perspective of 
analysis adopted (e.g., micro- or macroeconomic view), on the system boundaries 
drawn and on the availability of alternatives, on the time preferences and expectations 
on inflation assumed, and on the marginal utilities of the decision makers, a different 
discount rate can be applied. 
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With the current value method or a low rate of discount, the provisions have to be ac-
cumulated more rapidly than with the net present value method or a high discount rate. 
The net present value method is extremely sensitive to assumptions regarding the pre-
cise timing of future liabilities and to the discount rate used. The real discount rate as-
sumed usually takes inflation (expected decommissioning cost escalation) and nominal 
interest rates (interest from investing the money collected in the decommissioning fund 
until it is needed for paying decommissioning activities) into account. The scheduled 
timing of future decommissioning and waste management activities, i. e. the target year 
from which liabilities are discounted, thereby varies from country to country (cf. the 
chapter on decommissioning strategies). Furthermore, in countries, in which the provi-
sion of accruals relies upon the accounting standards prevailing in the industry for re-
porting liabilities, the accounting method depends on the accounting standard used 
(e.g. US-GAAP, IAS, national commercial code). 
The following table gives an overview of typical procedures of how funds are collected 
in the different countries differentiating between provisions based on discounted and 
undiscounted (‘overnight’) costs. This table is not exhaustive but all important installa-
tions are covered.  
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Table 4: Overview on procedures how decommissioning funds are set aside in the EU Member States 
and Romania.  
Kind of facility No pro-
visions 
made 
Provisions based on discounted costs Provisions 
based on un-
discounted 
costs 
 Country Country Nominal 
discount rate 
applied  
Inflation rate Real 
discount 
rate 
Countries 
Uranium 
mine/mill
1 
most 
countries 
E 
F 
IPC
9 
5.0% 
IPC
9
 
2.0% 
0.0% 
2.94% 
 
Research reac-
tors 
D 
IT 
NL 
RO 
HU 
UK 
S 
F 
B 
 
5.0% 
? 
 
2.0% 
? 
various
8 
2.94% 
? 
CZ 
FIN 
NPP 
 
RO 
UK
13 
D
2
  
F 
S 
E 
NL 
SI 
LT
12
 
HU 
B 
UK
14
 
UK
15 
5.5% 
5.0% 
 
 
4.0% 
4.29% 
 
 
? 
Indirectly
3
 
2.0% 
 
 
Indirectly
3
 
0.73% 
 
 
? 
5.5% 
2.94% 
various
8 
1.5% 
4.0% 
3.53% 
3.0% 
3.0%
10
 
? 
2.2% 
3.0% 
D
4 
CZ 
SK 
IT 
FIN 
LT
12 
Uranium con-
version, enrich-
ment and fuel 
fabrication 
plants 
RO 
UK 
NL, D 
F 
IAS 37
5 
5.0% 
Indirectly
3
 
2.0% 
IAS 37
5
 
2.94% 
 
Reprocessing 
plants 
B
11 UK14 
F 
 
5.0% 
 
2.0% 
2.2% 
2.94% 
 
Storage, dis-
posal 
UK CZ6 
HU 
B 
NL 
? 
 
? 
? 
 
? 
? 
3.0%
10
 
? 
3.0% 
CZ
7 
 This selection is not meant to be exhaustive. Information for Bulgaria could not be gained in the 
course of this study. 
1 Most of the uranium mines in Europe are shut down, decommissioned or in the process of de-
commissioning. 
2 German tax balance sheets (quite similar but not necessarily identical in balance sheets accord-
ing to IFRS/US-GAAP: cf. IAS 37, IFRIC 1) 
3 Updates of cost estimates from time to time taking price increases into account. 
4 Balance sheets according to German commercial code 
5 According to IFRS (IAS 37), liabilities have to be discounted taking market interest rates and 
liability risks into account (cf. Chapter 4 for more details on the IFRS). 
6 Repository Dukovany, CZ 
7 ISFSF Dukovany, CZ 
8 Depending on the respective period (2005-2020; after 2020) different real discount rates are 
applied (3.25%; 2.5%) 
9 Consumer price index (ENUSA is a public sector company). 
10 Recalculated every year based on interest gained and inflation rate. 
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11 Decommissioning activities are financed via an annual federal government contribution until the 
year 2008. 
12 Discount rate used only when calculating costs for choosing decommissioning strategy. 3.0% 
for dismantling only. 
13 Magnox and NDA plants. 
14 NDA plants’ discounting of costs; however, there are no provisions really made. 
15 British Energy’s plants; however, in fact, provisions depend on ability to pay. 
 
 
The following table which is not meant to be exhaustive gives an overview on decom-
missioning funds accumulated in relation to expected total costs of future decommis-
sioning of nuclear installations in the European Member States, as far as this 
information could be received in the course of the country analysis. The comparison of 
the ratio of provisions accumulated to expected costs with the ratio of years of opera-
tion to expected lifetime clearly indicates, in most cases, the collection of provisions 
lags behind the accumulation of liabilities. This is despite a large fixed part of the 
nuclear liabilities already arises with start of operation. However, it should be noted 
that, by its nature, discounting of provisions, where applied, strongly contributes to this 
lag. 
Possible sources of decommissioning financing as identified in the different countries 
are 
• income of the operator from selling electricity or other operator’s income; fees paid 
by the operator to the fund 
• general levy (surcharge) on the electricity tariff 
• donations from other countries, international organisations, the European Union or 
financial institutions 
• contributions (subsidies) by national or regional governments 
• interest / profits from the financial operations of the fund 
• benefits from estate or equipment sold before or during decommissioning 
• penalties imposed by the nuclear authority according to special regulations. 
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Table 5 Decommissioning funds accumulated in relation to expected total costs of future decommissioning of nuclear installations in the European Member States. 
Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
Kind of facility Total decommissioning 
costs estimated  
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions  
accumulated by 31-
12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions accumu-
lated in relation to 
expected costs  
[%] 
Years of operation until 
31-12-2004 in relation to 
total expected lifetime 
[%] 
BE Doel, Tihange 7 NPPs + spent fuel 
management 
2,300 (discounted) 
7,450 (discounted) 
1,376 
2,540 
60% 
34%  
various 
BE EUROCHEMIC Reprocessing Plant 203.3  
(EUR2004, discounted) 
  100 
BG Kozloduy unit 1 NPP 
BG Kozloduy unit 2 NPP 
BG Kozloduy unit 3 NPP 
BG Kozloduy unit 4 NPP 
BG Kozloduy unit 5 NPP 
BG Kozloduy unit 6 NPP 
 
 
 
2.6 billion Euro 
550 million Euro from 
EU + 280 million Euro 
in decomm. funds + 69 
million Euro in radioac-
tive waste manage-
ment funds 
 
 
35% 
 
 
21/30 as a rough weighted 
average of the 6 plants. 
BG Uranium mine Uranium mine     
BG IRT Sofia RR     
Dokovany 1 
Dokovany 2 
Dokovany 3 
CZ 
Dokovany 4 
NPP > 580 (price basis 2003) 
(the 580 do not include any 
costs for waste management 
and disposal) 
137 24% 48 
Temelin 1 CZ 
Temelin 2 
NPP > 480 (price basis 2004) 
(the 480 do not include any 
costs for waste management 
and disposal) 
28 6% 10 
CZ LVR-15 Research reactor 4.4 (price basis unclear) 2.5 55% 61.5 
CZ ISFSF Dukovany Interim storage 0.4 (price basis 2004) 0.018 4% 11 
CZ Repository Duk-
ovany 
Repository (above 
ground) 
23 (price basis unclear)    
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Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
Kind of facility Total decommissioning 
costs estimated  
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions  
accumulated by 31-
12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions accumu-
lated in relation to 
expected costs  
[%] 
Years of operation until 
31-12-2004 in relation to 
total expected lifetime 
[%] 
CZ RAWRA activities Waste management 1,490 (own estimate of all 
activities related to Dukovany 
and Temelin based upon 40 
years lifetime and current 
contribution of 50 CZK/MWh 
to Nuclear Account) 
211 14% n.a. 
DE E.ON Corporate 
group 
Several NPP (41.7% 
of total German NPP 
capacity in 2006) 
12,907  
DE RWE corporate 
group 
Several NPP (27.1% 
of total German NPP 
capacity in 2006) 
9,473  
DE EnBW corporate 
group 
Several NPP (21.4% 
of total German NPP 
capacity in 2006) 
Information on site-specific 
provisions is not accessible 
3,920 
Information on site-
specific provisions is 
not accessible 
 
DE Stadtwerke 
München 
Share in KKI 2  679   
DE GKN 1 NPP 81.8 
DE GKN 2 NPP 44.1 
DE KKP 1 NPP 72.7 
DE KKP 2 NPP 55.9 
DE KKG NPP 66.7 
DE KRB-B NPP 51.4 
DE KRB-C NPP 48.7 
DE KKI 1 NPP 74.3 
DE KKI 2 NPP 46.9 
DE KWB A NPP 82.9 
DE KWB B NPP 
 Information on site-
specific provisions is 
not accessible 
 
69.2 
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Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
Kind of facility Total decommissioning 
costs estimated  
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions  
accumulated by 31-
12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions accumu-
lated in relation to 
expected costs  
[%] 
Years of operation until 
31-12-2004 in relation to 
total expected lifetime 
[%] 
DE KKE NPP 1,709 39.5 
DE KWG NPP 1,401 55.9 
DE KKU NPP Information on site-
specific provisions is 
not accessible 
73.5 
DE KBR NPP 1,577 51.5 
DE KKB NPP 1,354 79.4 
DE KKK NPP 1,806 58.8 
DE KWO NPP 880 94.6 
DE KKS NPP 1,204 100 
DE KMK NPP 
 
Information on site-
specific provisions is 
not accessible 
 
100 
DE KWW NPP (> 700) Information on site-
specific provisions is 
not accessible 
According to E.ON, 
provisions should be 
more or less sufficient 
100 
DE KKR NPP 100 
DE KGR 1 NPP 100 
DE KGR 2 NPP 100 
DE KGR 3 NPP 100 
DE KGR 4 NPP 100 
DE KGR 5 NPP 
3,200 No nuclear provisions 
because liability is 
with the Federal gov-
ernment and not with 
EWN GmbH 
0% 
100 
DE AVR NPP ca. 500 Paid out of public 
budget, therefore 0 
0% 100 
DE KKN NPP 150    100 
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Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
Kind of facility Total decommissioning 
costs estimated  
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions  
accumulated by 31-
12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions accumu-
lated in relation to 
expected costs  
[%] 
Years of operation until 
31-12-2004 in relation to 
total expected lifetime 
[%] 
DE THTR-300 NPP (444) ?  100 
DE MZFR NPP 275  100 
DE KNK-II NPP 291 100 
DE FRM-II RR ? ? 
DE FRJ-1 RR 26  100 
DE FRJ-2 RR 100 ? 
DE FRG-1 RR 100 ? 
DE FRG-2 RR  100 
DE FR-2 RR 55 
Paid out of public 
budget, therefore 0 
0% 
100 
DE URENCO Enrichment No site-specific data accessible. Only data for the URENCO group as a whole: By the end of 2005, 
URENCO’s provisions in the company’s balance sheet for all the URENCO sites in total amount to 129 Mio. 
Euro for tails disposal, 157 Mio. Euro for dismantling of plant and machinery and 19 Mio. Euro for other, 
also non-nuclear purposes. 
DE ANF Fuel fabrication Information not accessible 
DE WAK Reprocessing, com-
plex site 
2,230 Paid out of public 
budget, therefore 0 
0% 100 
DE ITU-JRC Research facilities 389 Paid out of the EC 
budget, therefore 0 
0%  
DE Wismut Uranium mine    100 
ES Lobo (La Haba, 
Badajoz) 
Mina and Planta 
Lobo-G 
Mine and Mill (no 
separated costs for m 
available) 
8,4 (2006 estimate) N/A 100% 100 
ES Fábrica de Uranio 
de Andujar (FUA) 
(Andujar Uranium 
Mill-AUM) 
 
Uranium Mill - - - - 
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Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
Kind of facility Total decommissioning 
costs estimated  
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions  
accumulated by 31-
12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions accumu-
lated in relation to 
expected costs  
[%] 
Years of operation until 
31-12-2004 in relation to 
total expected lifetime 
[%] 
ES Saelices el Chico 
(Salamanca) 
Planta Elefante 
Uranium Mill 5,5 (2006 estimate) - - - 
ES Saelices el Chico 
(Salamanca) – 
Planta Quercus 
Uranium Mill 4,6 (2006 estimate) - - - 
ES Saelices el Chico 
(Salamanca) –  
La mina 
Uranium Mill 58,7 (2006 estimate) - - - 
ES Arbi Experimental 
reactor Bilbao 
Research reactor N/A N/A N/A N/A 
ES Vandellos 1 NPP > 224.3 (stage 3; 2006 esti-
mate) 
   
ES José Cabrera NPP >130.8 (spent fuel + stage 3; 
2006 estimate) 
   
ES Ascó I NPP >206.5 (spent fuel + stage 3; 
2006 estimate) 
   
FIN OL 1+2 (TVO) NPP 827  
(2005 estimate) 
827  42 
FIN Lo 1+2 (FPH) NPP 618  
(2005 estimate) 
618  50 
FIN FiR 1 (VTT) RR 5.3  
(2005 estimate) 
5.3  88 
FR EDF NPPs and waste 48,187 
(2006 estimate) 
24,705 51% Various 
FR CEA Research, fuel cycle 
and waste 
13,211 
(2006 estimate) 
8,602 65% Various 
FR AREVA  Fuel cycle and waste 
 
8,258 (2006 estimate) 4,332 52% Various 
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Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
Kind of facility Total decommissioning 
costs estimated  
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions  
accumulated by 31-
12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions accumu-
lated in relation to 
expected costs  
[%] 
Years of operation until 
31-12-2004 in relation to 
total expected lifetime 
[%] 
FR SOMANU 
Maubeuge 
Nuclear Maintenance  10 
(2006 estimate) 
6 66% 33 
HU NPP Paks NPP 2,523 
(2005 estimate) 
261 11 46 
HU ISFSF Paks SF storage site Together with NPP Together with NPP Together with NPP 10 
HU BRR Budapest RR 4.7 
(2005 estimate) 
Will not be financed 
from CNFF 
- <72 
HU TR Budapest RR 1 
(2005 estimate) 
Will not be financed 
from CNFF 
- <61 
IT SOGIN facilities  Diverse 4,029 (EUR 2004) 
(w/o costs of final disposal) 
570 still in the bal-
ance sheet, 800 in 
total transferred from 
ENEL (SOGIN) 
n.a. (CCSE) 
ca. 20% 
(ENEL->SOGIN) 
n.a. 
(CCSE) 
100 
IT ISPRA – JRC 
facilities 
RR 645 Paid out of the EC 
budget, therefore 0 
0.0% 100 
IT LENA Triga II  RR No decommissioning plan, no cost calculations, no provisions yet. 
LT INPP Unit 1 and 2 NPP ~ EUR 3700 million 
~ EUR 2020 million for im-
mediate dismantling strategy 
(see also Table 3) and EUR 
600 million for waste man-
agement (except of final 
disposal) (EUR 2002) 
By 2006: EUR 560 
million from all 
sources 
28% of immediate 
strategy costs 
15% of overall de-
commissioning costs 
Unit 1 – 100% (prema-
ture closure at 31 12 
2004) 
 
Unit 2 – 74% (expected 
premature closure at the 
end of 2009) 
NL Dodewaard NPP 175  
(undiscounted) 
75 
(discounted)  
114  
(for all remaining 
decommissioning 
liabilities) 
100% (compared to 
remaining liabilities 
100 
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Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
Kind of facility Total decommissioning 
costs estimated  
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions  
accumulated by 31-
12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions accumu-
lated in relation to 
expected costs  
[%] 
Years of operation until 
31-12-2004 in relation to 
total expected lifetime 
[%] 
NL Borssele  NPP 700  
(undiscounted) 
145 
(discounted) 
163.6 23.4% 
(undiscounted) 
100.0% 
(discounted) 
51 
NL URENCO Almelo Enrichment facility No site-specific data accessible. Only data for the URENCO group as a whole: By the end of 2005, 
URENCO’s provisions in the company’s balance sheet for all the URENCO sites in total amount to 129 Mio. 
Euro for tails disposal, 157 Mio. Euro for dismantling of plant and machinery and 19 Mio. Euro for other, 
also non-nuclear purposes. 
NL Petten nuclear 
reactor (HFR) 
(JRC Site) 
RR 69 5 (2003) 7.2% Not decided yet, maybe 
83% 
NL HOR-RID, TU 
Delft 
RR Not calculated yet 0 0.0% Not decided yet 
NL COVRA Waste management 
& disposal 
1,270 
 (disposal only) 
85.3 6.7% ca. 10% – 20% 
RO Cernavoda 1 NPP N/A 0 0 2.7 
RO Cernavoda 2 NPP N/A 0 0 - 
RO Horia Hulubei, 
Magurele, Bukar-
est 
RR 16 0 0 100 
RO TRIGA, Mioveni, 
Pitesti 
RR 100 0 0 49 
RO CNU Bihor Uranium mine N/A 0 0 100 
RO CNU Banat Uranium mine N/A 0 0 100 
RO CNU Suceava Uranium mine N/A 0 0 N/A 
RO CNU Feldioara Milling facility for 
uranium ore 
N/A 0 0 N/A 
RO FCN, Mioveni, 
Pitesti 
Fuel fabrication plant N/A 0 0 N/A 
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Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
Kind of facility Total decommissioning 
costs estimated  
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions  
accumulated by 31-
12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
Provisions accumu-
lated in relation to 
expected costs  
[%] 
Years of operation until 
31-12-2004 in relation to 
total expected lifetime 
[%] 
SE B1, B2 NPP 510 (EUR 2004) 510 100% 100 
SE F1, F2, F3 NPP 1,180 (EUR 2004) 1100 93% 53-78 
SE O1, O2, O3 NPP 890 (EUR 2004) 850 97% 53-85 
SE R1, R2, R3, R4 NPP 1,250 (EUR 2004) 1210 96% 58-78 
SI Krko Nuclear 
Power Plant 
NPP 1,149.3  
(undiscounted) 
338.5 (EUR 2002) 
(discounted) 
115 10.0% 
(undiscounted) 
34.0% 
(discounted) 
52.5 
SI TRIGA Mark II RR Not calculated yet 0 0.0% Not decided yet 
SI Central interim 
storage of radio-
active waste in 
Brinje 
storage of radioactive 
waste 
Not calculated yet 0 0.0% Not decided yet 
SI Zirovski Vrh Ura-
nium Mine and 
Milll; Waste Pile 
Jazbec 
Uranium Mine and 
Mill 
Not known 0 0.0% 100 
SK A1 J. Bohunice  NPP 378 (EUR 2004) 5 years, 25 
SK V1 J. Bohunice NPP 1,884 (EUR 2004) 28 years 75 
SK V2 J. Bohunice NPP 1,620 (EUR 2004) 28 years 75 
SK JE Mochovce 1,2 NPP 1,620 (EUR 2004) 
324  ca 6 % 
 
5 years 14 
UK British Energy 
facilities 
8 NPP sites (9,892 
MWe) 
1,137 (NLF)  
(31 March 2005) 
?% various 
UK All other civilian 
facilities 
Diverse facilities 
about 12,900 in total 
0 (NDA) 0.0% various 
Source: Cf. the country reports attached to this final report for additional information, assumptions made and the sources used for this table. This selection is not 
meant to be exhaustive and only covers the facilities analysed in more detail in the course of this study. If no other information is given, cost estimates listed 
will be undiscounted costs.  
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3.1.6 Management and investment of funds  
3.1.6.1 Overview on fund management systems 
Basically, decommissioning financing schemes can be differentiated into  
• payment of decommissioning activities from the current budget of public authorities; 
• internal unrestricted fund of private licensees; 
• internal restricted fund; 
• external unrestricted fund; 
• External restricted fund. 
Furthermore, it can be differentiated between funds management by public or private 
fund managers. Table 6 gives an overview on decommissioning financing systems of 
private and public licensees in Europe. Payment from current budget can be under-
stood as a kind of internal unrestricted fund of a public licensee. 
Table 6: Overview on decommissioning financing systems in Europe.  
Kind of facility Payment from 
current budget 
Internal External 
  Unrestricted Restricted  Unrestricted Restricted 
Uranium 
mine/mill1 
e.g., D, CZ  e.g., F   
Research reac-
tors 
e.g., D, E, UK, 
IT, B 
e.g., CZ  e.g., F, CZ   
NPP UK (NDA) D, B, NL,  
IT (SOGIN-
ENEL), CZ  
F, CZ IT (CCSE) FIN, LT, S, 
UK (NLF: 
British 
Energy), 
SK, E, BG, 
HU, SI 
Uranium con-
version, enrich-
ment and fuel 
fabrication 
plants 
UK D, NL F   
Reprocessing 
plants 
D, UK  F   
Storage, dis-
posal 
e.g., D, UK  e.g., E, F, NL 
(COVRA) 
 e.g., FIN, 
S, CZ 
This selection is not meant to be exhaustive. There are no provisions for decommissioning in Romania yet. 
Source: Wuppertal Institute, et al., 2006 
3.1.6.2 Internally and externally managed funds 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, funds can be differentiated into internal and ex-
ternal ones, with payment of decommissioning costs from current budget as a special 
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kind of internal financing scheme. For most of the non-NPP facilities, such internal 
financing systems exist – particularly for several research facilities - without setting 
aside any provisions at all, and with payments from the current budget (and maybe 
from additional annual income from operation). In few countries, internal funds exist for 
NPPs, too (internal funds managed by the operator in Belgium, France, Germany, 
Netherlands; payment from current budget and from income from operation at NDA in 
UK; part of the provisions accumulated with SOGIN in Italy – former ENEL provisions). 
With regard to the external funds, the degree of independency from the operators or 
the government by law or in practice differs from case to case as well as the role of the 
Parliament, of scientists, and of the municipalities concerned. In several cases, the 
external fund is solely controlled by the government. In all cases of external funds, 
government has a very strong position. This is shown by the following examples: 
• In the Slovak Republic, the ‘National Fund for Decommissioning of Nuclear Facili-
ties and for Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel Management’ is managed by the 
government. Members of the Board of Trustees are appointed by the Ministry of 
Economy. Members of the Supervisory Board are a deputy of the Authority for Nu-
clear Supervision and four members designated by different ministries. 
• In Spain, the fund is managed by the public sector company ENRESA fully con-
trolled by the government.  As is the ‘Nuclear Liabilities Fund’ in the UK which cov-
ers liabilities of British Energy plants.  
• In Italy, part of the means of finance to cover decommissioning costs comes from 
the state-governed ‘Cassia conjugation per ill set tore electric (CCSE)’ which allo-
cates surcharges on the electricity price for several purposes, among others, de-
commissioning. The CCSE is an external unrestricted fund of the state, i.e. that the 
money not directly needed to pay the organisation (SOGIN) responsible for de-
commissioning activities is used by the state for other purposes of public interest 
that are not possible to identify analytically. However, the state remains responsible 
for guaranteeing the pertinent cost coverage during all phases of decommissioning. 
• In Bulgaria, the ‘Nuclear Facilities Decommissioning Fund’ and the ‘Radioactive 
Waste Management Fund’ are managed by the Bulgarian National Bank and fully 
controlled by the Bulgarian government. The ‘Kozloduy International Decommis-
sioning Support Fund’ is to all intents and purposes an EU fund governed by con-
tributors and managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development’s nuclear safety team. 
• In Lithuania, the ‘State Enterprise Ignalina NPP Decommissioning Fund’ is man-
aged by governmental authorities in the ‘National Fund-Council of the Fund’. Its 
members are representatives of the state, municipal and scientific institutions and 
the operating company. Changes in the management of the fund will come into 
force in 2007. For example, it will be introduced that Parliament will have to ap-
prove annual budget and report of the fund. The ‘Ignalina International Decommis-
sioning Support Fund’ is to all intents and purposes an EU fund governed by 
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contributors and managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment’s nuclear safety team.  
• In Hungary, the Atomic Energy Authority (which is supervised by the Ministry of 
Justice and Law Enforcement in terms of its budget) manages the fund which is a 
dedicated State Treasury account. The value of the annual accruals is influenced 
by Parliament through a annual budgetary Act. 
• In Slovenia, the independent state-governed funding organisation ‘Financial Fund 
for Financing of Krsko NPP’ is controlled by the Slovene Parliament as well as by 
the Slovene Government. According to stakeholders interviewed, Parliament’s in-
fluence should not be neglected. 
• In the Czech Republic, there is a difference between reserves in internal restricted 
funds owned by the energy companies (‘blocked accounts’), provisions paid to the 
Nuclear Account and internal unrestricted funds of CEZ and UJV Rez. The Radio-
active Waste Repository Authority annually reviews the internal ‘blocked accounts’ 
and has to approve any withdrawal of funds. The external Nuclear Account is man-
aged by the Ministry of Finance. 
• In Finland, the members of the board of the ‘State Nuclear Waste Management 
Fund’ are nominated by the government. The fund has two auditors, one of whom 
is selected by the operators of the NPP. 
• Two of the up to seven members of the board of the Nuclear Waste Fund in Swe-
den, all nominated by the government, are proposed by reactor licensees or by a 
body representing them. 
3.1.6.3 Restricted and unrestricted fund management 
In some countries and for some facilities, specific restrictions (special legal require-
ments for nuclear decommissioning funds exist that go beyond general rules like gen-
eral accounting principles, general tax law, etc) are imposed on managers of internal or 
external funds, for example, with regard to  
• the way funds have to be accumulated 
• the investment of the financial means collected until they are used to pay for de-
commissioning activities 
• the payment for decommissioning costs 
• the regular reporting on funds and fund management 
• the control by the public (e.g., government, parliament, special boards, information 
rights of the public). 
Typical examples of investment restrictions and guarantees required for internal 
or external funds in practice are: 
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• Borrowing against securities in Finland: The part of liability that is not covered by 
the financial means in the fund must always be fully guaranteed. License holders 
are entitled to borrow back 75% of the capital of the fund against securities and at 
current interest rates. 
• In Sweden, assets of the Nuclear Waste Fund are to be deposited in interest bear-
ing accounts at the National Debt Office or invested in promissory notes issued by 
the state. 
• In Slovenia, it can be invested 
– not less than 30% in state bonds 
– not more than 5% in stock 
– not more than 15% in other bonds 
– not more than 5% in stocks of one issuer 
– approximately 10% in securities on foreign financial markets. 
• In the Czech Republic, the funds at the Nuclear Account can only be invested into 
liquid government bonds, bonds of the Czech National Bank, bonds of the Czech 
National Bank, state guaranteed bonds or in securities of issuers with high rating 
level. The internal blocked accounts have to be managed with a bank which has to 
ensure persistent liquidity (savings accounts with fixed rates of interest). 
• In the Slovak Republic, there are several restrictions with regard to the use of the 
financial means, for example, credits or loans to the operator cannot be provided. 
• In Spain, there is only a general principle that the ENRESA fund should be man-
aged with respect to the guiding principles of security, profitability and liquidity. 
• In France, assets of the internal restricted funds are protected by law and have to 
present a „sufficient degree of security and liquidity in order to serve their objec-
tive“. 
• In the Netherlands, there is a new regulation since October 2006 stating that opera-
tors of new NPP, from the first loading of the core, are required to lower financial 
risks of decommissioning by setting up provisions for the entire decommissioning 
cost. This could be via  insurance, a bank guarantee, a dedicated fund or other in-
strument offering equal safeguards (e. g., by using bank products).  
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3.1.6.4 Performance of nuclear decommissioning fund management 
The performance of nuclear decommissioning fund management is usually not known 
for internal unrestricted funds, but even not known for all restricted or external funds. 
Some information on interest gained by asset management of financial means of ex-
ternal funds and further information on fund management and investment is depicted in 
Table 8: 
• In Finland, performance in 2004 was 2.7%/year. 
• In Slovenia, performance in 2004 was 9.6%/year (8.56%/year on average between 
2000 and 2004). 
• In Sweden, average performance between 2000 and 2004 was 6.9%/year. 
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Table 7 Internal or external management of decommissioning funds in the European Member States.  
Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumu-
lated within the 
own assets of the 
operator of the 
facility or its 
mother company 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumulated 
by the operator of 
the facility or its 
mother company 
within a separated 
account / fund 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been 
accumulated 
in an exter-
nal fund 
under public 
control 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been ac-
cumulated in 
an external 
fund under 
mixed private-
public control 
[Mio. EUR] 
Share of funds the 
operator of the facil-
ity can access for 
other activities until 
the funds are needed 
for their original 
decommissioning 
purpose [%] 
BE Doel, Tihange 7 NPPs 
+ spent fuel 
management 
1,376 
2,540 
1,376  
2,540 
(within daughter 
company) 
   75% 
BG EBRD funds for 
Kozloduy unit 1 to 
4  
NPP 550 
 
  550  0 
BG Decomm- Funds 
for Kozloduy 1 to 6 
NPP 280  280   0 
BG Radwaste Man. 
Funds for Ko-
zloduy 1 to 6 
NPP 69  69   0 
BG IRT Sofia RR       
BG Uranium mine Uranium mine       
CZ Dokovany 1-4 NPP 137 101.7 34.9   74% 
CZ Temelin 1-2 NPP 28 7.4 20.7   26% 
CZ LVR-15 Research reac-
tor 
2.5 2.44 0.06   98% 
CZ ISFSF Dukovany Interim storage 0.018 0.006 0.0126   31% 
CZ RAWRA activities Waste man-
agement 
 
211   211   
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Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumu-
lated within the 
own assets of the 
operator of the 
facility or its 
mother company 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumulated 
by the operator of 
the facility or its 
mother company 
within a separated 
account / fund 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been 
accumulated 
in an exter-
nal fund 
under public 
control 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been ac-
cumulated in 
an external 
fund under 
mixed private-
public control 
[Mio. EUR] 
Share of funds the 
operator of the facil-
ity can access for 
other activities until 
the funds are needed 
for their original 
decommissioning 
purpose [%] 
DE GKN 1 NPP 100%    100% 
DE GKN 2 NPP 100%    100% 
DE KKP 1 NPP 100%    100% 
DE KKP 2 NPP 100%    100% 
DE KKG NPP 100%    100% 
DE KRB-B  100%    100% 
DE KRB-C NPP 100%    100% 
DE KKI 1 NPP 100%    100% 
DE KKI 2 NPP 100%    100% 
DE KWB A NPP 100%    100% 
DE KWB B NPP 
Information 
on site-
specific 
provisions is 
not acces-
sible 
100%    100% 
DE KKE NPP 1,709 100%    100% 
DE KWG NPP 1,401 100%    100% 
DE KKU NPP Information 
on site-
specific 
provisions is 
not acces-
sible 
100%    100% 
DE KBR NPP 1,577 100%    100% 
DE KKB NPP 1,354 100%    100% 
DE KKK NPP 1,806 100%    100% 
DE KWO NPP 880 100%    100% 
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Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumu-
lated within the 
own assets of the 
operator of the 
facility or its 
mother company 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumulated 
by the operator of 
the facility or its 
mother company 
within a separated 
account / fund 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been 
accumulated 
in an exter-
nal fund 
under public 
control 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been ac-
cumulated in 
an external 
fund under 
mixed private-
public control 
[Mio. EUR] 
Share of funds the 
operator of the facil-
ity can access for 
other activities until 
the funds are needed 
for their original 
decommissioning 
purpose [%] 
DE KKS NPP 1,204 100%    100% 
DE KMK NPP 100%    100% 
DE KWW NPP 
Information 
on site-
specific 
provisions is 
not acces-
sible 
100%    100% 
DE THTR-300 NPP ?      
DE URENCO Enrichment No site-specific data accessible. Only data for the URENCO group as a whole: By the end of 2005, URENCO’s 
provisions in the company’s balance sheet for all the URENCO sites in total amount to 129 Mio. Euro for tails dis-
posal, 157 Mio. Euro for dismantling of plant and machinery and 19 Mio. Euro for other, also non-nuclear purposes. 
DE ANF Fuel fabrication Information 
on site-
specific 
provisions is 
not acces-
sible 
100%    100% 
ES Lobo (La Haba, 
Badajoz) Mina and 
Planta Lobo-G 
Mine and Mill Already 
decommis-
sioned 
- - - - - 
ES Fábrica de Uranio 
de Andujar (FUA) 
(Andujar Uranium 
Mill-AUM) 
Uranium Mill Already 
decommis-
sioned 
- - AII - All because ENRESA 
was operator and is 
fund manager. 
ES Saelices el Chico 
Planta elefante 
Uranium Mill Already 
decommis-
sioned 
AII - - - AII 
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Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumu-
lated within the 
own assets of the 
operator of the 
facility or its 
mother company 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumulated 
by the operator of 
the facility or its 
mother company 
within a separated 
account / fund 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been 
accumulated 
in an exter-
nal fund 
under public 
control 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been ac-
cumulated in 
an external 
fund under 
mixed private-
public control 
[Mio. EUR] 
Share of funds the 
operator of the facil-
ity can access for 
other activities until 
the funds are needed 
for their original 
decommissioning 
purpose [%] 
ES Saelices el Chico 
(Salamanca) – 
Planta Quercus 
Uranium Mill NA – no 
separate 
account 
AII - - - AII 
ES Saelices el Chico 
(Salamanca) – La 
mina 
Uranium mine NA – no 
separate 
account 
AII - - - AII 
ES Arbi Experimental 
reactor Bilbao 
Research reac-
tor 
Decommis-
sioned 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
ES Vandellos 1 NPP 1 - - 100% - 0% 
ES José Cabrera NPP 1 - - 100% - 0% 
ES Asco NPP 1 - - 100% - 0% 
FIN OL 1+2 (TVO) NPP 826.6 - - 826.6 - 75% 
FIN Lo 1+2 (FHP) NPP 618 - - 618 - 75% 
FIN FiR 1 (VTT) RR 5.3 - - 5.3 - Not applicable 
FIN Olkiluoto 3 NPP 0 - - 0 - - 
FR EDF NPPs and 
waste 
24,705  24,705 / / / 
FR CEA Research, fuel 
cycle and waste 
8,602  8,602 / / / 
FR AREVA  Fuel cycle and 
waste 
4,332  4,332 / / / 
FR SOMANU 
Maubeuge 
Nuclear Mainte-
nance  
6 6  / / ? 
HU NPP Paks NPP 261 - - 261 - 0% 
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Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumu-
lated within the 
own assets of the 
operator of the 
facility or its 
mother company 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumulated 
by the operator of 
the facility or its 
mother company 
within a separated 
account / fund 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been 
accumulated 
in an exter-
nal fund 
under public 
control 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been ac-
cumulated in 
an external 
fund under 
mixed private-
public control 
[Mio. EUR] 
Share of funds the 
operator of the facil-
ity can access for 
other activities until 
the funds are needed 
for their original 
decommissioning 
purpose [%] 
HU ISFSF Paks SF storage Together 
with NPP 
     
HU BRR Budapest RR -      
HU TR Budapest RR -      
IT SOGIN facilities  Diverse n.a. 
(ENEL/SOG
IN+CCSE) 
570 still in the 
balance sheet, 800 
in total transferred 
from ENEL 
(SOGIN) 
 n.a. 
(CCSE) 
 as much as needed to 
SOGIN neither making 
any loss nor any profit 
IT ISPRA – JRC 
facilities 
RR Paid out of 
the EC 
budget, 
therefore 0 
Paid out of the EC 
budget, therefore 0 
    
IT LENA Triga II  RR 0 0 0 0 0  
LT INPP Unit 1+2 NPP By 2006 
EUR 560 
million from 
all sources 
including 
commit-
ments 
 National Fund - ~ 
EUR 107 million 
EUR 420 
million in the 
International 
Ignalina De-
commission-
ing Support 
Fund 
 Legally 0%, but practi-
cally there may be 
cases when accumu-
lated funds are used 
not for direct decom-
missioning purposes. 
NL Dodewaard NPP 114 114     
NL Borssele  NPP 164 164     
NL URENCO Almelo Enrichment 
facility 
No site-specific data accessible. Only data for the URENCO group as a whole: By the end of 2005, URENCO’s 
provisions in the company’s balance sheet for all the URENCO sites in total amount to 129 Mio. Euro for tails dis-
posal, 157 Mio. Euro for dismantling of plant and machinery and 19 Mio. Euro for other, also non-nuclear purposes. 
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Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumu-
lated within the 
own assets of the 
operator of the 
facility or its 
mother company 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumulated 
by the operator of 
the facility or its 
mother company 
within a separated 
account / fund 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been 
accumulated 
in an exter-
nal fund 
under public 
control 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been ac-
cumulated in 
an external 
fund under 
mixed private-
public control 
[Mio. EUR] 
Share of funds the 
operator of the facil-
ity can access for 
other activities until 
the funds are needed 
for their original 
decommissioning 
purpose [%] 
NL Petten nuclear 
reactor (HFR) 
(JRC Site) 
RR 5 (2003) 0      
NL HOR-RID, Delft RR 0      
NL COVRA Waste man-
agement & 
disposal 
85 85      
RO Cernavoda 1 NPP 0 0 0 0 0 - 
RO Cernavoda 2 NPP 0 0 0 0 0 - 
RO Horia Hulubei, 
Magurele, Bucha-
rest 
RR 0 0 0 0 0 - 
RO TRIGA, Mioveni, 
Pitesti 
RR 0 0 0 0 0 - 
RO CNU Bihor Uranium mine 0 0 0 0 0 - 
RO CNU Banat Uranium mine 0 0 0 0 0 - 
RO CNU Suceava Uranium mine 0 0 0 0 0 - 
RO CNU Feldioara Milling facility for 
uranium ore 
0 0 0 0 0 - 
RO FCN, Mioveni, 
Pitesti 
Fuel fabrication 
plant 
0 0 0 0 0 - 
SE  All nuclear facili-
ties 
3750   3750  0% 
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Country Name of nuclear 
facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumu-
lated within the 
own assets of the 
operator of the 
facility or its 
mother company 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which has 
been accumulated 
by the operator of 
the facility or its 
mother company 
within a separated 
account / fund 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been 
accumulated 
in an exter-
nal fund 
under public 
control 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
has been ac-
cumulated in 
an external 
fund under 
mixed private-
public control 
[Mio. EUR] 
Share of funds the 
operator of the facil-
ity can access for 
other activities until 
the funds are needed 
for their original 
decommissioning 
purpose [%] 
SE  All nuclear facili-
ties 
No information readily available 
on the total sum of costs paid 
directly by the utilities (outside 
the funding system) 
    
SI Krko Nuclear 
Power Plant 
NPP 115  115  0% 
SI Research reactor 
TRIGA Mark II 
RR 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SI Central interim 
storage of radioac-
tive waste in Brinje 
storage of ra-
dioactive waste 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
SI Zirovski Vrh Ura-
nium Mine and 
Milll; Waste Pile 
Jazbec 
Uranium Mine 
and Mill 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
SK A1 J. Bohunice  NPP ? ? ? 
SK V1 J. Bohunice NPP ? ? ? 
SK V2 J. Bohunice NPP ? ? ? 
SK JE Mochovce 1,2 NPP 
324 +  
? ? 
324 
? 
We did not manage to 
find the data 
UK British energy 
facilities 
8 NPP sites 
(9,892 MWe) 
1,137 (NLF)    1,137  0% 
Source: Cf. the country reports attached to this final report for additional information and the sources used for this table. This selection is not meant to be exhaustive 
and only covers the facilities analysed in more detail in the course of this study. 
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Table 8 Investment of financial means of decommissioning funds in the European Member States, until they are used for payment of decommissioning activities.  
Country Name of nuclear facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of 
which 
have been 
invested 
in secure 
state 
bonds 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other as-
sets with 
fixed inter-
est rates 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
lent to 
associated 
or joined 
companies 
or to third 
parties 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other means 
(shares, 
mergers & 
acquisitions, 
etc.)  
[Mio. EUR] 
Interest on 
invested 
financial 
means from 
decommis-
sioning 
funds in 
2004 
[%] 
Interest on 
invested finan-
cial means 
from decom-
missioning 
funds in period 
2000-2004 
[%] 
BE Tihange, Doel 7 NPPs 3,916   75%    
BG EBRD funds for Kozloduy 
1 to 4  
NPP 550       
BG Decomm. Funds for Ko-
zloduy 1 to 6 
NPP 280       
BG Radwaste Man. Funds for 
Kozloduy 1 to 6 
NPP 69       
BG IRT Sofia RR        
BG Uranium mine Uranium mine        
CZ Dokovany 1-4 NPP 137  34.9  ? ? ? ? 
CZ Temelin 1-2 NPP 28  20.7  ? ? ? ? 
CZ LVR-15 RR 2.5  0.06  ? ? ? ? 
CZ ISFSF Dukovany Interim storage 0.018  0.0126  ? ? ? ? 
CZ RAWRA activities Waste management 211 211    2%  
DE GKN 1 NPP 
DE GKN 2 NPP 
DE KKP 1 NPP 
DE KKP 2 NPP 
DE KKG NPP 
Information 
on site-
specific 
provisions is 
not acces-
sible 
Internal unrestricted funds with no investment requirements. In contrast to pension funds of 
some of the corporate groups with nuclear facilities in Germany, nuclear provisions are not 
internally segregated. A direct link from provisions / liabilities made on the right side of the 
balance sheet to assets on the left side of the balance sheet cannot be drawn.  
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Country Name of nuclear facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of 
which 
have been 
invested 
in secure 
state 
bonds 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other as-
sets with 
fixed inter-
est rates 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
lent to 
associated 
or joined 
companies 
or to third 
parties 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other means 
(shares, 
mergers & 
acquisitions, 
etc.)  
[Mio. EUR] 
Interest on 
invested 
financial 
means from 
decommis-
sioning 
funds in 
2004 
[%] 
Interest on 
invested finan-
cial means 
from decom-
missioning 
funds in period 
2000-2004 
[%] 
DE KRB-B NPP 
DE KRB-C NPP 
DE KKI 1 NPP 
DE KKI 2 NPP 
DE KWB A NPP 
DE KWB B NPP 
 
DE KKE NPP 1,709 
DE KWG NPP 1,401 
DE KKU NPP Information 
on site-
specific 
provisions is 
not acces-
sible 
DE KBR NPP 1,577 
DE KKB NPP 1,354 
DE KKK NPP 1,806 
DE KWO NPP 880 
DE KKS NPP 1,204 
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Country Name of nuclear facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of 
which 
have been 
invested 
in secure 
state 
bonds 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other as-
sets with 
fixed inter-
est rates 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
lent to 
associated 
or joined 
companies 
or to third 
parties 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other means 
(shares, 
mergers & 
acquisitions, 
etc.)  
[Mio. EUR] 
Interest on 
invested 
financial 
means from 
decommis-
sioning 
funds in 
2004 
[%] 
Interest on 
invested finan-
cial means 
from decom-
missioning 
funds in period 
2000-2004 
[%] 
DE KMK NPP Information 
on site-
specific 
provisions is 
not acces-
sible 
DE KWW NPP  
DE THTR-300 NPP ? 
DE URENCO Enrichment Information 
on site-
specific 
provisions is 
not acces-
sible 
DE ANF Fuel fabrication  
 
ES Lobo (La Haba, Badajoz) 
Mina and Planta Lobo-G 
Mine and Mill Already 
decommis-
sioned 
- - - - - - 
ES Fábrica de Uranio de 
Andujar (FUA) 
(Andujar Uranium Mill-
AUM) 
Uranium Mill Already 
decommis-
sioned 
- - - - - - 
ES Saelices el Chico 
Planta elefante 
Uranium Mill Already 
decommis-
sioned 
- - - - - - 
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Country Name of nuclear facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of 
which 
have been 
invested 
in secure 
state 
bonds 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other as-
sets with 
fixed inter-
est rates 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
lent to 
associated 
or joined 
companies 
or to third 
parties 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other means 
(shares, 
mergers & 
acquisitions, 
etc.)  
[Mio. EUR] 
Interest on 
invested 
financial 
means from 
decommis-
sioning 
funds in 
2004 
[%] 
Interest on 
invested finan-
cial means 
from decom-
missioning 
funds in period 
2000-2004 
[%] 
ES Saelices el Chico (Sala-
manca) – Planta Quercus 
Uranium Mill NA – no 
separate 
account 
- - - - - - 
ES Saelices el Chico (Sala-
manca) – La mina 
Uranium mine NA – no 
separate 
account 
- - - - - - 
ES Arbi Experimental reactor 
Bilbao 
Research reactor Already 
decommis-
sioned 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
ES Vandellos 1 NPP 1 - - - - - - 
ES José Cabrera NPP 1 - - - - - - 
ES Asco NPP 1 - - - - - - 
FIN OL 1+2 (TVO) NPP 826.6 - 594.5  - 20.2  
2.7% 
 
FIN Lo 1+2 (FHP) NPP 618 - 450   - 15  
2.7% 
 
FR AREVA’s facilities Fuel cycle facilities 2,798 1,126 973 129 570   
HU NPP Paks NPP 261 261 - - - Not defined Not defined 
HU ISFSF Paks SF storage Together 
with NPP 
Paks 
Together 
with NPP 
Paks 
     
HU BRR Budapest RR        
HU TR Budapest RR        
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Country Name of nuclear facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of 
which 
have been 
invested 
in secure 
state 
bonds 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other as-
sets with 
fixed inter-
est rates 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
lent to 
associated 
or joined 
companies 
or to third 
parties 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other means 
(shares, 
mergers & 
acquisitions, 
etc.)  
[Mio. EUR] 
Interest on 
invested 
financial 
means from 
decommis-
sioning 
funds in 
2004 
[%] 
Interest on 
invested finan-
cial means 
from decom-
missioning 
funds in period 
2000-2004 
[%] 
IT SOGIN facilities  Diverse 570 still in 
the balance 
sheet, 800 
in total 
transferred 
from ENEL 
(SOGIN) 
n.a. (CCSE) 
ca. 423 
(including receivables  
from SICN) 
ca. 2 ca. 145 ca. 3.0% 
(before taxes) 
 
IT ISPRA – JRC facilities RR Paid out of 
the EC 
budget, 
therefore 0 
      
IT LENA Triga II  RR 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0% 
LT INPP Unit 1+2 NPP By 2006: 
EUR 560 
million from 
all sources 
including 
commit-
ments, of 
which ap-
proximately 
EUR 170* 
have been 
already 
used. 
In 2004 – 
LTL 6.9 
million or 
EUR 2 
million 
    LTL 7.8 million 
or EUR 2.25 
million up to 
2006 
NL Dodewaard NPP 114 Internal unrestricted funds, with no investment requirements and no information 
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Country Name of nuclear facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of 
which 
have been 
invested 
in secure 
state 
bonds 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other as-
sets with 
fixed inter-
est rates 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
lent to 
associated 
or joined 
companies 
or to third 
parties 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other means 
(shares, 
mergers & 
acquisitions, 
etc.)  
[Mio. EUR] 
Interest on 
invested 
financial 
means from 
decommis-
sioning 
funds in 
2004 
[%] 
Interest on 
invested finan-
cial means 
from decom-
missioning 
funds in period 
2000-2004 
[%] 
NL Borssele  NPP 164 Internal unrestricted funds, with no investment requirements and no information 
NL URENCO Almelo Enrichment facility No site-specific data accessible. Only data for the URENCO group as a whole: By the end of 2005, 
URENCO’s provisions in the company’s balance sheet for all the URENCO sites in total amount to 129 
Mio. Euro for tails disposal, 157 Mio. Euro for dismantling of plant and machinery and 19 Mio. Euro for 
other, also non-nuclear purposes. 
NL Petten nuclear reactor 
(HFR) (JRC Site) 
RR 5 (2003)       
NL HOR-RID, TU Delft RR 0       
NL COVRA Waste management 
& disposal 
85 62 11  12   
RO Cernavoda 1 NPP 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
RO Cernavoda 2 NPP 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
RO Horia Hulubei, Magurele, 
Bucharest 
RR 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
RO TRIGA, Mioveni, Pitesti RR 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
RO CNU Bihor Uranium mine 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
RO CNU Banat Uranium mine 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
RO CNU Suceava Uranium mine 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
RO CNU Feldioara Milling facility for 
uranium ore 
0 0 0 0 0 - - 
RO FCN, Mioveni, Pitesti Fuel fabrication plant 0 0 0 0 0 - - 
SE  All nuclear facilities 
(except SFR-1) 
3750 3565     6.9% (average 
fort he period 
1996 – 2005) 
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Country Name of nuclear facility 
 
Kind of facility Provisions  
accumu-
lated by  
31-12-2004 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of 
which 
have been 
invested 
in secure 
state 
bonds 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other as-
sets with 
fixed inter-
est rates 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
lent to 
associated 
or joined 
companies 
or to third 
parties 
[Mio. EUR] 
… of which 
have been 
invested in 
other means 
(shares, 
mergers & 
acquisitions, 
etc.)  
[Mio. EUR] 
Interest on 
invested 
financial 
means from 
decommis-
sioning 
funds in 
2004 
[%] 
Interest on 
invested finan-
cial means 
from decom-
missioning 
funds in period 
2000-2004 
[%] 
SI Krko Nuclear Power 
Plant 
NPP 115 
(105.2  
in 2003) 
56 53 0 6 9.60% 8.56% 
SI Research reactor TRIGA 
Mark II 
RR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SI Central interim storage of 
radioactive waste in Brinje 
storage of radioac-
tive waste 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SI Zirovski Vrh Uranium Mine 
and Milll; Waste Pile Jaz-
bec 
Uranium Mine and 
Mill 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SK Nuclear power plants NPP 324+ ? ? ? ? ?  
UK British energy facilities 8 NPP sites (9,892 
MWe) 
1,137 (NLF) There is no information available on the investment policies of the trustees of the NLF 
Source: Cf. the country reports attached to this final report for additional information and the sources used for this table. This selection is not meant to be exhaustive 
and only covers the facilities analysed in more detail in the course of this study. 
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3.1.7 Special cases 
3.1.7.1 Early shutdown (‘Fall-back option’) 
In case a nuclear facility should, for any reason, stop its operation earlier than planned 
for in decommissioning cost estimates and decommissioning funding schemes, the 
money accumulated might not be sufficient to provide for all the decommissioning 
costs.  
In the case of the demonstration plant THTR-300 in Hamm-Uentrop/Germany early 
shutdown has lead to the problem that the stakeholders involved in this project (federal 
government, state of North Rhine-Westphalia, consortium of several energy compa-
nies) had protracted negotiations over the level of each contribution to cover actual 
decommissioning costs. Currently, payments have only been determined for the first 
period of the safe enclosure until 2009 but not for all the dismantling and further de-
commissioning activities which will follow. 
The following table shows how far the decommissioning financing schemes for com-
mercial NPP in the different countries propose to deal with an early shutdown. Only the 
decommissioning financing systems in Sweden and Finland and the insurance contract 
of the Belgonucleaire MOX-plant in Belgium fully consider such a case; the scheme in 
France will at least partly cover such a case after the five-year transition period from 
2006 onwards. 
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Table 9: Overview on the ways decommissioning financing schemes in the EU Member States account 
for an early shutdown of a commercial NPP 
Country Early shutdown 
accounted for? 
Remarks 
B No, except in 
the case of the 
MOX-plant of 
Belgonucleaire 
In the worst case, the taxpayer would have to pay. In the case of the 
MOX-plant, expected costs of decommissioning are covered by a contract 
Belgonucleaire has concluded with an insurance company. 
BG Not for plants 
under operation 
beyond 2006 
The taxpayer would have to pay in case of early shutdown of operating 
NPP. In the case of Kozloduy units 1-4, the European Union and other 
western European donors that expressed concerns about the safety of the 
reactors, have provided supplementary funds to assist with early shut-
down. 
CZ Not really The plant operator is required to bear all remaining cost after early shut-
down. In worst case (e.g. in the case of bankruptcy), the taxpayer would 
have to pay. 
D No Corporate groups operating NPP usually affirm in public that in the case of 
an early shutdown of one of its NPP, the corporate group would fully take 
care of the liability. However, in worst case, the taxpayer would have to 
pay. 
E Not really In the new law, with contributions to the fund being considered as tax 
payments, the Treasury is the first institution to be compensated in case 
of bankruptcy. In worst case, the taxpayer would have to pay.  
F Yes, but dis-
counted and 
after 5 years 
transition period 
The full amount of dismantling costs has to be provided for with the start 
of operation of the facility. However, this regulation is new (of 2006), and a 
5 years transition period has been granted. Furthermore, provisions are 
based on discounted costs. 
FIN Yes Part of the assessed liability that is not covered by money in the fund must 
be covered by securities (credit insurances, liability bank guarantees, real 
estate mortgages or liability guarantees by a Finnish association, with 
mortgages on a NPP not being accepted) furnished by the license-holder, 
and given to the Ministry of Trade and Industry which has to separately 
accept each. As an additional precaution against unforeseen events, 
supplementary securities are required by the Government to take into 
account any effects of incidents and costs. These additional securities 
cover up to 10% of the assessed liability. 
HU No In worst case, the taxpayer would have to pay. 
IT Not relevant No operating NPP since 1987. 
LT Not really Ignalina unit 1 is closed and unit 2 will be shut down early in 2010. Until 
May 2006, only about 15% (28%) of decommissioning (dismantling) costs 
have been accumulated. 
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Table 9 (continued): Overview on the ways decommissioning financing schemes in the EU Member Sta-
tes account for an early shutdown of a commercial NPP 
Country Early shutdown 
accounted for? 
Remarks 
NL No An amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act is under preparation which 
concerns the obligation for licensees to make sure that there is a certainty 
that there are sufficient means for decommissioning. However, due to the 
recent fall of the government, it is not sure what will happen to this. With 
regard to radioactive waste management, the taxpayer would have to pay 
in case the fees paid by the operator are not sufficient. 
RO No No decommissioning financing schemes in place, and fund operational 
mechanisms not yet precisely defined. In case the operator is unable to 
pay the National Agency for Radioactive Waste will take responsibility. 
S Yes Two types of guarantees by the operators: Guarantee I covers early clo-
sure; guarantee II covers lack of funds in the event that the fund balance 
should be found to be inadequate in the end. In March 2006, the govern-
ment proposed improved and more flexible possibilities of requiring secu-
rities and handling the remaining risk born by the state. 
SI No It can be assumed that the Slovenian state (and maybe Croatia, too) 
would have to pay for decommissioning in case of an early shutdown. 
SK No In case of early closure the state will take responsibility. 
UK No No commitment to ensure the Nuclear Liabilities Fund will be adequate to 
meet all the liabilities it is eligible to pay. 
 
3.1.7.2 Unexpected cost increases 
As already pointed out in Chapter 3.1.4.3, there are many economic risks and uncer-
tainties associated with the different technical decommissioning options of the nuclear 
fuel chain.  
A specific economic decommissioning problem is unforeseen events or unexpected 
cost increases which might happen during operation or decommissioning of a nuclear 
facility, and which can have a substantial impact on decommissioning costs. They can 
be, e. g., due to incidents or even accidents (like in the case of Bohunice A1 in Slovak 
Republic, which had accidents in 1976/77, and where decommissioning financing is not 
secured), or caused by unforeseen scientific, economic or political developments. 
In the reference (NEA/IAEA/EC 1999) it is recommended to take account of such pos-
sible developments by including the following in their suggested list of cost items. 
• insurances including liability insurance and pollution liability insurance  
• contingencies including 
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– risk, financial assurance versus inherent uncertainties in the scope, regulatory 
involvement, local and federal politics and waste disposal options, 
– escalation of waste disposal charges, and 
– general inflation over the period of performance 
However, it could not be found out in the course of this study how far these cost items 
are included in cost estimates and provisions in practice. Evidence collected so far 
suggests that, in most countries, decommissioning financing schemes do not ade-
quately account for such possible developments (cf. also the previous subchapter on 
the early closure case).  
Sweden and Finland seem to be notable exceptions where unforeseen events are at 
least partly accounted for according to the ‚Polluter Pays Principle’: 
• In Finland, as an additional precaution against unforeseen events, supplementary 
securities are required by the Government. They can cover up to 10% of the as-
sessed liability, and have to be given to the Ministry. 
• In Sweden, the regulation is even stronger: Guarantee I covers early closure, guar-
antee II covers lack of funds in the event that the fund balance should be found to 
be inadequate in the end.  
3.1.7.3 Transfer of ownership 
If all liabilities are transferred and all provisions as well as the respective assets remain 
available to their full extent, transfer of ownership will not affect the way the decommis-
sioning financing system is functioning. This is the usual case, e. g., when E.ON took 
over Sydkraft plants in Sweden, or when Vattenfall took over HEW in Germany. In 
general, a transfer of ownership between privately owned companies should not affect 
decommissioning financing, as long as the risks of bankruptcy of the owners do not 
differ from each other. However, this can be different in case of transfer of ownership 
from private to public, or vice versa, or in case of transfer of ownership from one pub-
licly owned organisation to another.  
For example, in the course of privatisation of shares in electricity supply companies in 
the new Member States, special agreements were made. For example, ENEL which 
took over 66% of the Slovakian electricity company Slovenske Elektrarne, did not take 
over any responsibility for decommissioning besides having to pay a fixed amount as 
set by law during operation of its NPPs to the National Nuclear Fund, although this 
amount is less than would be needed to fully pay expected decommissioning costs. 
Another example is the UK. The history of decommissioning provisions in the UK pre-
sented in the following table clearly shows how changes in the decommissioning fi-
nancing schemes reduced available financial means for decommissioning several 
times. Currently the only tangible funds are the previous provisions made by British 
Energy to the Nuclear Liabilities Fund (NLF). These will be supplemented by future 
payments to the NLF and any payments to the NLF made under a ‘cash sweep’ (a pro-
Final Report – EU Decommissioning Funding Methodologies TREN/05/NUCL/S07.55436 
Wuppertal Institute et al. 61 
portion (about 65%) of British Energy’s profits is paid into the NLF. The entitlement 
could be converted into shares in British Energy, which could be sold to the private 
market: the UK government has considered selling the shares but it has not committed 
to pay any sale proceeds into the fund; cf. the respective country report in the annex to 
this final report for more details). 
Table 10: History of decommissioning provisions in the UK 
Scheme Facilities covered Owner Provi-
sions 
Form Remaining 
funds 
Until 1990 9 civil Magnoxes & 7 
AGRs 
CEGB/ 
SSEB 
£3.8bn Internal 
accounting 
provisions 
£0 
1990 - 1996 
FFL 
8 civil Magnoxes, 5 
AGRs and 1 PWR 
Nuclear 
Electric 
£6bn Cash-flow to 
Nuclear 
Electric 
£2.7bn to  
Magnox Electric 
& £228m to 
British Energy 
1996 - 2005 
NLIP 
11 civil Magnoxes & 
other BNFL facilities 
BNFL £4016m Internal fund £0 
1998 - 2006 
Secretary of 
State’s Under-
taking 
All facilities owned by 
BNFL 
BNFL £5956m Government 
undertaking 
£0 
1996 - 2005 
NDF 
7 AGRs & 1 PWR British 
Energy 
£440m External 
segregated 
fund 
£440m to NLF 
Since 2005 NLF 7 AGRs, 1 PWR and 
spent fuel from 
Sizewell B 
British 
Energy 
£782m + 
‘Cash 
Sweep’ 
External 
segregated 
fund 
£782m + ‘Cash 
Sweep’ 
Since 2005 
Statutory seg-
regated account 
All liabilities except 
those owned by Brit-
ish Energy 
NDA £0 Government 
commitment 
£0 
Source: Research by Steve Thomas, PSIRU, University of Greenwich, Greenwich. Cf. the respective 
country report for more details. 
3.1.7.4 Special funding arrangements with new Member States 
In the course of the accession negotiations, special funding arrangements had been 
found for the closure of reactors that could not be economically upgraded to a required 
level of safety. Major costs of technical decommissioning, but also security of supply, 
energy efficiency and regional development issues are addressed through international 
decommissioning support funds, managed by the EBRD in London, to which the EU is 
the major (but not the sole) contributor: 
• Ignalina International Decommissioning Support Fund (IIDSF), Lithuania: 529 mil-
lion Euro EU assistance received between 1999 and 2006. 
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• Bohunice International Decommissioning Support Fund (BIDSF), Slovak Republic: 
approximately 600 million Euro EU assistance expected for the period 1998 – 2013. 
• Kozloduy International Decommissioning Support Fund (KIDSF), Bulgaria: 550 mil-
lion Euro assistance agreed on for the period 2000 - 2009. 
Additional assistance has been provided through the PHARE programme. 
3.1.8 Transparency to the public - Information rights of the public 
In several countries, changes in consumer protection law have, at least slightly, in-
creased citizens’ information rights. For example, while carrying out the research in UK 
in the course of this project, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) answered 
questions by one of the project team members while referring to the ‘Freedom of Infor-
mation Act’ of the year 2000. Another example is the authorities in the Czech Republic. 
They are required by Czech law to provide information in response to queries from the 
public regarding decommissioning strategies and costs.  
However, information rights of the public are usually restricted. Furthermore, in the lib-
eralised market, facility-specific information on the following are not available for all 
countries and usually not available in decommissioning financing systems with unre-
stricted internal funds. 
• estimates of total decommissioning cost 
• cost breakdowns by cost items 
• details of cost estimation methodology 
• provisions accumulated 
• investment of financial means allocated until the money is used for payment of de-
commissioning activities, and 
• details of payments from decommissioning funds for decommissioning activities 
In some cases, even the respective aggregated information on the level of the cor-
porate group operating nuclear facilities or on the country level is not fully open to 
the public. Country-specific, operator-specific or even some facility-specific information 
publicly available can be found in the following areas: 
• Legislation 
• Decommissioning plans (at least in some countries like, e. g., in Hungary) 
• Annual reports, balance sheets and income statements of external fund managing 
organisations with own legal personality. However, the numbers and information in 
these reports are usually not differentiated by the different nuclear facilities 
• Annual reports, balance sheets and income statements of most of the privately 
owned companies or corporate groups owning nuclear facilities directly or via sub-
sidiaries or associated companies. Again, the numbers and information in these re-
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ports are usually not differentiated by nuclear facilities. However, it should be noted 
that the switch to IFRS standards has forced several operators to release at least 
some additional information on the decommissioning financing issues. 
• JRC reports on the nuclear facilities Ispra (Italy), IRMM – Geel (Belgium), ITU – 
Karlsruhe (Germany), IE – Petten (Netherlands) 
• Publicly available literature giving a rough overview on the situation in several 
countries, like (NEA 1996), (NEA 2003) or (European Commission 2004), or na-
tional reports to the Joint Convention (mostly country-specific only; some facility-
specific information) 
• Reports by public (nuclear) authorities (e. g., reports by the National Court of Ac-
counts in France) 
• Websites and brochures (for example, in the UK, the creation of the NDA repre-
sented a major step forward in bringing different information material together and 
making it accessible through the website), 
Further information can also be found in documents published and hearings carried out 
in the course of environmental impact assessment and subsequent decision in principle 
processes at nuclear facilities.  Finally, some additional oral and additional written in-
formation can be usually received from responsible public authorities. In contrast, pri-
vately owned organisations may be less willing to provide any additional data or 
information. 
3.1.9 Stakeholder views on the current systems, on possible changes, 
and on the discussed harmonisation on EU level 
The identification of the relevant stakeholders in the different countries and on the 
European level, their role and their motivations with regard to the existing decommis-
sioning funding approaches and to the existing proposals of harmonising the methods 
of financing nuclear decommissioning and their own proposals for possible changes is 
an important basis for the development of possible steps of optimisation and harmoni-
sation of decommissioning financing schemes in Europe and in the different Member 
States. 
There are five bodies that have a role in developing the EU’s views on decommission-
ing financing: 
• European Commission 
• European Parliament 
• European Council 
• European Economic and Social Committee 
• Article 31 Expert group. 
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Important developments and statements published by these stakeholders have been 
already described in Chapter 1.1 (for more information of those and other stakeholders 
on EU level see the EU stakeholder report in the appendix). Further important 
stakeholders at the European level are: 
• EURELECTRIC and FORATOM: The electricity industry association and the Euro-
pean Atomic Forum similarly state that there must be adequate financing for de-
commissioning and that the funds must be available when needed but that Member 
States must have the ability to develop their own ways of reaching these goals. 
• Greenpeace International: The environmental NGO proposes that separate and 
transparent decommissioning funds should be set up, with no exceptions to allow 
operators to use the funds as a source of cheap financing. 
Main stakeholders in the 16 countries considered in the course of the country analyses 
are: 
• Operators of nuclear facilities 
• Managers of decommissioning funds 
• National government (different ministries) 
• National parliament 
• Nuclear safety authorities 
• Electricity market regulators 
• Trade unions 
• Municipalities and regional governments where nuclear facilities are sited 
• Environmental and consumer protection NGOs 
• Nuclear consultancy firms and independent experts 
• Banks, financial analysts and auditors 
• European Commission (at least in some countries) 
• European Community and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (at 
least in some countries). 
Not all these stakeholders could be interviewed in every country. In some countries, 
stakeholders refused to discuss the relevant topics with the authors of this report and to 
provide any additional data or information (for more information on these issues see 
the stakeholder analysis in the country reports in the appendix). 
Operators, decommissioning fund managers, national governments and nuclear safety 
authorities usually regard the existing, laws and regulations on decommissioning fi-
nancing in their country as sufficient. For example, ENRESA, ENUSA, UNESA, the 
MITYC and all nuclear power plant licensees in Spain assume that theoretically the 
methodologies of estimating decommissioning costs are sufficient, that the provisions 
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are adequate and that the funding will be available when the money is needed. An ex-
ception is the respective stakeholders in Romania where a decommissioning financing 
system has not been implemented yet and should be implemented as soon as possible 
according to a number of stakeholders. In the Netherlands, changes in the national 
decommissioning financing scheme are proposed and supported by some of the 
stakeholders. 
When it comes to the question of harmonisation on EU level, opinions are split. While 
some operators, regulators and governments generally welcome harmonisation in prin-
ciple (cf., e.g., the country reports for the Czech Republic and Hungary), others fear 
that harmonisation steps would intervene too much into their own freedom of decision 
or would not adequately take account of the special situations in the different countries 
(cf., e.g., the country report on Romania). In particular, in countries where the decom-
missioning financing system has undergone recent changes (e. g., Spain); there is the 
wish for some degree of stability of the system in the coming years. In Finland and 
Sweden, where these stakeholders have long experience and are quite satisfied with 
the system of a separate publicly-controlled funding system, harmonisation of details of 
the decommissioning financing systems is not considered necessary. However, in 
these countries, it is seen important to introduce general requirements on producers of 
nuclear energy to allocate appropriate financial means for future decommissioning to 
ensure a fair competitive market while leaving the Member States freedom to apply 
their own national system provided that they fulfil certain important general principles 
(minimum requirements/criteria) to be agreed between them.  
On the other hand, many NGOs claim that the existing decommissioning financing 
schemes are not transparent, adequate, well-managed and secure enough. Further-
more, the independency of nuclear regulators from the nuclear industry has been ques-
tioned; public control would not be functioning well enough, and participation of the 
public would be limited too much (cf., e.g., the criticism by NGOs in the Slovak Repub-
lic, in Lithuania). The main fear is that the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ would not be imple-
mented fully, and that the taxpayer and the next generation would have to pay for 
decommissioning of nuclear facilities, from which the current generation and the opera-
tors and their shareholders currently benefit. Therefore, they welcome attempts at the 
European level to harmonise decommissioning financing schemes. 
In parliaments, different views on the existing decommissioning financing schemes, 
their possible changes and a possible harmonisation on EU level exist, ranging from 
the operators’ to the NGOs’ view (cf. the country reports for France and the Slovak 
Republic). 
Municipalities are often neglected in the governance schemes. Those municipalities 
included in this stakeholder analysis (e. g., in Germany) asked for an earlier consulta-
tion and participation in the course of decommissioning processes, including considera-
tions on financing social and regional development measures in the course of facility 
shut down and decommissioning. 
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3.2 Main observations based on the country analyses 
3.2.1 Overview 
Before starting to analyse the financial consequences and risks of the decommission-
ing financing systems in the EU-27 in Chapter 4 in detail, main observations stemming 
from the country analyses are summarised in the following: 
• In existing decommissioning financing schemes, with the exception of few countries 
like Sweden, non-NPP facilities are often neglected although costs are partly higher 
than decommissioning costs of NPPs. 
• Cost estimates vary substantially depending on several factors and the methods 
applied. 
• Risks and uncertainties are not adequately addressed in most of the cost esti-
mates. 
• Although the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ is widely accepted, it is not always imple-
mented to its upmost possible extent. 
• Different expectations of contributors to decommissioning financing in new Member 
States can lead to a partly unclear situation with regard to future decommissioning 
financing. 
• There are different degrees and ways how the public is involved in controlling de-
commissioning financing, and what information rights the public has. 
• There are several barriers towards improvements of the current decommissioning 
financing schemes in the Member States and towards harmonisation on EU level. 
• A trend towards an increased restriction of decommissioning funds might be per-
ceived. 
3.2.2 Non-NPP facilities often neglected although costs are partly higher 
Until today, in most countries (except, e. g., Sweden), the discussion on decommis-
sioning funding has mainly concentrated on commercially used nuclear power plants 
and has quite often neglected other facilities like  
• uranium mines and mills which, in Europe, are largely no longer in operation, and 
where the expected decommissioning costs of all these mines and mills total con-
siderable amounts, 
• uranium conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication plants,  
• (complex) spent fuel reprocessing plants with the highest estimated decommission-
ing costs among all nuclear facilities, 
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• other waste management and interim storage facilities (however, usually, the fund-
ing schemes for these facilities are principally the same as for nuclear power 
plants) 
• research reactors and other nuclear research facilities (with the exception of JRC 
facilities for which reports on decommissioning status and cost estimates including 
budgetary plans are regularly made) and small demonstration plants. 
Costs for decommissioning of commercial nuclear power plants are higher than for 
several other types of nuclear facilities. However, this is not true for plutonium bulk-
handling facilities / reprocessing plants (e.g., decommissioning costs of WAK Karlsruhe 
are estimated at 2.2 billion Euro, and for Sellafield at about 58 billion Euro) or for facili-
ties where accidents have taken place (e. g., A1 in Jaslovske Bohunice/Slovak Repub-
lic).  
3.2.3 Varying cost estimates 
Differences in the decommissioning strategies pursued (deferred vs. immediate solu-
tions for decontamination and dismantling; different waste management strategies) and 
in technical methodologies of dismantling and storage and final disposal of waste 
mainly depend on differences in the geological situation and in the nuclear history, on 
the safety concepts applied, and on economic factors. The technical standards, proce-
dures and obligations in a country finally reflect the degree of risks accepted and borne 
by present generations, with this decision of present generations affecting also future 
generations. 
After the technical methodologies and obligations have been specified, the future costs 
of following these technical concepts have to be estimated. The present monetary 
value of the liabilities of the energy companies has to be determined from the begin-
ning of installation operation. This is subject to high levels of uncertainties.  While there 
is at least some decommissioning experience with uranium mines, research reactors 
and first commercial NPP, there is almost no experience at all with decommissioning of 
large NPP, reprocessing plants or the installation of a final disposal facility for high-
level radioactive waste. Furthermore uncertainties are created because of the long time 
delay between the generation of revenues during plant operation, and the payment of 
liabilities generated during operation. Risks and uncertainties are often insufficiently 
dealt with in cost estimation.  
The technical strategies, methodologies and obligations and the cost items taken into 
account (“scope” of the estimate), the respective time horizon for decommissioning and 
the inflation rate and discount rate applied as well as the degree to which risks and 
uncertainties are taken into account largely determine the size of the estimated future 
costs and their present value. Furthermore, it makes a big difference if: 
• cost estimates are developed by taking some international standard values from 
literature, and applying these numbers to the situation in the respective country (or-
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der-of-magnitude estimate), thereby neglecting, among others, the specific situation 
of the respective facility, differences in decommissioning strategies and technolo-
gies, share of workers and wages, purchasing power parities, and exchange rates, 
• or are derived from a critical and thorough analysis of: 
– some reference cases of nuclear facilities in a country, with analysis of transfer-
ability of the results to other cases in the country, 
– each facility in the country separately. 
In most cases, deterministic methods for estimating decommissioning costs are used. 
However, cost estimation methodologies differ significantly. There are cost estimation 
tools available (e.g., STILLKO by NIS, Germany), which are applied in several coun-
tries. In some countries, for some facilities, very detailed methodologies using scenario 
analysis have been used with comparison of different possible decommissioning paths 
and sensitivity analyses (cf., e. g., the methodology used in Lithuania), while in other 
countries there seem to be only rough estimates (e. g., Bulgaria and Romania, previ-
ously in Hungary). 
3.2.4 Risks and uncertainties have not been adequately addressed  
For several nuclear installations, particularly for all decommissioning activities in the 
context of waste management and disposal, only broad ranges of expected decommis-
sioning costs can be calculated, for example:  
• the 7 + 2 scenarios calculated in Slovenia in 2004, with cost estimates for decom-
missioning of Krsko NPP between 1,118.5 and 1,796.1 million Euro, and 
• the cost estimate for final disposal in an underground repository in France ranging 
between 13,500 and 58,035 million Euro. 
Examples like these both show the large risks and uncertainties associated with the 
identification and estimation of future costs of decommissioning which depend on the 
assumptions taken, the decommissioning strategy chosen, and thereby also on societal 
and political factors (cf. also NEA/RWM/WPDD 2006, 25f., for the weight of such fac-
tors). Risks can be partly taken into account by scenario or sensitivity analyses. How-
ever, in most cases they are not adequately dealt with. Nevertheless, professional or 
scientific cost estimation models (software) are starting to be extended and further de-
veloped respectively, like it is currently under development at NRG in the Netherlands. 
However, even if there is a range of cost estimates available for a plant showing differ-
ent sensitivities or scenarios, provisions are usually just made by referring to one of the 
cost estimates (like in the Slovene case of choosing ‘SID-45’ as the basis for determin-
ing the surcharge on the electricity price to be paid into the fund).  
Moreover, even if attention is paid to detailed and regularly updated cost estimates is 
paid that take financial risks into account, decommissioning projects regularly produce 
the unexpected (cf. Pfeifer/Gordelier/Drake 2004). Although regular cost estimation 
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reviews and consequently adapted provisions can partly cure this problem, a risk re-
mains that, in the end, the ‘polluter’ will not be able to pay for all the decommissioning 
costs, particularly if costs start increasing only after end of facility operation due to un-
foreseen events or developments which can come up in the course of the long time 
periods associated with decommissioning (cf. also Monnier/Steel/et al. 2006, p. 5). 
3.2.5 Varying implementation of ‚Polluter Pays Principle’ 
The broad acceptance and applicability of the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ for nuclear de-
commissioning financing relies on (cf. Chapter 5.3.2 and Chapter 5.3.3 for more details 
on this principle and its applicability in the context of decommissioning financing in the 
EU; cf. also NEA 2006a) 
• The special risks to environment and health involved in the nuclear process chain, 
which justify to particularly address the operator of a nuclear facility by special 
regulation and the demand to adequately provide for future decommissioning in or-
der to ensure safe decommissioning. 
• Intergenerational equity values: The generation benefiting from the output of the 
nuclear facility should pay for all consequences related to the production of this 
output. 
Although the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’ is widely accepted in principle, and although this 
term has been increasingly used in official documents (e. g., by the European Commis-
sion), it is not implemented to the upmost possible extent in every country. Examples 
have been given in Chapter 3.1.2.  
Fulfilment of the liabilities (operational and financial) related to nuclear waste manage-
ment and disposal as well as dismantling, decontamination, etc. (technical decommis-
sioning) is an absolute condition to the continued validity of the operating licences of 
nuclear facilities in some countries. For example, in Finland, according to the Nuclear 
Energy Act (section 26), the Government must cancel the operating licence wholly or 
partly, if the licensee is omitting to fulfil the financial provision obligation for nuclear 
waste management and decommissioning. 
Regulation can assure that the ‚Polluter Pays Principle’ will be followed also in special 
cases like early shutdown, major incidents or accidents, unexpected cost increases, 
bankruptcy of the operator, or other unforeseen events. This should receive particular 
attention as the collection of provisions lags behind the accumulation of liabilities for 
many facilities under routine operation. 
3.2.6 Different degree and ways of public control - Differing public 
information rights 
It can be basically differentiated between internal and external funds according to the 
degree of independence of the fund organisation from the facility operator. Further-
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more, there are different roles for the public, government, parliament and nuclear 
safety authority in the different decommissioning financing schemes. 
In countries with external funds, the national government has a strong or even solely 
dominating position. The influence of the national parliament is limited or even not ex-
isting in practice. In countries with internal unrestricted funds, there is little or no public 
control of decommissioning funds. The effectiveness of restrictions posed on operators 
and fund managers in restricted funding schemes could not be completely evaluated in 
the course of this project. It probably largely depends also on how the regulations are 
implemented and on the degree of independence and competence of the parties in-
volved (cf. Chapter 4 for further analysis of the problem of independence within the 
analysis of financial risks from the governance perspective). 
Against this background, it is interesting to see the recent development in France, 
where – according to the new law of June 2006 - a National Commission will be in-
stalled that will evaluate the decommissioning financing system every three years. 
Members of the Commission are designated by the National Assembly, the Senate and 
the Government. 
In all countries, there are only very limited rights for the public to receive detailed infor-
mation on decommissioning financing schemes. Furthermore, the municipalities con-
cerned interested in a socially and environmentally acceptable decommissioning 
process only have a weak position. 
This is the case although the impact on safety of the public, and particularly of the re-
gions where the facilities are located, could be substantial during decommissioning or 
in absence of decommissioning activities due to lack of finance.  
3.2.7 Harmonisation on EU level only with regard to general criteria to be 
fulfilled by national decommissioning financing schemes? 
As documented in Chapter 3.1.9, on the one hand, many stakeholders (operating com-
panies, governments, etc.) are quite satisfied with the present situation in their country, 
because they think that funding would be adequate and available when needed, and 
have concerns towards a process of harmonising decommissioning financing on the 
European level and substantially changing the present systems. On the other hand, 
some of these stakeholders stressed the importance to introduce some kind of general 
requirements or common criteria on producers of nuclear energy to ensure a level play-
ing field in the European Union. 
In conclusion, there is a strong preference to ensure freedom to apply an own national 
system in a Member State provided that this fulfils certain important general principles 
(minimum requirements/criteria) to be agreed on a European level. Following this ar-
gumentation would mean that possibilities for detailed regulation on European level 
would be significantly opposed, and thus are politically limited. 
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3.2.8 Trend towards increased restriction of funds? 
There are very different governance schemes of fund management, different invest-
ment rules, and variable access of operators of nuclear facilities to the funds.  
A number of Member States seem to be moving towards the increased restriction of 
funds (cf., e. g., the changes in legislation in Czech Republic, Sweden, Finland, and 
France). This development towards increased restriction of funds might be further ac-
celerated by pressure from the financial markets (analysts and auditors). 
3.2.9 Different expectations of contributors to decommissioning financ-
ing in new Member States  
In the new Member States, based on the stakeholder interviews carried out, it can be 
observed that 
• The European Commission expects its financial assistance of decommissioning 
and accompanying measures in the new Member States to be limited. The Euro-
pean Commission, e.g., does not plan to extend the assistance to Bohunice in the 
Slovak Republic beyond 2013. 
• In contrast, some representatives from governments and other stakeholders in the 
new Member States interviewed expect to receive EU contributions beyond what 
has been agreed on up to now. 
These different expectations can lead to a situation, in which it is unclear how future 
decommissioning activities will be paid for. 
3.3 Identification of typical examples of decommissioning financing 
methodologies  
3.3.1 Criteria for differentiating between typical financial schemes  
The country analysis has revealed substantial differences between the decommission-
ing financing systems in the EU-27. It would be beyond the scope of this project to ana-
lyse the financial consequences and risks involved in all these financing schemes in 
detail. Therefore, the analysis in Chapter 4 has to concentrate on specific types of de-
commissioning schemes. Several criteria might be applied to differentiate between 
typical decommissioning financing schemes: 
• Liable organisation / Distribution of liabilities 
– private: quoted companies / other companies 
– public (national, international, EU) 
– mixed public-private 
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• Ownership of operating company 
– private: quoted companies / other companies 
– public (national, international, European Commission) 
– mixed public-private 
• Fund management 
– private: quoted companies / other companies 
– public (national, international, EU) 
– mixed public-private 
• Independence of fund organisation from facility operation 
– internal fund within liable organisation (e.g., on-balance-sheet recognition of li-
abilities, or internal restricted fund),  
– external fund separated from operator, e.g. state company or agency (with or 
w/o transfer of liabilities and assets; with or w/o operator short-fall guarantee) 
• Restriction to management, investment and use of the funds  
– no limitation; operator has full access to the funds 
– some restrictions, e.g. assets earmarked formally against liabilities, or only lim-
ited borrowing from external fund, or authorisation needed before decommis-
sioning activities are paid out of the fund 
– strictly separated (“segregated”, “blocked”) fund 
• Rules for securing sufficient funds in case of short-falls, e. g. caused by insolvency 
and transfer of ownership 
– no rules / coverage 
– group solidarity of operators 
– insurance 
• Public control / reviews / audits / sanctions 
– internal / external 
– involvement / no involvement of third parties (Board of Auditors, Court of Audit, 
consultants) 
– regular / from time to time 
– obligatory / non-obligatory 
– decommissioning funding requirements have or have not to be fulfilled to re-
ceive operating license 
– no sanctions / sanctions in case of non-compliance 
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– no / weak / strong role for Parliament in public controlling / authorisation proc-
ess 
• In particular: Role of nuclear safety regulator 
– requirement to develop a decommissioning plan 
– requirement to develop a decommissioning cost plan 
– low / high quality requirements 
– low / high competence of regulator 
– involvement / no involvement of third parties (e. g., consultants) 
• Right of the public to have access to information:  
– private information: only annual reporting according to trade/commercial law 
– information partly public or only to a specific board 
– information fully public 
– low / high quality of information 
• Different sources of fund contribution 
– explicit tax or levy 
– part of electricity price 
– interest generated by the fund 
– penalties imposed by nuclear regulator 
– grants from national government and/or EU 
– part of general public budget 
• Dismantling (technical decommissioning) strategies 
– immediate 
– deferred 
– mixed 
• Cost estimates 
– quality of data base 
– order-of-magnitude estimate (rough calculation without detailed engineering 
data, e. g. by taking some cost figures in international literature for granted and 
only slightly adapting them to the situation in the country, i. e. by scaling up or 
down factors and approximate ratios) / budgetary estimate (based on the use of 
flow sheets, layouts and equipment details, where the scope has been defined 
but the detailed engineering has not been performed, e. g., modelling based on 
reference cases or differentiated modelling for every individual facility) / defini-
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tive estimate (one where the details of the project have been prepared and its 
scope and depth are well defined) 
– deterministic / taking uncertainties and risks into account (e. g. by sensitivity or 
scenario analysis) 
– regular review of cost estimates / reviews only from time to time 
– using inflation indexes or concrete prices to update costs 
– competence of organisations / persons carrying out the cost estimates 
• Amount of decommissioning costs and (financial) risks 
– Extremely high costs and risks: e.g. reprocessing plants, some uranium mines 
– High costs and risks: e.g. commercially used NPPs, some uranium mines 
– low to medium costs and risks: e.g. enrichment, conversion and fuel fabrication 
plants, research reactors, interim storages, small demonstration plants, some 
uranium mines and mills 
• History of building up a fund 
– From the beginning of operation of facilities (usually in old Member States) with 
or without changes in funding methodology 
– Having started after several years of operation (often in new Member States) 
– No changes / changes in funding methodology after several years of operation 
(several old and new Member States) 
• Importance of decommissioning financing regulation for future nuclear facilities 
– Already all plants shut down; no plans / legal possibilities to construct new 
plants 
– Ongoing nuclear phase-out; no plans / legal possibilities to construct new plants 
– Plants in operation; and plans / legal possibilities to construct new plants 
• Scope of provisions / constructive obligations / contingent liabilities / covenants 
made (different degree of asset cover) 
– covering all decommissioning costs / covering only part of decommissioning 
costs or even no provisions at all 
– covering on-site / on-site and off-site decommissioning costs 
• Accounting method / standard 
– international (IAS/IFRS, US-GAAP)/ national standards 
– undiscounted costs (overnight costs) / discounted costs (interest rate) 
– depreciation 
– expense / activate 
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– consolidation  
• Investment 
– operating / financial assets / specific financial asset portfolio 
– voluntary / mandatory financial-asset cover 
– different share of secure government bonds, equity, other non-government se-
curities 
3.3.2 Types of decommissioning financing schemes chosen for deeper 
analysis of financial consequences and risks 
The long list of possible criteria shows that the identification of types of decommission-
ing financing schemes is a multi-dimensional decision-making process. It does not 
seem to be possible to design complex types which can be clearly differentiated and at 
the same time to take into account all these relevant criteria and their possible parame-
ter values. Therefore, and with regard to the financial risk analysis that follows in Chap-
ter 4, it seems to be more appropriate to focus on particularly important criteria. Criteria 
selected from this perspective are the ones identified already in Chapter 3.1.6.1 as the 
ones being basic criteria for the identification of fund management systems (cf. the 
definitions in Chapter 2): 
• The differentiation between internal and external decommissioning financing solu-
tions (where internal means that the decommissioning funds/financial assets are 
part of the respective organisation and in the general accounts of the operator; ex-
ternal, in contrast, means that the decommissioning funds/financial assets are not 
part of the respective organisation and are not in the general accounts of the opera-
tor); 
• The differentiation between restricted and unrestricted funds; 
• The differentiation between public and private licensees being liable for decommis-
sioning cost. 
Therefore, the typical schemes analysed in more detail in the following are 
• Internal unrestricted fund; 
• Internal restricted fund; 
• External unrestricted fund;  
• External restricted fund; 
• Moreover, some public operators pay decommissioning costs from the current bud-
gets, which, in fact, is a kind of public internal unrestricted fund. 
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4 Analysis of financial consequences and risks 
4.1 Introduction into the financial risk analysis 
4.1.1 Overview on the four perspectives: accounting, valuation, govern-
ance, investment 
An analysis of financial consequences and risks of the existing decommissioning fi-
nancing schemes is particularly needed with respect to large quoted companies active 
or having a share in the nuclear business, but also with respect to other private or pub-
lic organisations being liable for nuclear decommissioning. They have to take both into 
account 
• economic pressure from the liberalised energy markets and the (national and in-
ternational) financial markets, 
• nuclear safety requirements. 
The financial risk analysis divides the financial consequences into  
• the risks related to governance issues, 
• the risks related to accounting issues,  
• the risks related to financial valuation issues and  
• the risks related to the investment policy.  
The governance perspective discusses  
• the risks relating to the organisational solution chosen for the decommissioning 
funds, the internal control systems, boards etc; 
• the adequacy of managerial responsibility for operating costs associated with the 
different decommissioning funding methodologies applied; 
• the financial risks associated with the different decommissioning funding method-
ologies; 
• how, depending on the decommissioning funding scheme applied, the financial 
risks shift between different stakeholders; 
• how strategic decisions can be impacted by different decommissioning funding me-
thodologies. 
The accounting perspective treats  
• how the different decommissioning funding methodologies can impede the compa-
rability between countries and how this can influence the usefulness of the informa-
tion provided of users making economic decisions; 
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• the impact of the different decommissioning funding methodologies to the pricing 
policy (power generation costs); 
• the consequences relating to the methods of accumulating the funds, taking regard, 
among others, of the differences between the different accounting standards used 
(national standards, IFRS/IAS, US-GAAP); 
• the impact of the different decommissioning funding methodologies to efficient use 
of capital. 
The valuation perspective describes  
• the impact of different decommissioning funding methodologies to the financial 
valuation of power generation plants and their financing potential; 
• the impact of different decommissioning funding methodologies to the risk-adjusted 
average cost of capital.  
The investment perspective discusses  
• the risks relating to the rules and methods of investing the funds provided and of 
the current investment portfolios chosen; 
• the risks relating to the differences in accessibility of the energy companies to the 
funds. 
4.1.2 Specifications and underlying principles 
When specifying a decommissioning funding system, it has to be differentiated 
between  
• the entity being liable for providing for decommissioning financing, 
• the entity which accumulates the fund and  
• the power of authority to dispose of the decommissioning funds which itself com-
prises of the activities of managing and controlling the funds investment and 
authorising payments for decommissioning. If the power of authority to dispose is 
with a third party, the degree of independence between the third party and the op-
erators can significantly vary. Therefore, in each case, the degree of independence 
has to be separately assessed. 
Underlying principles governing the financial risk analysis are the assumptions that 
• the ‚Polluter Pays Principle’ must apply as far as possible, and the operators of the 
nuclear installations are regarded as ‚polluters’  
• ‚transparency is an important requirement and 
• a high level of quality (best practice) of fund management is vital. 
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4.2 Governance Perspective 
4.2.1 Citizen’s health and safety, polluter pays principle 
Assuring the health and safety of citizens in all European countries is the overriding 
tenet of decommissioning. Authorities/regulators have to protect citizens from radioac-
tive emissions caused by the operation of and the different types of radioactive wastes 
generated by a nuclear facility. Therefore, all nuclear facilities have to be decontami-
nated and dismantled and the arising nuclear waste has to be managed and disposed 
of. For safety reasons, these activities must be carried out in any case. The safety re-
gime should ensure that decontamination and dismantling and management and dis-
posal of all sorts of arising radioactive wastes are timely executed, that unsafe 
technical procedures are not carried out, and that someone is going to pay for it. There-
fore, authorities should require the accumulation of financial resources for decommis-
sioning as a condition of receiving an operating license. 
Under the assumption of the “polluter pays principle” decommissioning has to be paid 
by the operator of the nuclear installation. This reflects the policy (attitude) that the ge-
neration benefiting from the nuclear energy produced, and not future generations, 
should pay for decommissioning. 
The objective of “decommissioning funding systems” is to ensure the availability of an 
adequate amount of financial resources (based on reliable and consistent cost calcula-
tions) for decommissioning by the time decommissioning activities have to be carried 
out. The availability and the adequate amount of financial resources for decommission-
ing are a key factor if the target of releasing a nuclear power installation (and its opera-
tor) from restrictions should be achieved. 
4.2.2 Decommissioning governance 
Operators, be they public or private, obtain cash inflows from their nuclear activities 
during the designed lifetime in the form of net sales (revenues). Part of this cash inflow 
has to be allocated to decommissioning funds (set up of provisions) because, after the 
shutdown of a nuclear installation, decommissioning activities will absorb a substantial 
amount of an operator’s financial resources (past inflows).  
Decommissioning expenditure can be understood as part of the capital expenditures of 
constructing a nuclear installation which, contrary to a classical investment pattern, 
arise/accrue not before the cash inflow period through sale of energy but when the use 
of the nuclear installation has come to an end (no further sale of energy and thus no 
further cash inflows). Therefore, the operator of a nuclear installation should set aside 
an adequate amount of financial resources (decommissioning funds) in order to pay the 
capital expenditures when shutting down the nuclear installation. The existence of this 
”inverse investment pattern” embodies an inherent governance conflict (cf. Chapter 
4.2.3.2).  
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The core issues in “decommissioning governance” therefore are questions such as: 
• Can, in a competitive environment, the operation of a nuclear installation generate 
sufficient financial resources (cash inflows) to cover all costs, inclusive decommis-
sioning? 
• How can it be assured that the adequate amount of financial resources will be set 
aside? 
• How can it be assured that the financial resources (funds set aside) will be man-
aged in a way that the financial resources are available at the time when needed:  
– after the permanent shut down at the end of the planned lifetime or  
– after an earlier shut down induced by an incident or accident during the planned 
lifetime? 
• How can it be prevented that the financial resources set aside for the decommis-
sioning are used for other purposes than for decommissioning? 
• How can “decommissioning” be prudently organised/structured, which means to 
assure the fulfilment of the key objective of citizen’s health and safety and thereby 
leaving sufficient decision-making ability to entrepreneurial operators of nuclear in-
stallations? 
In order to achieve the objective of decommissioning, different “decommissioning funds 
methodologies” have evolved and are applied throughout Europe. The adequacy of 
different methods relating to the objective of decommissioning is the core of the gov-
ernance perspective. In other words: How stringent are the different methods in the 
context of the temptation and the possibility not to set aside adequate financial re-
sources and/or to use the financial resources set aside for other purposes. 
To understand these concerns first the roots of a possible use for other purposes or a 
possible renouncement of setting aside provisions will be described; after this the dif-
ferent methodologies will be assessed in the context of the governance perspective. 
4.2.3 Roots of conflicts 
The operators of a nuclear installation assume, besides the responsibility for a safe 
operation, the responsibility for the financial balance and success. The pressure of 
achieving financial objectives (benchmarks) will grow in line with the ongoing deregula-
tion, which on its side will further intensify the competition (cf. Chapter 2 in IAEA 2006).  
4.2.3.1 Operators: Conflicting use of financial resources 
The main source of financial funds (cash inflows) of nuclear power plant operators is  
• Net sales/revenues received by the sale of energy.  
It is generally assumed that the revenues will flow on a stable basis until the end of 
operation (however, this assumption could be questioned in line with an increasing 
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degree of market deregulation). It is, only for the explanation of all financial purposes, 
further assumed that there will be no accident driven shut down during the lifetime. The 
accident case will be described in a separate chapter. 
The main root lies in the conflicting use of financial resources. Operators of a nuclear 
installation like a nuclear power plant not only need and use financial resources for the 
accumulation of decommissioning funds but also for many other purposes. Operators 
have also to incur expenses. Not all expenses constitute a direct cash outflow. In gen-
eral, expenses occur for the following main purposes: 
• Current costs (including maintenance, administration, salaries, nuclear fuel ele-
ments, insurance, material and services purchased, others); 
• Depreciation of the nuclear power plant; 
• To set aside and accumulate decommissioning funds in line with cost calculations 
and the guaranteed requirements within the limits of the licensing procedure; 
• Taxes 
• Interest and dividends (for private companies) 
Moreover, operators have to use (allocate) financial resources for 
• investments (capital expenditures) to renew the nuclear power plant (in order to 
maintain the operating license or to expand the lifetime) and 
• to redeem debt. 
4.2.3.2 Inverse investment pattern 
Entrepreneurs who want to implement a specific strategy have to finance this strategy. 
Hence they have to convince the capital markets to provide financial means (be it eq-
uity or debt). Financial markets are though referees as they diligently assess and ana-
lyse a strategy before financing it. Through this process, a disciplinary effect is imposed 
to managers. 
Now, if an enterprise such as an operator of a nuclear power plant accumulates sub-
stantial amounts of financial resources, which are only used in the distant future (time 
horizon of up to forty or more years), it could be tempted to use these financial re-
sources to finance strategies (e.g. acquisitions, investment in business segments not 
fitting to the overall strategy, etc.), which would not pass the stringent control of capital 
markets. 
The availability and the power of authority of decommissioning means of finance there-
fore constitute a considerable strategic risk of investing in possibly value decreasing 
strategies. Thus, the governance perspective should not only care about the risk of not 
disposing of financial resources for decommissioning at the time when needed but also 
at not giving wrong strategic incentives to operators. There is a similar strategic risk for 
governments (see 4.2.3.5).  
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In a positive economic environment, cash inflows will be sufficient to meet all present 
and future cash requirements/outflows. However, in a negative/unfavourable economic 
environment, cash outflows can be higher than inflows. Operators can quickly find 
themselves in conflicts of interest as they are, in such a situation, compelled to decide 
how to use the scarce financial resources (or to tap the capital markets).  
Such conflicts force them, in the financial and economic interest of their enterprise, to 
ponder different conflicting objectives and measures.  Conflicting objectives could arise 
between the accumulation of decommissioning funds and the redemption of debt or 
renewal investments (capital expenditures).  
If banks and bondholders urge redemption of debt in a period where the cash inflows 
are insufficient, the management could be tempted to defer the feeding of decommis-
sioning funds (which would lead to an under funded situation) or even to use the exist-
ing decommissioning funds (if they have the power of authority) as financing source. 
Or, an operator could, based on economic difficulties, be forced to require an extension 
of the lifetime of his plant in order to prolong the cash inflow period. If, in such a case, 
the licensing authorities push for a huge renewal program, the same temptation of de-
ferring decommissioning duties could emerge. 
Or, there could arise a conflict between setting aside decommissioning provisions or 
paying out dividends to shareholders. In such a situation, the prudence principle would 
require that dividend payments should only be allowed if and when all necessary de-
commissioning provisions are built (cf. KPMG/NRG 2006, p.50). 
As the increasing competition (on market shares) among nuclear energy providers and 
nuclear energy providers and providers of other energy sources is likely to increase, 
the need to cut the energy price could emerge. Decommissioning is part of the operat-
ing costs and thus also has an impact on the level of energy prices that can be offered 
to clients. This could lead to a conflict between feeding decommissioning funds and 
cutting the energy prices in order to maintain market shares. What should an operator, 
in an increasingly competitive environment and under increasing investor pressure, 
decide if he/she feels that the yield of an enlargement /renewal investment is higher 
than the performance of the fund. 
The roots of conflicting interests not only are conflicting uses of cash flows. They also 
arise in cases where an under funded situation already exists. In such a situation, 
enormous pressure could be imposed on decision makers to postpone decommission-
ing. It is more likely than not that under funded situations accrue because only part of 
decommissioning costs being accounted for (compare country reports; e.g. UK where 
the scope of the segregated fund, NLF, did not cover all stages of decommissioning) 
and because of the cost estimates and calculations remaining extremely difficult as 
long as the technical, political and industrial solution for final nuclear waste disposal is 
not generally accepted (more see chapter on the accounting perspective). 
A big responsibility is imposed to external certified auditors in the context of the correct 
amount of funds set aside. However, they verify if the calculations are in line with the 
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stipulated principles, they are not able to verify the accuracy of existing assumptions 
and cost calculations models. The audit reports on the adequacy and availability of 
financial resources always have to be read with this qualification in mind. 
4.2.3.3 Transfer of liabilities in case of change in ownership or bankruptcy of an 
entity 
The discussion on adequacy and availability of decommissioning funds must also con-
tain the question of what happens in the case of a change in ownership or bankruptcy 
of an entity.  
It must be prevented that the responsibility for decommissioning is separated from the 
nuclear power plant owner through a change in ownership (cf. country report Germany, 
Chapter 3.3: Fall-back option and transfer of ownership). Therefore, it must also be 
assured that, in the case of a change of ownership or bankruptcy, all decommissioning 
liabilities are transferred to a new owner or that the liabilities are secured by other 
measures.  
Very high attention has to be paid to this problem in the case of internal funds. The 
question is if an internal fund can be sufficiently secure given the assumption that there 
exists a risk of bankruptcy for all companies over a period of at least 60 years, which is 
a minimum operating life and time to complete decommissioning. 
In no case a situation should evolve where no financially sound/solvent legal entity re-
mains responsible for the liabilities or where the beneficiaries cannot claim the assets 
set aside for decommissioning. 
4.2.3.4 Conflicting interests and stakeholders 
The degree of conflict and the possible management decision depend on the position 
of power of involved stakeholders. The measure or solution the operators will be in-
clined to realise/implement is co-driven by the behaviour and position of power of the 
concerned stakeholders. Which of the stakeholders disposes of the best degree of or-
ganisation in order to exert the most direct and strongest influence (power)? It can be 
assumed that debtors (banks, bondholders) have, based on direct contractual relations, 
a stronger position to achieve redemption than citizens (or even more importantly fu-
ture generations), who are interested in adequate decommissioning funds, but who 
have not a direct written contract with the operators. 
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Table 11: Flows of funds and involved/concerned stakeholders (operators) 
Source of Funds Stakeholder 
Net sales/revenue received by the sale of energy Client, Operator 
  
Use of Funds Stakeholder 
Current operating costs  Employees, Suppliers, Auditors 
Depreciation Owner, Operator, Auditors 
Decommissioning Funds Citizens, Public, Competitors (not NPP, other 
energy producers), Auditors 
Taxes Government, Public 
Interests  
Dividends 
Debtors (Banks, Bondholders) 
Owner, Investors 
Investments (capital expenditures) 
Redemption of Debt 
Owner, Operator, Clients, Citizens (safety aspect) 
Debtors (Banks, Bondholders) 
 
4.2.3.5 Governments: Conflicting use of financial resources  
There also exist conflicting interests to which, in particular, governmental authorities 
managing decommissioning funds are exposed to.  
Both, public and private operators, encounter the problem of possibly conflicting use of 
scarce financial resources. The country reports contain different examples where de-
commissioning funds, managed by governmental authorities, have been used for other 
than exclusively for decommissioning purposes (cf. country report UK). However, in the 
case of private operators, it is clear that they have imperatively to set aside provisions 
during the operating period (lifetime). The financial resources have to be available 
when the facility is shot down.  
Contrary to this, public owners can abstain from building up provisions and pay all de-
commissioning costs from the current budgets (examples: Germany or to a huge extent 
UK NDA). This approach embodies a strategic risk (cf. the analysis of strategic risk of 
private operators in chapter 4.2.3.2). 
Governments, respectively public owners, who do not build up provisions but prefer to 
pay decommissioning from their current budget, are tempted to use the financial re-
sources for other purposes, where they expect higher social and political benefits. The 
UK government argues that it is not reasonable to put money in a segregated fund, 
because the social benefits of using this money for other public projects in the mean-
time (e.g. health) might be higher (cf. country report UK). This view embodies a strate-
gic risk, not only because the evaluation of the benefits is difficult, but more importantly 
because decommissioning has to be paid some day. If there will not be an adequate 
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amount of financial means set aside, a budget conflict can evolve, all the more most 
governments carry already today a huge debt burden.   
Paying decommissioning costs from current budgets means that the polluter pays prin-
ciple is overruled/suspended. In other words: those benefiting today from nuclear en-
ergy produced and creating decommissioning obligations do not have to pay all costs 
related to the production of nuclear energy. This hurts the principle of the intergenera-
tional justice and restricts autonomy of action of future generations because they will 
be compelled to first pay open bills from their parents before being able to plan and 
implement their own strategies (cf. also chapter 4.3.6). 
4.2.3.6 Dual system in one market 
So far the comments have been made relating to one methodology of providing for 
future decommissioning costs or the comparison among different methodologies. How-
ever, a very important aspect of the assessment is the fact, that in the European mar-
ket, and even within one country, some operators of nuclear facilities have to set up 
provisions while others are not affected by such a requirement. For example, in the UK, 
private operators are obliged to set aside decommissioning funds whereas public op-
erators can pay decommissioning costs form the current budget.  
Such principal differences mean an economic disadvantage for private operators in the 
liberalised market competing with public licensees, which becomes evident in the cour-
se of privatisation or preparation for possible privatisation of public operators as it can 
be seen in France and in some of the new Member States. 
Furthermore, the existence of such a dual system in the European market can become 
a threat to the decommissioning objective because wrong incentives are set. If de-
commissioning funds of private operators are under funded, responsible 
boards/committees (national energy policy) could be tempted to shift private decom-
missioning liabilities to a public entity and thereby eliminating the imminent financing 
gap. However, this would not solve the problem, it would only postpone it.  
4.2.4 Different Decommissioning Funding Methodologies 
4.2.4.1 The Governance Chain of Decommissioning Funding Methodologies 
The five basic decommissioning funding methodologies identified in Chapter 3.3 can be 
classified/analysed according to seven key components, which govern decommission-
ing funding methodologies. These seven components are illustrated in the decommis-
sioning governance chain in the table below. The governance chain (vertical reading of 
the table) contains the seven components where, in each part of the chain, and be-
tween different parts, governance aspects are embedded. The governance grid (hori-
zontal reading of the table) illustrates that the single parts of the chain can be 
differently assessed according to internal and external funding methodologies. 
Final Report – EU Decommissioning Funding Methodologies TREN/05/NUCL/S07.55436 
Wuppertal Institute et al. 85 
Figure 2: Decommissioning governance chain 
 
Source: Wuppertal Institute, et al., 2006: The governance chain contains seven basic components and 
five basic methodologies. Each basic methodology depicts a basic model, which can be sup-
plemented by many different additional specifications, which are discussed in more detail in the 
chapters on the accounting, valuation and investment perspective. Typical examples would be 
the degree of transparency or the applied accounting treatment or the degree of independence 
of involved parties and others (also see chapter on “criteria for identifying typical financial 
schemes 3.3.1). 
The first component [A] of the governance chain is the question of who defines or who 
regulates and monitors decommissioning (financing).  
• In most cases, this task is assigned to public licensing authorities (government 
level).  
• Key issues are:  
o The independence of the authority, which has to align different objec-
tives from different stakeholders. 
o Independence criteria for executive employees of an authority. They 
should dispose of sufficient personal independence from the operators 
and, if the operators are public entities, from the government.  
The second component [B] is the question of who is liable or who has to pay the de-
commissioning activities? Due to the “polluter pays principle” assumption, the operators 
of nuclear installations have to carry all decommissioning costs. They pay through a 
decommissioning funding system, which urges them to financially contribute to a des-
ignated decommissioning fund. 
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– This issue is not discussed in detail because the polluter pays principle is an 
underlying assumption. 
The third component [C] is the entity, which holds the fund in its general accounts.  
– Various methodologies are possible. The scope includes different solutions be-
tween internal unrestricted to external restricted .  
– The issue is strongly linked to the sixth component (power of authorising pay-
ments for decommissioning). 
The fourth component [D] is the question of who outlines the investment policy and the 
investment guidelines. 
– This aspect will be discussed in more detail in the chapter on the investment 
perspective.  
The fifth component [E] is the question of who manages the fund. 
– This aspect will also be discussed in more detail in the chapter on the invest-
ment perspective.  
– Key issue is: The degree of independence between the operators (as polluters 
and thus contributors to the funds) and the investment managers.  
The sixth component [F] is the question of who disposes of the power of authorising 
payments for decommissioning. 
– The key issue is: The degree of independence between the operators (as pol-
luters and thus contributors to the funds), the fund management and the posi-
tion disposing of the power of authorising payments. 
– The conflict potential always remains with the entity that has access to the de-
commissioning funds (power of authority).  
– If the operator disposes of the power of authority he could be tempted to defer 
payments in periods where the fund is underperforming (under funded). 
– If the government disposes of the power of authority it could be tempted to de-
fer payments in periods where it wishes to use the financial resources for other 
purposes (e.g. health, defence, agriculture etc.) 
The seventh component [G] is the question of who monitors or controls decommission-
ing (financing) and who has the authority for sanctions in the case of non-compliance.  
– The same considerations as for component (A) are relevant. 
4.2.4.2 Restrictions and earmarking 
The internal restricted and the external restricted decommissioning methodologies are 
characterised by restrictions imposed on the accumulation, management and use of 
financial means. 
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A restriction (earmark) imposed on a financial asset limits or directs the use of the fi-
nancial assets for a clearly defined purpose (in the case of decommissioning for paying 
decommissioning costs and nothing else).  
Earmarked assets have to be disclosed separately in the balance sheet. If there are 
restricted or earmarked decommissioning assets, the directors of the nuclear power 
plant or the fund manager act as trustees and they cannot independently decide to use 
it for other purposes.  
However, earmarking alone doesn’t effectively protect decommissioning funds (assets) 
from use for other purposes. Earmarking only increases transparency and elevates the 
barrier for alternative use. In addition, in case of misuse, it clarifies legal assessments 
in case of complaints (and facilitates prosecution) (cf. Chapter 4.3.5.8; gross or net 
presentation). 
Fund assets have to be available at the time when needed. This implicates that the 
beneficiaries must be able, in all circumstances (change in ownership, bankruptcy and 
others), to legally claim the assets. This is not fully guaranteed just by earmarking. Ad-
ditional restrictions/regulation is needed to ensure this. 
4.2.5 The inherent conflict potential of different funding methodologies 
4.2.5.1 Governance in general 
The “governance” assessment of different decommissioning funding methodologies 
always has to be carried out from the perspective of achieving the necessary health 
and safety for citizens and the final objective of decommissioning, which is the release 
of a nuclear power plant from any nuclear restrictions. 
Moreover, country specific aspects have to be taken into consideration (see country 
reports). For example, the assessment of an applied methodology also depends on the 
amount of nuclear entities in a country. A country with only one nuclear entity has, at 
least in some aspects, to be differently analysed than a country with thirty nuclear enti-
ties. 
Basically, it can be said, that there is nothing like a one-and-only solution for decom-
missioning financing. In principle, a bundle of decommissioning solutions assuring the 
health and safety of citizens and being within the legal boundaries of a country are 
valid and can be applied. Within the legal boundaries means, that the solutions comply 
with all stipulations from relevant laws and regulations. Thereby, international and na-
tional laws and regulations are important (cf. Chapter 5 for relevant international regu-
lations). 
However, the governance debate goes beyond mere compliance with relevant regula-
tions. A legalistic view hardly guarantees an efficient management of complex situa-
tions. Complex situations are characterised by many different risks. Governance 
contains legal aspects but also goes an important step further. It provides a balanced 
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and structured setup of a dependable system of checks and balances, which facilitates 
the risk management and contributes to achieving the key objectives of an entity. 
The importance of governance in the context of decommissioning, which goes beyond 
mere compliance with existing laws and regulations, is similar to the well-known classi-
cal debate on corporate governance. There too, it could be (and it has been) argued 
that a strict application of laws and regulations is sufficient. However, the development 
in all countries worldwide has proven that a good governance system is key to a sus-
tainable economic success of companies and their investors. All countries know many 
examples where insufficient checks and balances are a main reason for severe com-
pany failures going from crashes up to total breakdowns (losses).  Examples are: the 
Swissair grounding; in Germany Flowtex, Holzmann, Vulkan, in France Vivendi, etc. 
Therefore, almost all European countries and also international organisations such as 
the OECD (2004) have developed Codes of Best Governance Practice aiming at en-
forcing confidence in the well functioning of the market economy. These codes focus 
on and give recommendations for questions such: How can transparency be improved, 
how can an equal treatment of shareholders be achieved, how can the exercise of 
shareholders right be improved, how can the interests of different stakeholders (mainly 
shareholders and managers) be aligned, how can the organisational structure be opti-
mised, how can independence be assured, which are appropriate control mechanisms 
and which behaviour is recommendable in cases of conflicts of interest?  
Such recommendations are a typical case of soft legislation (non-binding principles). 
By giving guidance and suggestions, they indicate the way to best practice without cre-
ating new and possibly inefficient regulations. 
4.2.5.2 Governance and decommissioning in particular  
Different strengths and weaknesses can be attributed to internal and external decom-
missioning methodologies. Almost all weaknesses of specific funding systems are 
linked to the degree of the conflicts of interests potential. Conflicts of interests do not 
automatically disqualify a solution. But it necessitates accompanying control measures 
in order to prevent negative effects stemming from conflicts of interests or, in the gov-
ernance language, “checks and balances” have to be established.  
As a general rule, it can be said that the higher the conflict of interests potential linked 
to a decommissioning methodology, the higher the need for additional checks and bal-
ances measures or measures which assure good decommissioning practice by provid-
ing appropriate fences (as risk reducers).  
Given the many conflicts of interests embedded in decommissioning and the impor-
tance of the health and safety aspect over a long time horizon, it is advisable to rec-
ommend best practice of decommissioning financing, which goes beyond mere legal 
compliance. Important aspects, which could require recommendations, are very similar 
to the above-mentioned aspects of governance: 
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• How to improve transparency? 
• How to assure independence?  
• How to deal with conflicts of interests? 
• How to deal with uncertainty (unexpected situations)? 
• What are the appropriate control measures („fences“)? 
The governance analysis depicts that internal and external methodologies need addi-
tional selected checks and balances measures. One key issue in decommissioning (cf. 
Chapter 4.2.2) is the question of how to prudently organise “decommissioning”, which 
means to assure the fulfilment of the key objective of citizen’s safety and thereby leav-
ing sufficient decision-making ability to entrepreneurial operators of nuclear installa-
tions. Therefore, it should strive for solutions with a minimum of necessary additional 
measures. All additional measures cause additional costs and carry the inherent risk of 
inefficiency. Any control measure, which could be avoided, should be avoided. In prin-
ciple, external approaches reduce the need of additional measures of checks and bal-
ances. 
4.2.5.3 Governance and competition  
The main focus of this report is the aspect of citizens’ health and safety and not the 
question of how different methodologies affect competition. However, driven by liberali-
sation and privatisation, the framework of competition in the nuclear energy industry is 
changing, and therefore, some remarks regarding the impact on competition have to be 
made. Three issues are relevant: 
• First, competition is always a source of possible conflicts of interests (see 4.2.3.1 
and 4.2.3.2).  
• Second, any impact on competition by differences in decommissioning financing 
methodologies applied in different countries should be avoided because this could 
lead to pressure to compromise safety in order to raise competitiveness of a coun-
try’s energy industry. The applied decommissioning regime affects the cost struc-
ture of the nuclear facility and thus, also affects the competitiveness of an operator 
in the liberalised energy market. In particular, all reductions in safety in order to 
gain market shares and monetary benefits have to be prevented. Countries can 
also influence the competitiveness of their private nuclear energy industry through 
split of liabilities between the public and the private organisations, with dual de-
commissioning financing systems in place (cf. Chapter 4.2.3.6). Here, full transpar-
ency should be required. 
• And finally, the third reason to discuss governance and competition is the fact, that 
governments as public operators tend to pay decommissioning from the current 
budget (for example, in Germany, or NDA in UK). An economic environment, which 
requires private operators to set aside decommissioning funds and, at the same 
time, allows public operators to pay later through the current budgets, clearly dis-
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advantages private operators, at least in those areas in which both are competing 
with each other (cf. Chapter 4.2.3.6). 
4.2.5.4 In the case of an incident or accident or other cases of early shutdown 
In chapter 4.2.1.3, the inverse investment pattern has been described as a driver for 
conflicts of interests. A report of the Nuclear Energy Institute in the US describes this 
as the construction in reverse (NEI 2002).  
Given the safety and health imperative, it is advisable that all financial resources for 
decommissioning (or at least guarantees for the availability of these resources) should 
be already available at the initial commissioning of a nuclear power plant (cf. Finland: 
the condition for giving the first operating licence is that the decommissioning and 
waste management financial liability is fully covered (100%) by securities at the start-up 
moment). This is all the more important as decommissioning has to be executed in the 
case of an incident or accident that induces an early shutdown of the plant.  
The financial risks related to a major incident or accident or other event that leads to an 
early shutdown of the plant are that, at the occurrence of such an event, not all liabili-
ties are covered (under funded situation) and the flow of contributions will cease. How-
ever, the process of decommissioning has to start immediately. In order to assure 
health and safety in such a critical period, a financial source must be available to bridge 
the financial gap induced to an early shutdown.  
Another risk should be mentioned when analysing the case of a major incident or acci-
dent: the political consequences should not be ignored. They could lead to a total re-
valuation of the nuclear industry or to more stringent regulations and thus higher 
decommissioning costs. 
4.2.6 Conclusions from the governance perspective 
4.2.6.1 Criteria for choosing a preferred decommissioning financing solution 
from the governance perspective 
The objective of this part of the study on “Comparison among different decommission-
ing methodologies” is to analyse and assess financial risks relating to the various 
methods to set aside and manage financial resources for decommissioning purposes 
and, and based upon the analysis, to propose feasible steps of optimising decommis-
sioning funding methodologies. The ideal outcome would be to identify a preferred 
methodology. 
However, a perfect solution doesn’t which can be recommended to all countries and 
facilities. The shortcomings of the current budget methodology have been clearly de-
scribed in chapter 4.2.3.6 and chapter 4.2.5.3. Therefore, the current budget methodol-
ogy is not regarded to be an appropriate solution. The different internal and external 
methodologies have their specific strengths and weaknesses. In chapter 4.2.4.1, it has 
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been explained that basically a bundle of internal and external solutions exists that 
could be applied. Therefore, it will be difficult to develop a recommendation, which em-
braces all critical aspects or, which differentiates between acceptable and unaccept-
able decommissioning funding solutions. 
However, what can be done is to define important criteria characterising a preferred 
solution. Such a solution should preferably  
• aim at reducing any possible situation where financial funds obtained by the opera-
tor can be used for different purposes (multi-purpose application), and thus aim at 
reducing any possible situation where financial funds for decommissioning can slip 
in a conflicting relation with other financing purposes. This means that decommis-
sioning funds should preferably not be in the general accounts of operators, be they 
private or governmental authorities (cf. KPMG/NRG 2006, p. 63: Funds assets 
should be separate or legally separated from other assets and liabilities); 
• avoid situations where decommissioning funds remain in the general accounts, 
because this can become critical in the context of securing decommissioning funds 
under a long term perspective; 
• focus on the independence of involved parties (operator, fund management, autho-
rities; in other words, between all members of the governance chain (A to G)); 
• avoid situations where the operator has the power of authority to dispose of the 
decommissioning funds. Such solutions can become critical in the context of secur-
ing decommissioning funds under a long term perspective; 
Conflicts of interests exist for internal as well as for external decommissioning funding 
methodologies and for private operators as well as for public operators. However, it can 
be said that those sharing the responsibility in the context of internal systems are faced 
with more sources of possible conflicts of interest than those in external regimes. Ac-
cordingly, it can be said that the need for additional “checks and balances” measures 
(fences) increases with internal solutions. 
The higher weight of conflicts of interests in the case of internal methodologies together 
with the higher barriers for beneficiaries to legally claim assets when necessary are the 
main arguments, which speak for preferring external solutions where assets are sepa-
rately accumulated and managed. 
An improvement of the decommissioning problem will not be found by proposing a one-
and-only preferable solution. First, it will be difficult to reach acceptance of such a pro-
posed preferred decommissioning financing methodology. Second, some countries are 
satisfied with their applied decommissioning financing methodology and wish not to 
change anything and fear that the development of new guidance could impair the ac-
tual national systems. Moreover, various countries do not seem to wish the decommis-
sioning issue to be solved on a European level. A realistic perspective therefore leads 
to the conclusion that internal as external decommissioning methodologies will be con-
tinuously applied. However, an improvement will not be found predominantly by switch-
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ing from one principle scheme to another but first and foremost on the level of generally 
agreed and monitored principles and additional measures (“risk reducers”, “fences”) 
reducing the conflict potential of decommissioning financing methodologies. 
4.2.6.2 Public oversight board 
In addition, in order to ensure that a specific level and quality of generally agreed and 
monitored principles of additional measures (“risk reducers”, “fences”) will be applied, it 
would be reasonable to create a kind of European “oversight board” or at least a kind of 
“decommissioning financing committee” or “council’”. Such a public board or committee 
or council would set principles and framework guidelines and would also monitor them. 
The general principles and framework guidelines should improve the well functioning of 
systems and have the purpose of enabling most decommissioning methodologies. 
Moreover, the board or committee could propose methodology-specific additional 
measures (fences). This will be further discussed in Chapter 6.3.2 and Chapter 6.4.3. 
4.3 Accounting Perspective 
4.3.1 Overriding Perspective 
The accounting perspective is an overriding perspective. The comments on accounting 
are relevant for the discussion of all other perspectives (governance, investment and 
valuation perspective) because accounting provides the basic information needed to 
make any decision or assessment. Without valuable information no reliable assess-
ment can be made. Accounting plays a major role in increasing transparency. 
The application of different accounting approaches hampers a valuable comparison of 
the applied decommissioning financing systems.  
The “country reports” in the appendix to this final report and previous chapters of this 
study describe the many uncertainties, which are embedded in estimating future de-
commissioning costs. Different ways how to estimate these future costs can lead to not 
fully comparable amounts of provisions. 
The “country reports” also reveal that, on the one hand, different accounting principles 
are applied and that, on the other hand, the data availability differs and is partly insuffi-
cient.  
Starting from the definition of “decommissioning” it is almost impossible (or only with an 
enormous input of time resources which is an inefficient exercise) to compare and as-
sess the financial risks and consequences of the applied decommissioning funding 
systems in all European countries.  
Three main problems exist:  
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• The definition in each country only covers a specific, in most cases a limited range 
of decommissioning activities. Such an environment favours the emerging of under 
funded situations.  
• In addition, even provisions for the same range are not comparable as they are 
based on country specific accounting treatments.  
• And third, the basis (assumptions) of cost calculation is not always disclosed. 
Figure 3: Difficult comparisons between countries 
 
Source: Wuppertal Institute, et al., 2006 
There is not always sufficient information available on the underlying accounting princi-
ples applied in the different countries, and the data are neither reliably comparable nor 
consistent and there is a lack of transparency. Such an accounting environment can 
lead to substantial misinterpretations and errors in judgement. 
• Example: If one has to compare an externally managed decommissioning fund in 
country A with an internally managed decommissioning fund in country B, they 
might be inclined to prefer the external solution, because they put a significant 
weight on inherent governance risks linked to internal funds. However, if the exter-
nal decommissioning fund were under funded because it has not been appropri-
ately accounted for the provisions (not all cost elements are recognised) whereas 
the internal fund is appropriately funded the choice could possibly be in favour of 
the internal fund.  
• Another example would be: If not all cost elements are recognised, an enterprise 
(nuclear operator) doesn’t account for all debt, and provisions are debt. In this 
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case, the enterprise doesn’t disclose a true and fair view of the financial position 
and performance. Consequently, the misled investors would overestimate the fi-
nancial value. This aggravates and complicates the decision of investors in an un-
acceptable way. Investors would pay a too high price for a stake in the enterprise. 
(The shareholder value concept will be explained and discussed in more detail in 
the valuation chapter). 
The question of valuation and credit ranking is important as many equity research pub-
lications from financial institutions reveal. The unsatisfactory and inadequate account-
ing environment and the missing reliability and thus comparability of information in 
many cases, documented in the country reports in the appendix to this final report, urge 
the equity research institutions to describe their accounting assumptions before they 
are up to explain and comment their findings. Special efforts have to be undertaken to 
value and compare decommissioning provisions. Such efforts are usually not neces-
sary in other industries such as the chemical or airline industry or others where ana-
lysts and investors can rely and resort to accepted principles.  
• Example: FitchRatings report by Shnaps/Monnier/Steel (2005):  
– „Generally, published accounts do not provide adequate detail on how these es-
timated costs are calculated. For instance, to what degree do they make allow-
ances for future efficiency improvements due to technological innovation? … To 
make a useful comparison between operators’ spent fuel provisions, further de-
tailed information is needed, which is not always included in published company 
reports.“ (p.5) 
– „Long-term spent fuel storage is harder to estimate due to lack of experience, 
available storage capacity and definitive government policy.“ (p.5) 
4.3.2 EU-Directives or IFRS: Striving towards Harmonisation  
It is important to work towards a harmonisation of applied accounting principles. This 
leads to the question: which “principles”? Different sets of accounting standards exist 
which all treat the key issues linked with “decommissioning activities”. Therefore, it is 
neither advisable nor necessary to develop specific “Generally Accepted Nuclear De-
commissioning Principles”. The complexity linked to the underlying assumptions for 
measuring decommissioning provisions should not be amplified by special accounting 
principles.   
What is paramount is to commit oneself to an existing set of ”generally accepted ac-
counting principles” and to add, where vital, clarifications.  
It is not a component of this report to propose a specific set of accounting standards. 
However, it is imperative to underline that a reliable assessment of decommissioning 
funding methodologies can only be achieved by the means of a single set of account-
ing principles. 
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Basically, two accounting systems (single set of accounting standards) could be con-
sidered for European companies:  
• the EU-Directives (the Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 and 
the Seventh Council Directive 83/349 EEC of 13 June 1983 referred to in this report 
as 4th and 7th EU-Directives) or  
• the International Financial Reporting Standards IFRSs. These include International 
Accounting Standards (IASsTM) and interpretations as at 1 January 2006. For the 
purpose of this report it is referred to as IFRSs. 
Two specific reasons speak in favour of IFRSs.  
• First reason: After a diligent and comprehensive process, the EU has adopted 
IFRSs  for quoted companies, applicable from the year 2005 onwards.  
• Second reason: The report also treats the valuation perspective from an investor’s 
(shareholders) point of view. Various quoted companies fully own or have shares in 
companies owning nuclear facilities, which implies the application of the IFRSs lo-
gic.  
This report will argue based on the IFRSs logic. However, this should not be regarded 
as an anticipation of the accounting system that will be finally chosen. Both would be 
appropriate under the condition that they are strictly applied (including auditing). 
The above mentioned report by Shnaps/Monnier/Steel (2005) supports this view: „The 
recent move towards IFRS accounting should allow for closer comparison as previ-
ously the operators were reporting under different accounting standards.“ (p.6)  
4.3.3 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
4.3.3.1 Accounting Framework 
This section describes selected key issues and elements of “generally accepted ac-
counting principles (GAAP)” whereas the next section will particularly treat the key is-
sues linked to “decommissioning accounting”. The meaning of accounting frameworks 
always is profoundly underestimated. For a detailed analysis and a deeper understand-
ing of accounting frameworks it is recommended to consult the IFRSs 2006 bound 
volume. The following description shall introduce, in few words, into the logic of ac-
counting frameworks.  
Accounting frameworks consist of different parts, which are arranged in a pyramid hier-
archy. On the top, there is the objective of accounting principles, followed by underlying 
assumptions, qualitative characteristics, elements of financial statements and the crite-
ria for recognition, measurement and disclosure. 
The interpretation of information provided by an accounting system should only be 
used in the spirit of the accounting framework. All specific standards of an accounting 
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system are derived from the principle philosophy and logic given in the framework. If 
discussions arise about the meaning of a specific standard, the solution always has to 
be found according to the spirit of the framework. 
4.3.3.2 Objective of GAAP 
Within the IFRSs Framework, the objective of accounting is recorded as follows: 
“The objective of financial statements is to provide information about the financial posi-
tion, performance and changes in financial position of an entity that is useful to a wide 
range of users. Users include present and potential investors, employees, lenders, 
suppliers and other creditors, customers, governments and their agencies and the pub-
lic” (IFRSs Framework, par. 12). 
4.3.3.3 Underlying Assumptions of GAAP 
The target of IFRSs (and all other accounting principles) is based on two underlying 
assumptions, the accrual basis and the going concern: 
• The accrual basis says that transactions and other events are recognised when 
they occur and not when cash or cash equivalent is received or paid and that they 
are recorded in periods to which they relate (IFRSs Framework, par. 22). 
• The going concern assumption means that an entity will normally continue in opera-
tion (IFRSs Framework, par. 23). 
4.3.3.4 Qualitative Characteristics of GAAP 
Moreover, the framework defines the attributes that make information useful to users. 
These attributes are termed “qualitative characteristics”. The IFRSs Framework ac-
centuates, besides others, “understandability, relevance, reliability, comparability and 
constraints on relevant and reliable information” as lead qualitative characteristics 
(IFRSs Framework, par. 24-45).  
It is assumed that information must meet these criteria in order to be useful for decision 
makers. 
4.3.3.5 True and fair view (fair presentation) 
The application of the principal qualitative characteristics and appropriate accounting 
standards normally results in financial statements, which present a “true and fair view”. 
True and fair view means that the financial position, the performance and changes in 
financial position of an entity are fairly presented (IFRSs Framework, par. 46). 
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4.3.3.6 Elements of GAAP 
The next important parts of the framework are the “elements” of financial statements. 
Accounting groups broad classes according to their economic characteristics. These 
broad classes are termed “elements” (IFRSs Framework, par. 47-80).  
Elements in the Balance Sheet (related to financial position) are:  
• Assets; 
• Liabilities and 
• Equity.  
The elements in the Income Statement (related to the performance) are  
• Income and  
• Expenses. 
4.3.3.7 Recognition, Measurement and Disclosure 
As a last step, frameworks have to define when a financial item meets the definition of 
an element.  
According to IFRSs, “recognition is the process of incorporating in the balance sheet 
or income statement an item that meets the definition of an element and satisfies the 
criteria for recognition” (IFRSs Framework, par. 82). An item should be recognised if it 
is probable that any future economic benefit associated with the item will flow to or from 
the entity and the item has a cost or value that can be measured with reliability (IFRSs 
Framework, par. 83). 
According to IFRSs, “measurement” is the process of determining the monetary 
amounts at which elements of the financial statements are to be recognised and car-
ried in the balance sheet or income statement (IFRSs Framework, par. 99). 
It is evident, that comparability and reliability of cost calculations can only be achieved 
when, in all cases, the same items are recognised and measured according to the sa-
me principles. 
Finally, accounting standards also lay down which information has to be disclosed. 
4.3.4 Accounting standards and decommissioning financing methodolo-
gies 
The main blocks of accounting frameworks have been described in the previous chap-
ter. This section investigates the interface between decommissioning and accounting.   
One key issue in the comparison among different decommissioning financing method-
ologies is the question of the adequate amount of funds (assets) and provisions. Both 
depend on the recognised and measured costs linked to decommissioning.  
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Therefore, from the decommissioning perspective, the following questions have to be 
diligently analysed:  
• Which cost items (based on cost calculations) should be recognised as costs and 
how, if recognised, should they be measured; 
• From the accounting angle, it has to be analysed which are the relevant accounting 
standards for decommissioning activities.  
• The accrual basis says that transactions are recognised when they occur and that 
they are recorded in periods to which they relate (IFRSs Framework, par. 22). This 
leads to the question: to which point in time is the building of provisions justified?  
– Some argue that the creation of provisions, and thus funds, need not to start in 
the first year.  
– Others argue that the creation should start at the same moment as the nuclear 
power plant has been commissioned because of the nuclear plant being con-
taminated once the nuclear fission is initiated for the first time (DresdnerKlein-
wortWassersteinResearch).  
– The accrual assumption clearly speaks for the second position, at least for all 
demolition and dismantling costs.  
– As an example, in Finland the condition for giving the first operating licence is 
that the decommissioning and waste management financial liability is fully cov-
ered (100%) by securities at the start-up moment. 
– As an example, in France (Court of Accounts) it is argued that, in the case of 
dismantling, the start-up of the facility triggers the obligation, while in the case of 
spent fuel and waste management obligations they are triggered by the produc-
tive activity, shares a similar view (country report France p. 35: CDC 2005). 
• Is the going concern assumption feasible given the fact of limited life of a nuclear 
power plant?  
– Here it can be argued that yes, because in case of an accident the valuation of 
assets would undergo the immediate impairment test of assets and thus, the 
devaluation would be reflected in the balance sheet through lower asset values. 
4.3.5 Relevant elements in the context of decommissioning 
4.3.5.1 Cost Items 
The identification of cost items that should be recognised has to be derived from the 
definition of “decommissioning” and the underlying “polluter pays principle” assumption: 
• “All activities covering the technical decommissioning of the nuclear installation 
(decontamination, dismantling and demolition) and waste management (manage-
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ment and disposal of radioactive waste and spent fuel) leading to the release of the 
nuclear installations from radiological restrictions.”  
Based on this definition, the accounting perspective alludes to a comprehensive cover-
age of cost items, including future waste management costs. The underlying assump-
tion of the polluter pays principle depicts, that the costs have to be recognised in the 
books of the operators of nuclear installations (polluters).  
Also see chapter 3.1.4 where the eleven cost items according to the “Proposed Stan-
dardised List of Items for Costing Purposes on Decommissioning of Nuclear Installa-
tions”, published by NEA/IAEA/EC are described. 
4.3.5.2 Selected Standards Relating to the Balance Sheet 
The following list is neither comprehensive nor does it constitute an authoritative opin-
ion on the final application in the context of decommissioning. The list aims at highlight-
ing which elements and standards of the IFRSs 2006 bound volume are important and 
where accounting and how accounting can provide support for comparable and reliable 
information on decommissioning methodologies.  
Liabilities: 
• Provisions (IAS 37) 
• Constructive Obligations (IAS 37 
• Contingent Liabilities (IAS 37) 
Assets: 
• Property, Plant, Equipment (IAS 16) which includes depreciation  
• Impairment of Assets (IAS 36) 
• Contingent Assets (IAS 37) 
• Rights to Interests arising from Decommissioning, Restoration and Environmental 
Rehabilitation Funds (IFRIC 5). (IFRIC is the International Financial Reporting In-
terpretations Committee of IASB, which provides timely guidance on newly, identi-
fied issues not specifically addressed in existing IFRSs.) 
Equity (consolidation method) 
• Investments in Associates (IAS 28).  
Not all standards will be explained in detail. However, a closer look at the treatment of 
provisions in IAS 37 points out the usefulness of accounting standards in the context of 
decommissioning. 
4.3.5.3 Decommissioning costs constitute a liability  
Decommissioning costs constitute a liability as they are a present obligation of an op-
erator arising from past events, the settlement of which is expected to result in an out-
TREN/05/NUCL/S07.55436 Final Report – EU Decommissioning Funding Methodologies 
100 Wuppertal Institute et al. 
flow from the entity of resources embodying economic benefits (compare: IFRSs® 
2006, IAS 37, par. 10). IAS 37, par. 10 defines provisions as liabilities of uncertain tim-
ing or amount and IAS 37 differentiates between legal and constructive obligations and 
contingent liabilities. 
IAS 37, par. 14: Provision shall be recognised when: 
• an entity has a present obligation (legal or constructive) as a result of past events; 
• it is probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be re-
quired to settle the obligation; and 
• a reliable estimate can be made of the amount of the obligation. 
IAS 37, par. 10: A constructive obligation is an obligation that derives from an entity’s 
actions where: 
• by an established pattern of past practice, published policies or a sufficiently spe-
cific current statement, the entity has indicated to other parties that it will accept 
certain responsibilities; and 
• as a result, the entity has created a valid expectation on the part of those other par-
ties that it will discharge those responsibilities.   
IAS 37, par. 10: A contingent liability is: 
• A possible obligation that arises from past events and whose existence will be con-
firmed only by the occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more uncertain future 
events not wholly within the control of the entity; or 
• a present obligation that arises from past events but is not recognised because: 
– It is not probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will 
be required to settle the obligation; or... 
– the amount of the obligation cannot be measured with sufficient reliability.  
• IAS 37, par. 27: An entity shall not recognise a contingent liability. 
It seems to be evident that operators of nuclear installations have present obligations 
as a result of past events, which will lead to cash outflows. Moreover, it can be argued 
that based on licensing requirements (regulators, conditions to obtain the license) and 
the applied communication of operators (message towards citizens relating to the 
health and safety policy), operators are faced with constructive obligations, which have 
to be recognised as provisions. 
The case of contingent liabilities is also a typical pattern that fits to the operations of a 
nuclear facility, as various amounts of obligations cannot be measured with sufficient 
reliability (interface between intermediate storage and final waste disposal). 
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4.3.5.4 Assessment of IAS 37 
The discussion of key elements of IAS 37 exemplifies that accounting has convincing 
answers to the problem of treating decommissioning activities. However, gaps remain, 
which should be pinpointed.  
IFRSs define provisions as liabilities of uncertain timing and amount which should be 
recognised when, and only when an entity has a present obligation (legal or construc-
tive) as a result of past events, it is probable that an outflow of resources embodying 
economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation and a reliable estimate can 
be made of the amount of the obligation. 
This definition of provisions leaves room for different interpretations and applications in 
the context of decommissioning activities because of the costs of the final waste dis-
posal remaining unclear as long as ultimate waste disposal is not definitively arranged 
(uncertainties as to the political, technical and industrial solution which will be chosen). 
For the same reason, the time period of intermediate storage also is uncertain, again 
leading to difficulties in estimating costs and attributing probabilities. Moreover, all cost 
calculations are based on a set of assumptions, which also leave room for discussions 
and interpretations. 
Therefore, expressions such as “probable outflow, reliable estimate of the obligation, 
best estimate” can be interpreted in different ways leading to a situation where some 
operators recognise decommissioning obligations as liabilities and build up provisions 
in their accounts whereas others do not recognise it as liabilities and only disclose it as 
contingent liabilities (or a s a third way do not account for it).  
Probable outflow means, in the IFRSs logic, that the event is more likely than not to 
occur (IAS 37, par. 23). To exceed the more likely than not level, the probability has to 
be higher than 50%. Each probability debate can lead to diverging interpretations.  
In contrast, the terms best and reliable estimate are less critical. Best estimate is the 
amount that an operator would rationally pay to settle the obligation at the balance 
sheet day or to transfer it to a third party at that time (IAS 37, par. 37). A reliable esti-
mate is only in extremely rare cases not be possible (IAS 37, par. 26).  
Therefore, a recommendation should contain the description of the mechanisms be-
tween intermediate storage and the final waste disposal in order to eliminate all possi-
ble latitude of judgement and to achieve a consistent application of recognising 
provisions. Such a clarification would mainly treat the interface between 
• intermediate storage and final disposal of waste and  
• provisions and contingent liabilities and 
• legal and constructive obligations and 
• the assumptions on which the cost calculations are based. 
A clarification (amendment) should improve the reliability and comparability and elimi-
nate the risk that a provision will not be recognised or only too late. 
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4.3.5.5 Covenants 
Covenants are restrictions set on contracts and are enforceable. Examples might be 
that a contract between a bank and operator contains a covenant, which restricts the 
credit to specific criteria such as debt/equity ratio or others. If the criteria are not met 
any longer the credit has to be paid back immediately. 
Covenants should be disclosed. They narrow the financing potential of an operator. 
This can lead to a possible conflict between building decommissioning funds and re-
deeming debt. Moreover, knowledge about covenants is imperative for investors if they 
want to reliably assess the risk. 
4.3.5.6 Costs of future operations 
Provisions are obligations based/derived from past events. However, not only costs 
based on past events but also costs of future operations (costs that only accrue when 
operations are continued) are a key element in funding systems.  
However, these costs only occur when operations are continued. As soon as new fuel 
elements are used the additional decommissioning costs accrue and have to be 
recognised as provisions. In case of a stop of operations, no new fuel elements will be 
burnt and no additional costs accrue. 
Future costs for decommissioning also are operative costs and therefore included in 
the estimates for future free cash flows (for more details see 4.4.1). 
The theme is if an operator has the continuing ability to cover decommissioning costs 
of future operations or, if this is not given, he should discontinue operations. Key ques-
tions are: 
• Is the operator financially sound in order to undergo incremental decommissioning 
costs; 
• Does the (future) market environment allow to sell energy at prices which also allow 
to cover decommissioning costs; 
• Do the disclosed financial information allow a reliable judgement of these ques-
tions? 
The question if an operator can afford to continue or if he should, due to limited finan-
cial resources, rather stop operations, is in the first line a strategic question, which on 
her side can only be answered if a comprehensive transparency about the financial 
position and performance is given. 
If an operator decides (or will be forced by authorities) to discontinue operations and 
not to incur additional future costs, the underlying “going concern” assumption will be-
come invalid leading to an immediate revaluation of all assets.  
Final Report – EU Decommissioning Funding Methodologies TREN/05/NUCL/S07.55436 
Wuppertal Institute et al. 103 
4.3.5.7 Disclosure of liabilities 
Operators should, either in the financial statements or in the annexes, disclose the fol-
lowing information: 
• The decommissioning strategy (immediate, deferred or entombment), including the 
spent fuel and waste management and final disposal strategy assumed;  
• provisions, constructive obligations and contingent liabilities  
– subdivided into provisions, constructive obligations and contingent liabilities for 
demolition, dismantling and waste disposal 
– and eventually subdivided into the respective amount of high, medium and low 
radioactive waste; 
• the assumptions behind the cost calculations (discount rate, timing of future liabili-
ties); 
– Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein Research consider the nuclear liabilities ac-
counting assumptions to be too conservative (Buemi/Galaun 2005); 
– UK case: NDA aims at reducing the timescale for dismantling from 130 years af-
ter plant closure to 25 years. The amount of provisions considerably differs be-
tween assumed timescales of 130 or 25 years. Longer timescales considerably 
reduce the present value of liabilities (cf. UK Country Report). 
– In Germany, there exists a software tool (NIS, see country report Germany p. 
12ff.) for the estimation and calculation of dismantling costs. However, there is 
no need for operators to disclose the reasons for choosing a specific decom-
missioning strategy or specific assumptions on decommissioning costs. Sub-
stantial differences between single operators can exist because they use 
different assumptions (see country report Germany p. 11 and p.44).  
– In France too, there is no public access to the underlying assumptions for the 
cost-calculations (cf. country report France p. 5 and 25ff). 
• covenants. 
This information is particularly important to all investors in order to receive a true and 
fair view of the financial position and performance. A fair valuation (more details in “va-
luation perspective”) can only be achieved when full transparency on the fair amounts 
of all types of liabilities is given. (The higher the liabilities the lower the value; this 
means that undisclosed liabilities tend to mislead investors).  
4.3.5.8 Financial assets, decommissioning funds 
In cases where an internal, but separated decommissioning funding methodology is 
applied, earmarked assets are carried on the asset side and the respective provisions 
are carried on the liability side of the balance sheet. 
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The question is if a gross presentation (total amount of provisions and total amount of 
funds) is reasonable or if the disclosure of the net position is advisable (only the differ-
ence between provisions and funds should be carried in the balance sheet). 
Basically, it can be said that the prohibition of netting is an important accounting princi-
ple. However, in the case of decommissioning funds, the question if the funds meets 
the definition as financial asset, has first to be treated. 
An asset is “a resource controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from 
which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the entity.” (IFRSs Framework, 
par. 49). Thereby, the future economic benefit embodied in asset may flow to the entity 
in a number of ways, including settling a liability (IFRSs Framework, par. 55). From 
this point of view it can be argued that funds (respectively rights to receive reimburse-
ments from a separated fund, BC2) meet the definition of an asset because they can 
be used to settle the liability.  
In the context of the net presentation issue, IFRSs uses as basis for conclusions (BC 
on IFRIC Interpretation 5) the analogy of decommissioning funds and pension funds. In 
the case of pension funds only the net position has to be disclosed whereas the gross 
presentation is prescribed in the case of decommissioning funds. IFRIC 5, BC8c: It 
would not be appropriate to treat decommissioning funds as analogous to pension 
funds, which are presented net of the related liability. 
Instructive and interesting is that IFRSs bases its arguments on the assumption of a 
possible use of funds for other purposes. If funds are used for other purposes, the li-
abilities remain and therefore the gross presentation is correct. IFRIC 5, BC8b: Treat-
ing the decommissioning obligation as analogous to a financial liability would not result 
in derecognition through extinguishment. If the fund does not assume the obligation for 
decommissioning, the criteria in IAS 39 for derecognition of financial liabilities through 
extinguishment are not met. At best, the fund acts like an in-substance defeasance that 
does not qualify for derecognition of the liability. 
As a conclusion from this discussion can be drawn that a net presentation would possi-
bly mislead investors and other decision takers as they might underestimate liabilities. 
A net presentation is only feasible if any kind of use of decommissioning funds for other 
than decommissioning purposes is excluded.  
These arguments also support the comments made on earmarking in the chapter 
4.2.4.2 (Governance Chain) where it has been argued that earmarking is not a solution 
to protect decommissioning funds. 
4.3.5.9 Disclosure of assets (decommissioning funds) 
Operators should, either in the financial statements or in the annexes, disclose the fol-
lowing information: 
• Description of decommissioning funds,  
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– applied methodology, rationale behind it; 
– accounting treatment; 
– description of the state (under funded, over funded); 
– strategy (what is the target level of decommissioning funds and how will it be fi-
nanced); 
– governance structure (check and balances in the context of decommissioning 
funds; 
• Depreciation policy; 
• Investment policy (capital expenditures); 
4.3.5.10 Transactions with related parties 
Transactions with related parties are a normal feature of commerce and business (IAS 
24, par. 5) However, they always are a delicate issue, mainly in cases where not all 
involved parties are independent in their decisions and where one party can exercise 
influence on another party. The reason is that related parties may enter into transac-
tions that unrelated parties would not (IAS 24, par 6). 
If the power of authority to dispose of funds is not fully separated from the contributor to 
the fund, rules for transactions with related parties will have to be implemented in order 
to ensure that the company owning the plant and being responsible for its decommis-
sioning activities doesn’t enter into transactions with its decommissioning unit, which 
might distort the performance (profit). A typical example would be lending of funds to a 
mother company at below market rates (cf. 4.5.7.5). 
Two issues are relevant. One is pricing (measurement) and the other disclosure of 
transactions with related parties. 
IAS 24 only focuses on the disclosure, measurement has been removed (IN7). Accord-
ing to IAS 24, par 9a, „a party is related to an entity if: directly or indirectly through one 
or more intermediaries, the party:  
• controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, the entity  
• (ii) has an interest in the entity that gives it significant influence over it or  
• (iii) has joint control over the entity.“ 
Transactions with related parties should also be disclosed in the context of decommis-
sioning in line with IAS 24, par. 12 to 22. They are an important component of overall 
transparency. 
4.3.6 Accounting and public licensees (governments) 
In chapter 4.2.3.5, the subject of conflicting use of financial resources for governments 
has been discussed, particularly for cases where governments pay decommissioning 
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costs from the current budget. It has been explained that paying decommissioning 
costs from current budgets overrules the polluter pays principle. However, this subject 
also has a link to accounting. 
Expenditures and income have, in principle, to be recognised during the period when 
they occur (cf. accrual principle, 4.3.3.3 and 4.3.4). Governments paying from current 
budgets apply the cash principle, which has proven to be inappropriate.  
Two tendencies are important: 
• First, accounting tends to accrual accounting for all organisations be they private 
companies, non-profit organisations or governmental authorities/governments.  
• Second, it can be observed that the growing competition is challenged by privatisa-
tion of public enterprises. However, enterprises can only be successfully privatised 
if they apply an accepted accounting standard, which are either EU-Directives or 
IFRS. Finally, it should be mentioned that privatisation will be very difficult if no 
segregated funds for decommissioning are available. 
4.3.7 Accounting and consolidation 
4.3.7.1 Primary issue: Scope and method of consolidation 
Consolidated figures are group figures. A group consists of a parent company and all 
its subsidiaries. Subsidiaries are enterprises, which are controlled by the parent (cf. IAS 
27, par. 4). 
The primary issues in consolidating enterprises are the scope and the method of con-
solidation. The scope and the methods of consolidation applied can materially influence 
the consolidated financial figures. According to the chosen method, certain data appear 
and certain data do not appear in the consolidated group accounts. 
4.3.7.2 The scope of consolidation  
The scope of consolidation indicates which enterprises are and which are not inte-
grated into the consolidated group figures. It is impossible to correctly interpret group 
figures without knowing the scope of consolidation.  
4.3.7.3 Consolidation methods 
The method of consolidation configures how data from different enterprises (subsidiar-
ies) in different countries are aggregated to produce group figures. For a useful analy-
sis, the methods of consolidation must be known and it must be clear that all 
subsidiaries have applied uniform accounting policies for transactions and other events 
in similar circumstances (IAS 27, par. 28). 
IFRSs and other standards allow three different methods of consolidation depending 
on the percentage stake, which a parent company holds in a subsidiary: Full consolida-
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tion, the method of equity consolidation or proportional consolidation. The standard 
procedures (IAS 27, par. 22ff) are: 
Full consolidation 
• Full consolidation is normally applied to all enterprises that are controlled by a par-
ent enterprise. This means that, in practice, the parent enterprise owns or controls, 
directly or indirectly, 50% or more of voting rights. These enterprises are referred 
to as subsidiaries. 
• Under full consolidation, the financial statements of the enterprises in the group 
are combined on a line-by-line basis by adding together items like assets, liabili-
ties, equity, income and expenses. Interenterprise balances and interenterprise 
transactions are totally eliminated.  
Equity method 
• The equity method is normally applied for investments in „associates.” An „associ-
ate” is an enterprise which is neither a subsidiary nor a joint venture and in which 
the investor has a significant influence (normally, between 20% and 49%).  
• Under the equity method, the investor’s investment in an investee enterprise is 
initially recorded at cost and is adjusted thereafter for changes in the net assets of 
that enterprise (IAS 28, par. 11). As is the case in full consolidation, interenterprise 
balances and interenterprise transactions are eliminated, together with any unreal-
ised profits and losses relating thereto. 
Proportionate consolidation 
• Under proportionate consolidation, the parent’s/investor’s share of each of the as-
sets, liabilities, income and expenses of the other group enterprises is combined 
on a line by line basis with similar items in the parent’s/investor’s financial state-
ments. Again, interenterprise balances and interenterprise transactions are elimi-
nated, together with any unrealised profits and losses relating thereto. 
4.3.7.4 Assessment of consolidation methods 
Of paramount importance is the equity method (applied for stakes between 20% and 
49%). The equity method is less a consolidation than a valuation method. Equity is 
defined as the net asset value (fair value of assets minus debt). If a parent owns, ex-
ample given, 49% of a nuclear power plant (subsidiary), only 49% of the equity of the 
subsidiary appear in the groups’ balance sheet and only 49% of the benefit appear in 
the groups income statement. All other items such as debt (provisions for decommis-
sioning are debt), revenues and others are not traceable in the consolidated state-
ments, which means that an investor cannot see the amount of debt and provisions for 
decommissioning. However, the influence of a parent company (control) of a subsidiary 
increases the closer a parent comes to the 50% level (which would lead to full consoli-
dation). 
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Therefore, it is of paramount importance to investors to know the total amount of debt 
and revenues of all equity consolidated subsidiary. It can be assumed that if a parent 
holds 49% of a subsidiary and all other shareholders only hold small stakes, the re-
sponsibility (liability) for appropriate decommissioning funding would fall back to the 
main shareholder. 
The same information is important to the public. If the information were only given on a 
consolidated group level and not, in addition, for all consolidated enterprises on a sepa-
rate basis, an important piece of information would not be accessible and the neces-
sary transparency would be lost.  
4.3.8 Conclusions from the accounting perspective: The meaning of ac-
counting principles 
Transparency is important and accounting can substantially contribute to improved 
transparency. 
The underlying assumption of the polluter pays principle depicts, that the costs have to 
be recognised in the books of the operators of nuclear installations (polluters).  
To resume, it can be asked if existing accounting principles cover the requirements 
linked to decommissioning activities or if nuclear installations require a specific set of 
accounting principles. The answer given by accounting seems to be clear but clarifica-
tions are recommended.  
It is not a question of which internationally accepted standards should be applied but 
that all operators consistently apply the same “Generally Accepted Accounting Princi-
ples (GAAP)” and that this will be confirmed in the auditors report. What is paramount 
is to commit oneself to an existing set of ”generally accepted accounting principles” and 
to add, where vital, clarifications.  
Therefore, it is recommended that the licensing authorities in different countries apply a 
consistent definition of accounting and that a kind of oversight board should enforce the 
improvement of comparable and consistent accounting and auditing rules. 
It is recommended to apply IFRSs together with clarifications (EU interpretations and 
guidance) in order to improve the reliability and comparability. Clarifications are neces-
sary in the context of: 
Assumptions 
• guidance for assumptions for cost calculations and recognising provisions;  
• disclosure of assumptions behind the cost calculations; 
Mechanisms 
• description of the mechanisms between intermediate storage and the final waste 
disposal in order to eliminate all possible latitude of judgement and to achieve a 
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consistent application of recognising provisions. Such a clarification would mainly 
treat the interface between  
– intermediate storage and final waste disposal and  
– provisions and contingent liabilities and 
– legal and constructive obligations. 
Equity consolidation 
• total amount of debt and provisions of all equity consolidated entities(associates) 
• total revenues of all equity consolidated entities (associates) 
If other standards are applied 
• The relation between IFRSs and national legislation and the discussion of where 
main differences are. 
Applying the “current budget” methodology doesn’t meet the qualitative characteristics 
of modern accounting and is a possible source of failure in decommissioning financing. 
4.4 Valuation Perspective 
4.4.1 Free cash flow and shareholder value 
4.4.1.1 Overview 
The valuation perspective is particularly important to investors. The decision to invest in 
securities of nuclear installations (to buy or sell shares of an enterprise) depends on 
the valuation made by investors. Investors and analysts determine the financial value 
of an enterprise by deducting total debt from the sum of discounted future free cash 
flows thus arriving to the so-called shareholder value. The future free cash flows are 
based on assumptions of the probable development (business plan). 
Investors always make implicit assumptions when analysing an entity and thus each 
financial value is a result of assumptions of future free cash flows including future costs 
(decommissioning costs are future/backend costs). The free cash flow consideration is 
strictly based on cash inflow and out flow considerations.  
Revenues minus operating costs leads to the operating profit (EBIT = Earnings Before 
Interest and Taxes). Decommissioning costs are operating costs and therefore taken 
into account in a free cash flow consideration. 
The free cash flow of a period is calculated as shown in the following table: 
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Table 12:  Calculation of the free cash flow of a period 
 
Source: Rappaport 1986. 
To arrive from free cash flows to the fundamental financial value (shareholder value) of 
an entity all estimated future free cash flows are added. (Past free cash flows only ser-
ve as basis for the calculation of future free cash flows). In order to add cash flows from 
different time periods, discounting is required. Future free cash flows get discounted 
with the discount rate to the present value. The weighted average costs of capital 
(WACC) are used as discount rate. 
The WACC depend on various factors such as the risk free interest rate (in the valua-
tion context, risk free rate is a notion used by financial experts and doesn’t address the 
risk linked to nuclear power installations), the debt/equity ratio of an entity but also from 
the specific risk linked to an enterprise. The higher the risk attributed or perceived the 
higher the WACC and thus the lower the financial value.  
When investors do not trust that the free cash flows in the distant future will really ma-
terialise, they require a higher risk premium, and thus apply a higher WACC/discount 
rate. In other words, they add a risk premium, which leads to lower present values of 
future free cash flows and thus to a lower financial value (shareholder value). The repu-
tation risk of an enterprise is also reflected in the risk premium added. 
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Table 13:  Shareholder Value 
 
Source: Rappaport 1986. 
In the context of different decommissioning funds methodologies attention has to be 
drawn to three valuation components: Debt, free cash flows and WACC. 
Debt 
• The chart above depicts that the shareholder value decreases with increasing 
debt. Higher provisions therefore decrease/impair the financial value of an invest-
ment. The following remarks made by financial experts show how critical the debt 
issue is: 
– Nuclear waste provisions only recognise liabilities from waste generated to bal-
ance sheet date and not the expected future liability for the whole of a nuclear 
plant’s operating life (Buemi/Galaun 2005)  
– …estimates the “decommissioning activities” to be worth $ one trillion globally 
and £ 44 billion in the UK (Cattley/Van t’Sant/Steel 2006): 
Future Free Cash Flows 
• Future free cash flows reflect all factors linked to the strategy and 
• include future decommissioning costs. 
• In the case of nuclear power plants, there is only a limited time period where free 
cash flows accrue (life time of nuclear power plant). Therefore, the residual value 
cannot be calculated based on eternal cash flows. 
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• The estimation of future free cash flows is difficult due to the many risks and 
uncertainties. Therefore, in order to avoid additional risks and uncertainties, the 
highest possible transparency is required.  
• Investors are interested in value increasing investments. One financial value driver 
is the future free cash flows, which contain all operative costs.   
– Investors have a genuine interest (also as citizens) that safe and effective de-
commissioning methods be applied. Unsafe or unreliable decommissioning can 
impose a substantial reputational risk on operators. This would result in higher 
WACC and thus in a decrease in shareholder value;  
– Investors also have a strong interest in high EBITs (operating profits) and there-
fore in least cost decommissioning methods (cf. 3.1.3). 
• Future free cash flows embrace many uncertainties as to the political, industrial 
and technical solutions of final waste disposal (cf. accounting perspective). These 
uncertainties have to be taken into account when valuing an entity. 
– It is likely that the cash outflow from managing nuclear waste is understated 
(Buemi/Galaun 2005)  
WACC (discount factor) 
• Changes in the WACC have a high sensitivity. A change in risk perception there-
fore substantially impacts the financial value. 
• A reasonable risk assessment is only possible with a high degree of transparency. 
• Low transparency bears enormous risks for both, investors and operators. 
4.4.1.2 Present or current value and valuation 
At the beginning of the previous subchapter, it has been said that investors determine 
the financial value of an enterprise by deducting total debt from the sum of discounted 
future free cash flows. 
Now, the question has to be answered how provision estimates have to be treated. Is it 
appropriate to also discount decommissioning provisions (which are debt) to the net 
present value or should decommissioning provisions not at all be discounted. (Cf. 
chapter 3.1.5, where the current value method with an assumed discount rate of 0% 
and the present value method with a positive discount rate are addressed.) 
Discounting decommissioning provisions would mean, as an example, that decommis-
sioning costs of Euro 134 million accruing in 10 years would be only Euro 100 million 
today if a discount rate of 3% were to be used. 
From the perspective of investors, who want to determine a rational value of the enter-
prise a discounted approach seems to be logical. They would argue that the discount 
rate mirrors the probability or uncertainty that is attributed to the future free cash flows 
and that future free cash flows include future decommissioning costs (such as contribu-
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tions). It seems evident that the future free cash flows have to be discounted to the net 
present value (of the corporate value) and therefore, in order to reach consistency be-
tween the treatment of provisions and contributions, decommissioning provisions 
should also be discounted. This also reflects the position of IAS 37. According to IAS 
37, par. 45, where the effect of time value of money is material the amount of a provi-
sion shall be the present value of the expenditures expected to be required to settle the 
obligation. In IAS 37, par. 46 the argument is made that provisions relating to cash out-
flows that arise soon after the balance sheet date are more onerous than those where 
cash outflows of the same amount arise later. 
4.4.1.3 Present or current value and setting aside funds 
If the question is addressed which is the adequate amount of funds, which have to be 
set aside, additional arguments become relevant. The key objective here is to assure 
health and safety (and not to determine a rationale value to buy or sell enterprises).  
It must be assured that at any time an adequate amount is available to finance the 
process of decommissioning. The highest safety can be reached if at start-up, the full 
undiscounted amount (in our example Euro 134 million) is set aside. In this case, no 
additional uncertainties stemming from the investment process (expected and required 
annual average performance of 3% in order to reach the level of Euros 134 million in 
ten years) are added. The risk linked to the investment process could lead to under 
funded situations (mainly in the case of an unexpected early shutdown). Therefore, 
contrary to an undiscounted approach, the discounted approach requires very depend-
able guarantees. 
The uncertainty aspect is very relevant because decommissioning has to deal with very 
long time frames. It can be argued that, given the health and safety imperative, de-
commissioning provisions should not be discounted. Consequently, the full amount of 
provisions should be set aside at the start-up moment. Thus, almost all uncertainties 
and risks related to the investment process can be eliminated. 
If decommissioning provisions were not discounted, the required (adequate) fund as-
sets would be higher in order to have a fully funded situation. Now, the fund assets 
would, under a long-term perspective, in all probability, provide a positive investment 
return. However, this return is not needed to cover decommissioning costs. Therefore, 
in such a case, the investment return should be at the free disposal of the operator in 
order to avoid double charging of operators. It would be a compensation for having set 
aside higher amounts at the beginning. 
Example Finland: The system is based on undiscounted costs. The deposited money in 
the fund is gaining interest every year and this interest is reducing the annual amount 
of new money that needs to be paid to the fund. The difference to a discounted ap-
proach is that in an undiscounted system the interest gained is taken into account "a 
posteriori" based on realised returns rather than based on speculative expectations on 
high returns to the capital in the future. 
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The non-discounting approach in the context of determining the adequate amount of 
funds set aside offers higher safety to the beneficiaries but renounces on the opportuni-
ties, which possibly could be exploited with an efficient investment strategy.  
With the approaches where no discounting is allowed combined with the requirement to 
provide securities for the unfunded liabilities, a better long-term insurance can be ob-
tained against situations, where early shutdown means that all the decommissioning 
activities need to be implemented much earlier than planned and hence there is not 
sufficient time for the funded money to be increased by virtue of the anticipated interest 
gains (owing to positive discount rate).  
4.4.1.4 Discounting and transparency 
This discussion again draws the attention to the overwhelming meaning of transpar-
ency. All assumptions in the context of determining the financial amount of provisions 
must be disclosed and the rationale behind the assumptions has to be explained. 
Moreover, it is crucial that both debt totals are disclosed, the provisions for decommis-
sioning (i. e., their undiscounted or discounted amount plus the discount rate used) and 
the undiscounted debt burden. This allows investors and other involved parties to as-
sess the risks and to value an enterprise according to their own risk assessment. 
4.4.2 Valuation and different decommissioning methodologies 
The key drivers in valuation have been described above. Now the question has to be 
treated if different decommissioning funding methodologies affect valuation. 
From first sight, this can be denied because investors (decision makers) will not include 
decommissioning funds as assets (no future economic benefit embodied, which lead to 
a cash inflow). In the case of internal solutions, informed investors will not include cash 
inflows from financial assets in their future free cash flows calculations (except in the 
case of setting aside undiscounted amounts). Thus, full transparency and rational be-
haviour of investors assumed, funds have no impact on the total of corporate value. 
However, in the valuation process, investors deduct the total amount of provisions as 
debt. This also reflects the view of IFRS that the liabilities have to be assessed inde-
pendently from the assets as no automatic derecognition can be assumed (cf. Chapter 
4.3.5.8).  
Furthermore, in any case, the operators have to pay contributions, which affect the 
income statement. This cash outflow is of interest to investors. As described above, 
contributions to decommissioning funds and or building up of provisions is contained in 
the operational costs and therefore reflected in a free cash flow approach. 
Moreover, it could be argued that investors attribute different risk profiles to different 
decommissioning funds methodologies. If this were the case, the valuation would be 
affected through a higher or lower WACC (discount factor).  
Final Report – EU Decommissioning Funding Methodologies TREN/05/NUCL/S07.55436 
Wuppertal Institute et al. 115 
Investors only are in position to judge and weigh the different decommissioning funds 
methodologies against each other if they receive all relevant information from opera-
tors. Therefore, transparency is again important. 
4.4.3 Valuation and consolidation 
The consolidation methods have been described in the accounting perspective chapter 
4.3.6. It has been pinpointed that, in the case of equity consolidation, investors can’t 
see the amount of debt and provisions for decommissioning of equity consolidated 
subsidiaries. 
Even if there is only a 49% control of the subsidiary the group carries a substantial re-
sponsibility for the adequacy of provisions (example given if all other shareholders only 
hold 5% each).  
Therefore, investors need to know the potential debt burden (respectively liability po-
tential) in order to assess risk. 
4.4.4 Valuation and limited life time 
Nuclear power plants have a limited lifetime. Therefore, at the end of the operation pe-
riod (final shut down) all decommissioning funds should be set aside and available. 
This aspect belongs to the central debate of this study. 
However, another “fund” for repaying the nominal share capital should be set aside and 
respective liquid funds should be available at the end of operation be it in order to re-
pay the capital to the shareholders (owners) or be it as initial share capital for con-
structing a new nuclear power plant.   
4.4.5 Conclusions from the valuation perspective 
A reliable valuation has to allow a comprehensive risk assessment (all risks linked to 
the investment). 
Decommissioning funds methodologies are not the key driver for the financial value 
and valuation process as long as appropriate information is given. If transparency is 
given, investors will be in a position to assess the risk and, based on their investment 
strategy, utilise the appropriate discount factor. Different investors assess risks differ-
ently. 
Transparency is paramount as key to minimising all effects linked to various factors of 
uncertainty and to assuring that investors receive a true and fair view of the financial 
position and performance. Only transparency helps to prevent wrong investment deci-
sions and thus inefficient allocation of financial resources. 
As to the valuation perspective only one important information has to be included in a 
recommendation: The disclosure of both, discounted and undiscounted amounts of 
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decommissioning provisions/debts. Other special ingredients are not required to be 
included in a recommendation. All what is important in the context of valuation is al-
ready included in the governance and accounting perspectives. 
4.5 Investment Perspective 
4.5.1 Safe system is a key objective 
The key objective of the investment perspective is to analyse the aspects, which are 
important for a safe investment system. Safe system means that no unnecessary un-
certainty or risk be added through the investment activity (fund management). The in-
vestment policy must contribute to enforcing the objective to cover all decommissioning 
costs. 
In the context of this report, the term “safe” refers to the objective of assuring the health 
and safety of citizens. However, other reports define financial security in a broader 
sense, for example, they include in their security definition the objective that the finan-
cial interests of the government are guaranteed (KPMG/NRG 2006, p. 13 and 93). 
4.5.2 The importance of efficient asset management 
Operators have, under the terms of the polluter pays principle, to pay contributions into 
a funding system in order to cover all future decommissioning costs. Decommissioning 
is expensive. Huge amounts of financial means are needed to pay for all liabilities.  
• In the UK, liabilities in excess of £75bn have to be paid in the future (Country Re-
port UK).  
• Liability estimates are periodically revised upward and the unpredictability of de-
commissioning costs – in particular, the cost of both high- and low-level radwaste 
disposal – is likely to push the bill much higher (Bank of New York 2006, p. 2).” 
• In France: The French Court of Accounts has calculated undiscounted liabilities 
totalling 65 billions Euro (see country report France p. 1 and chapter 3.1.4.3). 
Decommissioning costs paid in the form of contributions to an external fund (cash out-
flow) or in form of building up provisions against restricted/earmarked assets in the 
operator’s accounts are operational costs of an operator and thus a cost element of 
energy production (production costs per kWh). Consequently, decommissioning costs 
substantially impact the competitive position of an operator in the energy market. This 
fact, together with the unpredictability and the huge amounts of future decommission-
ing costs, directs the attention of involved stakeholders to the investment success (per-
formance).  
The incentive to finance part of future decommissioning costs through a high invest-
ment performance is evident. However, a high performance on its part can conflict with 
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the prudence principle, which plays an important role in the field of financial asset ma-
nagement.  
4.5.3 Financial risks 
Investors always have to align two key interests. They wish to receive the highest pos-
sible return and they also want to keep the risk linked to their investments in an ac-
ceptable realm. 
The financial risk of an investment in securities is defined as volatility (measured as 
standard deviation). Therefore, the risk in the language of financial markets is meas-
ured in deviations containing both, positive as well as negative deviation, and not only, 
as in the insurance or legal business, the negative case. A high volatility de-
notes/indicates a high risk, a low volatility a low risk. A volatility of 20% means that an 
investor investing in a security (example given stock of company A) with an expected 
annual return of 10% can, with a probability of 66.6%, expect an absolute annual return 
between -10% (10% expected return minus 20%) and 30% (10% expected return plus 
20%). If the investor were to invest in a security with an expected annual return of 5% 
and a volatility of 10%, the return would be, in two thirds of all cases, between -5% and 
15%. 
Higher investment returns are always linked to higher risks (volatilities). The art of in-
vesting consists in perfectly adjusting the risk-return ratio to the investors’ objectives. 
It has been said that a high absolute performance (return) can substantially contribute 
to mitigating the costs of an operator and assuring the availability of decommissioning 
funds after shutdown. However, this “possible” high performance goes hand in hand 
with a high risk. This trade-off is particularly important in the nuclear business as very 
long durations (time to maturity) are involved. The following example illustrates the im-
pact of different returns in cases where periods of 40 years and more are concerned.  
If a manager of a decommissioning fund invests Euro 100 with an expected annual 
yield (performance) of 2%, he/she will dispose of Euro 122 in 10 years or Euro 221 in 
40 years. If the same manager invests Euro 100 with an expected annual yield (per-
formance) of 7%, he/she will dispose of Euro 197 in 10 years or Euro 1497 in 40 years. 
Euro 1497 is 6.8 times as much as Euro 221, a considerable difference after 40 years. 
Or one would have to invest at the beginning Euro 678 in order to receive Euro 1497 
after 40 years with an assumed yield of 2%.  
In other words: In the case of 7% yield, an operator would have to pay contributions of 
Euro 100 whereas in the 2% yield he would have to pay Euro 678 in order to achieve 
the same target. As decommissioning costs are operating costs, such a difference will 
also be reflected in higher or lower energy prices (costs of kWh produced). 
This example demonstrates the importance of the investment perspective. Contribu-
tions to be paid in are directly linked to the investment success and an investment per-
formance can mitigate the contributions due. 
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However, investment is always linked to a risk as investors’ base their investments 
decisions on assumptions on the future, whereas the risk from the angle of citizens, 
who require health and safety, is that the decommissioning funds are not available on 
time. They might argue that no additional risks be added through the investment proc-
ess and the tools and techniques of financial markets.  
Therefore, the risk perception of financial markets is not the only aspect which has to 
be considered. Two risks have to be weighed against each other. The risk linked to the 
investment process and the risks linked to the renunciation of a positive investment 
performance (cf.4.4.1.1). 
4.5.4 Key themes 
The following chart illustrates the main elements in the context of the investment per-
spective. Based on the polluter pays principle required by the EU in all fields, it is evi-
dent that operators have to pay the contributions. It seems also clear that 
decommissioning funds should only be used for decommissioning activities. The other 
key themes to be treated are the questions of: 
• regulation and controlling, who regulates and who controls the investment process;  
• investment manager, who manages the fund; 
• power of authority, who authorises the payments and 
• investment strategy and policy and 
• performance reporting. 
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Figure 4: Investment Matrix (Componenets) of Decommissioning Funds 
 
 
4.5.5 Regulator and controlling/monitoring 
Financial markets experience a regulating and monitoring authority in many fields of 
activities in general and in investment fields in particular. The main objective of regula-
tion and control is thereby the “protection of investors”. Examples are the supervision of 
banks or the legislation on stock exchanges, investment funds or pension funds. 
The regulating effect can be achieved by a government regulation or by the means of 
self-regulation. Self-regulation has proven to be a successful and effective way in fi-
nancial markets affairs.  
Important to the success of self-regulation is the independence of the authority from the 
monitored entities and the ability of the authority to impose effective (corrective) meas-
ures in case of non-appliance by a member of the self-regulation system. 
It is not within the scope of this report to explain and design in detail all tasks, which a 
regulating body should assume. However, one key element is to develop investment 
guidelines and monitor the investments in decommissioning funds. Such guidelines 
would not go in detail; they would give a frame, in which a fund manager can develop 
his own investment approach. Thereby, they would implicitly also describe and limit the 
financial risks of a portfolio (fund). 
Such guidelines assure that those who carry the responsibility have clear superior tar-
gets, that they look into the subject of investment policy and asses to which extent the 
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guidelines (frame) allow different investment policies and that the performance can be 
periodically monitored. Guidelines also contribute to mitigate the various conflicts of 
interests, which are embedded in the course of the investment process. 
Thus, “uniform” guidelines from an independent body contribute to increased transpar-
ency and comparability of funds and they procure an increased certainty to the public 
that the funds are well managed and an adequate amount of financial resources will be 
available at the time when needed.  
In this context the question has to be answered whether a regulator issuing general 
principles and guidelines and monitoring the compliance should be positioned on an 
international level (EU) or on a national level. It is proposed to choose the international 
solution because a certain degree of consistency and clear rules of the game are nec-
essary in order not to provoke any competition, which could threaten the safety. Such 
principles and guidelines could also be issued and monitored by an (European) over-
sight board or decommissioning financing committee (cf. Chapter 6.3.2 and Chapter 
6.4.3). 
4.5.6 Investment manager 
In the chapter on governance (governance chain), it has been highlighted that, given 
the multiple conflicts of interest, it should be aimed at achieving the highest degree of 
independence between the operators (as polluters and thus contributors to the funds) 
and the investment managers.  
It is not advisable to allow that the operators assume the role as investment managers 
(internally managed internal or external funds). The conflicts of interest are too strong 
(cf. Chapter 4.5.6.5) and it is not their genuine business. The business of operators of 
nuclear installations is to produce and sell energy and not to be an investment expert. 
There should be specific requirements regarding the qualifications of investment man-
agers such as:  
• the track record and 
• the independence from the operator. 
It would be reasonable that the entity regulating decommissioning (financing) defines 
criteria for the qualifications of investment managers (cf. Chapter 4.5.4). 
4.5.7 Investment policy 
4.5.7.1 Objectives of an investment strategy and policy 
First it must be outlined, that any investment policy has to be aligned to the interests of 
the beneficiaries. Beneficiaries of decommissioning funds are the public in the broadest 
sense because the objective of decommissioning is to assure health and safety of citi-
zens. The public is dependent on the availability of an adequate amount at the time 
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needed because, in case of non-availability, the execution of safe decommissioning 
could be delayed or threatened (no execution at all or unsafe (only partly) execution or 
the public would have to pay in its role as taxpayer (which would mean that the opera-
tors have externalised internal operative costs). 
4.5.7.2 Investment strategy and policy 
It is not within the scope of this report to describe a general investment strategy for 
decommissioning fund managers. Such a strategy would contain all main elements 
such as the strategic and tactical asset allocation, the investment guidelines, invest-
ment committee and internal audit of the investment process in general and the specific 
risks linked to the investment process in particular (procedural organisation of invest-
ment process). 
4.5.7.3 Correlation 
The correlation is a key factor for the diversification and risk reduction of any portfolio. 
If a portfolio is composed of a certain number of different stocks with a low correlation, 
then the unsystematic risk (enterprise specific) can be eliminated and the only remain-
ing risk is the systematic risk (market risk). 
Correlation indicates to what extent the returns of security A and B correlate. Do both 
similarly loose at the same time (high correlation) or can it be assumed that a loss of A 
is usually offset by a gain in B (low correlation). The total risk of a fund (portfolio) can 
only be assessed if the correlation of different returns of different securities can be 
measured (covariance). 
Now, a decommissioning fund should also consider (as a second type of correlation)  
the correlation between the energy industry in general and the nuclear industry in par-
ticular. It leads to the question if a decommissioning fund should be allowed to invest in 
nuclear energy companies or not. The idea behind is that the performance of decom-
missioning funds should not be correlated with the performance of nuclear operators.  
Beneficiaries of decommissioning funds (citizens) especially depend on the availability 
of an adequate amount of financial means for decommissioning. If decommissioning 
funds were invested in nuclear industry, the beneficiaries would be double hit in case of 
economic and financial problems of the nuclear industry. It cannot be assumed that the 
shares of nuclear operators are high performers in times where the nuclear industry 
faces problems. 
4.5.7.4 Asset and liability management 
A summary of the significance of a high fund performance has been given in the intro-
duction to the “investment perspective” chapter. A renunciation of a high return is only 
justified if the risk linked to it were not manageable. Otherwise, all should be done in 
order to benefit from a high performance. 
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Some argue, that at all time, the market value of a fund should be at least as high as 
the accrued costs for decommissioning (provisions). In this case, the fund manager 
could only accept a limited risk in investment policy because a high risk would imply a 
high volatility and this could lead to a temporary under-funded situation (in the case of 
negative deviations from the expected return).  
However, the long average duration of the liabilities opens the door to an investment 
style, which can manage these risks. It is referred to as  “asset & liability management”.  
On the liabilities side provisions for decommissioning are recognised. These have, to a 
large extent and in the absence of incidents or accidents during the planned lifetime of 
a nuclear installation, a long duration (average time to maturity). On the assets side are 
decommissioning funds (be they internal or external). Now, the investment of the funds 
(assets) should match the duration of the liabilities (principle of “matching maturities”). 
This means that, for the (usually larger) part of the assets covering long-term liabilities, 
a long-term investment perspective is advisable, and a medium-term/short-term in-
vestment perspective for the part of the assets matching medium-term/short-term li-
abilities. Long term allows allocating more means to shares (with a higher expected 
return). Shares have a higher volatility and thus, under a long-term perspective a 
higher return. This kind of investment policy is also applied by insurance companies, 
which have insurance contracts (liabilities) with very long durations. 
The “asset & liability management” approach would reflect the business basics of nu-
clear power installations and would allow to benefit as much as possible from the pos-
sibilities of financial markets. 
In the case of major incidents or accidents (cf. 3.1.7.1), the funds have to be immedi-
ately available. Now, it could be that just at this moment, the fund is under funded due 
to an actual strong decline in stock markets. This case is possible. However, it would 
be a lost opportunity, if therefore one could not benefit from a high return under a long-
term perspective. Therefore, to cover such situations, a guarantee fund is recom-
mended in parallel to an asset and liability management. This fund could, for example, 
be financed by contributions from all European operators (cf. also Chapter 6.2.2.6.3 for 
particular recommendations on this issue). 
4.5.7.5 Investments to related parties (mother companies) 
A decommissioning fund investing in shares or bonds or other kind of investments has 
to consider the usual investment rules. However, if the fund wishes to invest in securi-
ties of his mother company, then special attention has to be paid to the question if the 
transaction is made at market rates. 
Two examples from the country reports can be given: In Finland, operators have to pay 
contribution to an external segregated decommissioning fund (State Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund) with the right to borrow back 75% of the capital of the fund at mar-
ket rates (country report Finland p. 19). In Germany, where the internal unrestricted 
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methodology is applied for private operators, it happened in the past that operators lent 
to mother companies at very low or even zero rates below market interest (country re-
port Germany p. 33).  
The meaning of a good fund performance has been described in chapter 4.5.2. Lend-
ing money to mother companies below market rates like it was partly done in Germany 
not only means a cross-subsidy, because it could be considered as a redemption to the 
operator of already paid contributions, but also bears a considerable strategic risk for 
all involved parties (cf. Chapter 4.2.3.2).  
4.5.8 Performance reporting 
Performance reporting means that the investment manager has to periodically inform 
all interested parties about the performance and the risk profile of the fund.  
Performance reporting contributes to an increased transparency and comparability of 
funds and to an increased confidence of the public that the funds are well managed 
and that an adequate amount of financial resources will be available at the time when 
needed. 
4.5.9 Power of authority 
This aspect has been already described in the context of the governance chain (sixth 
component; cf. chapter 4.2.4.1) where the highest degree of independence between 
the operators, the fund management and the position disposing of the power of author-
ising payments is proposed. 
The main argument is that enormous pressure lies on the entity having access to the 
decommissioning funds (power of authority). If the power of authority to dispose is with 
a third party, the degree of independence between the third party and the operators 
has to be separately assessed. 
4.5.10 In the case of an incident or accident or other kind of early closure 
Most of the remarks made so far are based on the assumption that no major incident or 
accident or other unexpected event leading to an early shutdown will happen. Such 
events would lead to other cash outflow patterns, as financial resources set aside will 
be immediately used. Moreover, in the case of an incident or accident, the decommis-
sioning costs are likely to rise as dismantling and demolition becomes more expensive.  
Such potential liabilities should be fully covered at the start-up moment. Therefore, at 
the start-up moment, a kind of guarantee fund should exist which disposes of an ade-
quate amount of financial means for any early closure case. (cf. Chapter 6.2.2.6.3 for 
particular recommendations on this issue). 
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Furthermore, in case of early closure the assets of nuclear installations would be im-
paired which leads to a substantially lower financial value: The going concern assump-
tion would be invalid and the value would decrease to zero. If not all liabilities linked to 
an incident or accident were covered, the value would even be negative (minus not 
covered liabilities) and question of who will be able and willing to pay the remaining 
costs arises. 
An incident or accident in a nuclear installation will not only impact the financial value of 
the respective operator but of all nuclear installations because investors will immedi-
ately change the risk perception and discount future free cash flows with higher WACC. 
Moreover, it can be assumed that the future free cash flow estimates of all nuclear in-
stallations will be revised downwards as can be assumed that the consumers will buy 
less nuclear energy in the future. 
Whether or not such effects are permanent (revaluation of industry) or only temporary 
depends to a high degree on the question if, in an actual case, the liabilities linked of 
an incident or accident have really been appropriately covered or not. This strongly 
speaks for the creation of well-funded guarantee fund. 
Another aspect should be addressed in the context of a guarantee fund. The composi-
tion of the portfolio of a fund has to be screened with a view on a special correlation. It 
can be assumed that in case of a major incident or accident the whole industry in the 
neighbourhood will also be affected by damages. Therefore, the value of the fund could 
also be impaired if the fund were invested in stocks of companies in the neighbour-
hood. The theme is that an incident/accident fund should, besides all other require-
ments, also consider the geographical distribution of the investments. 
4.5.11 Conclusions from the investment perspective 
The objective of the investment is to serve the needs of the beneficiaries, which are the 
public respectively the citizens. 
A safe investment system is required which doesn’t add any unnecessary additional 
uncertainty. 
A guarantee fund is required to cover risks, which are added through the investment 
process in general and risk, which are linked to an incident or accident in particular. 
Transparency about the investment process, strategy and performance are a key ele-
ment of a safe system. 
The independence and competence of all involved stakeholders is important.  
The incentive to finance part of future decommissioning costs through a high invest-
ment performance is evident. A high performance on its part can conflict with the pru-
dence principle, which plays an important role in the field of financial asset 
management. The professional application of asset & liability management allows ma-
naging a higher risk. 
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Special attention has to be paid to lending practices to related parties. 
The analysis of all correlations between decommissioning funds and the nuclear indus-
try or investments in areas surrounding the nuclear facilities is important. 
It is recommended to develop “guidelines”, which describe the required qualifications of 
investment managers and which give a basic investment policy frame also defining the 
acceptable risk levels. A kind of oversight board or decommissioning financing commit-
tee could provide such guidance (cf. Chapter 6.3.26.3.2 and 6.4.3). 
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5 Legal framework for dealing with the different financial risks 
of decommissioning financing systems in Europe  
5.1 Introduction 
This study on EU decommissioning financing methodology underlines in previous 
chapters the barriers to safety of availability of sufficient funds for future decommission-
ing at the time needed, and the different standards, different financial risks, different 
systematic and different access to information in the EU member states.  
This chapter analyses the legal framework, possibilities and limits for dealing with the 
different decommissioning financing systems and the different degrees of financial risks 
on the EU level, i. e. for dealing with the possibilities to harmonise the different ap-
proaches in the EU in order to reduce risks and increase safety. This chapter does not 
look into the legal possibilities for every Member States to improve their own decom-
missioning financing systems. 
The classic legal basis for harmonising legislation in internal market relations is Article 
95 Para 1 of the European Communities Treaty (ECT). 
The following evaluation will show that the EURATOM treaty does not present the ade-
quate legal basis for harmonisation of decommissioning fund structures in this field, 
contrary to previous Commission moves towards harmonisation of decommissioning 
structures which were all exclusively based on Article 30, 31 EURATOM. 
On the contrary, a move back to the ECT rules and especially Article 95 together 
with Article 175 on environmental grounds will enforce the position of the Euro-
pean Commission.  
In addition, it could be considered in how far a thorough enforcement and maybe fur-
ther development of the accounting directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349 EEC would 
make sense with respect to further contributing to reduce decommissioning financing 
risks (cf. Chapter 4.3 for more details on these accounting aspects and the rules and 
principles which should govern accounting of decommissioning costs; this aspect is not 
further discussed in this Chapter since it covers only one part of the risk problem). 
This chapter tries to present to the European Commission argumentation for opening 
towards a different approach of the choice of legal bases for all efforts to harmonise 
decommissioning funds rules. 
Up to now, the European Commission has drafted within the so-called Nuclear Pack-
age proposals from 2002 two draft directives, one on setting basic obligations and gen-
eral principles on the safety of nuclear installations and the other on management of 
spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.  
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To choose Article 31 EURATOM for these directives and for harmonisation rules will 
create a dilemma for real regulatory progress in the European Union. The EURATOM 
Treaty does not provide any direct legal bases for legislative action in the field of fi-
nancing of decommissioning. There is no legal leeway for extensive interpretation of 
EURATOM rules. The EC Treaty provides enough direct legal ground. Nuclear energy 
treatment in the broadest sense is only in those parts submitted to the specialised 
EURATOM treaty which are clearly defined in the EURATOM treaty itself or in secon-
dary legislation based on the EURATOM treaty whereas all other subjects have to be 
treated under the ECT and its respective secondary legislation. 
It would on the contrary only be adequate to integrate the discussion concerning safety 
and availability of decommission funding under the EC Treaty (ECT).  
The following evaluation aims to provide sound legal arguments for a choice towards 
ECT. 
5.2 Arguments in favour of the use of the European Communities Treaty 
(ECT) as legal basis for any draft legal proposal by the European Com-
mission 
5.2.1 Objectives and Tasks of the EURATOM Treaty 
The EURATOM treaty has distinct objectives and tasks. EURATOM Treaty is the 
treaty promoting the use of nuclear technology 
According to Article 1 of the Euratom Treaty of 1957 (EURATOM), the main task of the 
Community is “to contribute to the raising of the standards of living in the Member 
States and to the development of relations with other countries by creating the condi-
tions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries”.  
To accomplish this task, the Community was given sovereign rights, which the Member 
States transferred to it by signing the Treaty, in the following areas:  
• research,  
• health and safety (protection of workers and the population against the dangers of 
ionising radiation),  
• supply of raw materials,  
• nuclear safeguards, and  
• external relations. 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) recently repeated that: 
• the establishment of a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of 
nuclear    installations; 
• measures relating to the assessment and verification of safety; 
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• emergency preparedness;  
• the siting of a nuclear installation and  
• the design, construction and operation of nuclear installations, 
are covered by the main focus of the EURATOM treaty.1 
All secondary legislation, recommendations and the like can only be based on the 
EURATOM treaty and its options for initiate legislative proposals if they are within the 
limited scope of application of the EURATOM treaty.  
Consequently, all legislative proposals and recommendations on the structure, avail-
ability of decommissioning funds in the respective Member States have to be based on 
the Treaty of the European Communities. The treaty competences of EURATOM do 
not relate to any financing of decommissioning relations. It goes against international 
rules of general interpretation to extend the competencies of the EURATOM treaty be-
yond the limits the treaty founder have given to it. 
It is especially invalid to try to extent by the simple means of interpretation a new com-
petence of EURATOM which is clearly regulated under the general EC Treaty but 
which is not covered by the EURATOM treaty.   
5.2.2 Cohabitation and Prevalence- EURATOM treaty and ECT 
In the European treaty context we face a situation of two treaties, EURATOM and ECT 
which need in some cases clear distinction of respective responsibilities, almost similar 
to reflections on applicability of one of these treaties with international treaties. 
The European Court of Justice ruled in judgment of 26 October 1982 (Hauptzollamt 
Mainz v. C A Kupferberg & Cie. KG, paragraph 29) that provisions in an international 
agreement and in the EC Treaty having the same object, nevertheless, have to be “… 
considered and interpreted in their own context …”2. An interpretation of the applicabil-
ity of EURATOM provisions as legal basis versus ECT provisions has to follow this 
logic. 
EURATOM is not answering to necessities and requirements for safe, stable sufficient 
and market-compatible availability of decommissioning funds within the internal Energy 
market and in response to environmental protection issues. 
                                                
1  JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: 10 December 2002 (International agreements - Convention on Nuclear 
Safety - Accession decision - Compatibility with the Euratom Treaty - External competence of the 
Community - Articles 30 to 39 of the Euratom Treaty)  Case C-29/99, 
2  Although article 21 of the agreement between the EEC and the Portuguese Republic on free trade and 
article 95 of the EEC treaty have the same object inasmuch as they aim at the elimination of tax dis-
crimination , both provisions , which are moreover worded differently , must however be considered 
and interpreted in their own context .  
Since the EEC treaty and the agreement on free trade pursue different objectives , it follows that the 
interpretation given to article 95 of the treaty cannot be applied by way of simple analogy to the 
agreement on free trade . 
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If the European Commission or the Council want to integrate such competence into the 
EURATOM treaty, the respective amendment procedure rules provided in the 
EURATOM Treaty e.g. intergovernmental conferences, ratification procedure will have 
to be followed. 
Since this is not foreseen, the application of ECT is prevalent. 
5.2.3 Integration of principles from EURATOM into  ECT based legal di-
rective 
There maybe an approach to be examined and that is to use provisions in the 
EURATOM treaty and general principles deriving from the Euratom Treaty used to ar-
gue and to support legislative proposals on EU level  on decommissioning. 
There maybe a way feasible to use a dual legal approach and to base proposals on 
both EURATOM and ECT rules but this is possible only under legal “leadership” of arti-
cle 175 and 95 of the ECT. 
The general ECT, its secondary legislation and the introduction of specific principles 
from international law into European legislation provide the primary applicable ground 
for adequate legally binding proposals and subsequent secondary legislation based on 
those proposals. 
The European Commission had published on the 6th of November 2003 the proposal 
for a “Community approach to nuclear safety”. 
As outlined in this study this package of proposed measures has now been put on hold. 
As much as this proposal by the European Commission had failed to be accepted so 
far it had lead to an EU level attention on decommissioning financing and opened a 
way towards further intensive work by the European Commission. 
Recently the European Commission re-opened the path towards harmonised rules for 
decommissioning funds with a new proposal, this time as Recommendations “of…on 
the management of financial resources for the decommissioning of nuclear installa-
tions, spent fuel and radioactive waste” and now uses the joint declaration as inter-
institutional statement form July 2003 by the European Commission, the Council and 
the European Parliament3 “at least” as setting the “ground for Community action.”4 
                                                
3 „Statements made with regard to decommissioning and waste management activities  
Interinstitutional  statement  
The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission underline the need for Member States to 
ensure that adequate financial resources for decommissioning and waste management activities, 
which are audited in Member States, are actually available for the purpose for which they have been 
established and are managed in a transparent way, thus avoiding obstacles to fair competition in the 
energy market'.  
Commissions statement  
‘The Commission notes the importance of ensuring that funds established for the purpose of decom-
missioning and waste management activities, which relate to the objectives of the Euratom Treaty, are 
managed in a transparent way, and used only for the said purpose. In this context, it intends, within 
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This ground for action can by itself only be seen as a certain programme or action plan, 
but has by itself no legal power to serve as bases for legally binding actions. And at 
close sight the inter-institutional statement itself only underlines the “need of Member 
States to ensure” but does not open in a direction of legislative proposal by the Euro-
pean and especially the Commission’s level. 
The European Commission published Recommendations for decommissioning funds, 
but they were classified by the Commission as being “legally non-binding”5.   
5.2.4 The legal nature of the inter-institutional agreement on decommis-
sioning 
Neither the EURATOM Treaty nor the ECT provide direct ground and legal character 
for such inter-institutional agreement as bases for actions on decommissioning regula-
tions.  
The fact that the declaration is published in the Official Journal does not give it a legal 
binding character as legal bases for action on the side of the European Commission. It 
may help for arguments for the Commission on why it thinks necessary and adequate 
to come up with a legislative proposal. But such legal proposal has to stand on firm 
rules established in the European Treaties. 
The concept of an institutionalised inter-institutional agreement by Council, Commis-
sion and Parliament came up during the discussion for a Constitution for Europe (TEU). 
The work on this treaty was underway at the same time of discussion for a nuclear 
package. 
In the draft constitution Article I-25 European Commission outlines as following under 
paragraph 1 and 2:  
“The European Commission shall promote the general European interest of 
the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the 
application of the Constitution, and steps taken measures adopted by the 
Institutions under the Constitution. It shall oversee the application of Union 
law under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It shall 
execute the budget and manage programmes. It shall exercise coordinat-
ing, executive and management functions, as laid down in the Constitution. 
                                                                                                                                          
the scope of its responsibilities of the Euratom Treaty to publish an annual report on the use of de-
commissioning and waste management funds. It shall pay particular attention to ensuring the full ap-
plication of the relevant provisions of Community law'. Official Journal L 176/56 15.7.2003  
4  See Draft COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of … on the management of financial resources for 
the decommissioning of nuclear installations, spent fuel and radioactive waste, Explanatory memo-
randum (as of October 2006)  
5  See also explicitly on this the “European Parliament resolution on the use of financial resources ear-
marked for the decommissioning of nuclear power plants” (2005/2027(INI), adopted 16
th
 of November 
2005 which underlines the promised recommendation of the European Commission as legally non-
binding 
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With the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and other 
cases provided for in the Constitution, it shall ensure the Union's external 
representation. It shall initiate the Union's annual and multi annual pro-
gramming with a view to achieving interinstitutional agreements.  
2. Except where the Constitution provides otherwise, Union legislative acts 
can be adopted only on the basis of a Commission proposal. Other acts are 
adopted on the basis of a Commission proposal where the Constitution so 
provides.” 
This restricts the agreement to programming and planning and by itself does not open 
to a new ground for legally binding acts. 
The EC treaty would be the right basis, in order to ensure the environmental and safety 
provision of Article 6 of the ECT and the regulations concerning the free market princi-
ple according to Article 14 ECT. It would be first of all Article 175 Par. 1 ECT, which 
provides the appropriate legal ground for such initiatives by the European Commission. 
Concerning the implication for the internal market for energy, especially in view to the 
decommissioning funds proposed Article 95 ECT is also to be taken as legal basis.  
Since the liberalisation of the energy markets, especially since the entering into force of 
Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 
1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, now regulated by 
Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
96/92/EC, all regulations for the different sources of energy and all production of elec-
tricity from energy sources such as nuclear have to be coherent and in line with the 
internal market regulations, if they have an impact on the internal market. Commission 
proposals concerning funding for decommissioning will have an impact on the activities 
of the electricity market. All regulations concerning this market have to be balanced in 
view of the above directive 96/92/EC.   
5.2.5 The European Commission’s current legal arguments for EURATOM 
as bases for decommissioning regulation on European level 
The Commission at present supports the following line of argument in their legal rea-
soning: 
Article 2(c) of the Treaty calls on the Community to facilitate investment and ensure the 
establishment of the basic installations necessary for the development of nuclear en-
ergy in the Community. The development of such energy cannot be dissociated from 
the process of the decommissioning of such investments or installations. Article 41 of 
the Treaty requires investment projects relating to nuclear energy to be communicated 
to the Commission for examination. Council Regulation (Euratom) No 2587/1999 of 2 
December 1999 defining the investment projects to be communicated to the Commis-
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sion in accordance with Article 41 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic En-
ergy Community6 includes decommissioning activities as investment projects to be 
communicated to and discussed with the Commission. Consequently, persons and 
undertakings7 should inform the Commission of decommissioning funding arrange-
ments in respect of newly built nuclear installations. 
There is no dissent by this decommissioning study on the importance of acting on 
European level and the Commission should be supported in its tenacity. But the above 
Commission arguments lead to a factual new EURATOM treaty. The interpretation pro-
cedure of the Commission goes too far and neglects the ECT in basically denying ap-
plicability of the ECT.  
5.2.6 Evaluation in view of prevalence of the ECT – Article 305 Paragraph 
2 ECT  
Concerning the question of which treaty should be applicable, EURATOM or the gen-
eral EC treaty (ECT), Article 305 Par. 2 ECT places the ECT in a subsidiary position in 
relation to the EURATOM treaty, but only if the predominant applicability of Article 31 
EURATOM treaty is proven. 
 Article 305 par 2: “The provisions of this Treaty shall not derogate from those of the 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.”  
But this article is of declaratory nature only. Therefore it has to be evaluated if Article 
31 EURATOM would be the right and exclusive legal basis for the concrete draft pro-
posals.  
Articles 30 seq. of the EURATOM Treaty form part of Title Two, Chapter III of this 
treaty, entitled "Health and Safety" and are connected with the preamble to the 
EURATOM Treaty, in which the signatory States declare to be "anxious to create the 
conditions of safety necessary to eliminate hazards to the life and health of the public".  
Linked to this, Article 2(b) of the EURATOM Treaty develops further, that the Commu-
nity shall establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the 
general public and ensure that they are applied.  
Article 31 refers directly to Article 30 EURATOM Treaty. 
The text of Article 30 to 32 reads as follows: 
“Article 30 
Basic standards shall be laid down within the Community for the protection of the 
health of workers and the general public against dangers arising form ionizing radia-
tions. 
                                                
6 OJ L 315, 9.12.1999, p. 1. 
7 Persons and undertakings engaged in industrial activities listed in Annex II to the EURATOM Treaty  
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The expression basic standards means: 
a. maximum permissible doses compatible  with adequate safety; 
b. maximum permissible levels of exposure  and contamination; 
c. the fundamental principles governing the health surveillance of workers.  
 
Article 31 
The basic standards shall be worked out by the Commission after it has obtained the 
opinion of a group of persons appointed by the Scientific and Technical Committee 
from among scientific experts, and in particular public health experts, in the Member 
States. The Commission shall obtain the opinion of the Economic and Social Commit-
tee on these basic standards. 
After consulting the European Parliament the Council shall, on a proposal from the 
Commission, which shall forward to it the opinions obtained from these Committees, 
establish the basic standards; the Council shall act by a qualified majority. 
 
Article 32 
At the request of the Commission or of a Member State, the basic standards may be 
revised or supplemented in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31.  
The Commission shall examine any request made by a Member State.  
 
In the EURATOM treaty, especially competition and respectively internal market law 
considerations are not established. The procedural requirements and conditions of Ar-
ticle 31 EURATOM Treaty profoundly different from those of the ECT, especially Article 
175 and the internal market harmonization provisions as laid down in Article 95 ECT.  
Article 95 Para 1 ECT reads as following: »” 
1.   By way of derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise pro-
vided in this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement 
of the objectives set out in Article 14. The Council shall, acting in accor-
dance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approxima-
tion of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
Member States which have as their object the establishment and function-
ing of the internal market. 
..” 
Art. 175 ECT gives the ground for regulations to follow the scope and obligations of the 
basic Article 6 ECT, such as the precautionary principle and the principle of preventive 
action. Article 6 has the following wording: 
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Article 6 ECT 
Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and im-
plementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particu-
lar with a view to promoting sustainable development. 
 
Article 174 ECT describes the aims and principles of the EC environmental policy. Arti-
cle 174 Par 2 calls for a high level of protection. Article 175 contains the legal basis for 
legislative measures and governs the decision-making process for their coming into 
being. Article 176 allows Member States the option to maintain or take more stringent 
measures. 
 
Article 175 Par 1 ECT reads as following:   
1. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Arti-
cle 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, shall decide what action is to be taken by the 
Community in order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 174. 
Article 175 ECT reflects the Treaty of Amsterdam, which reformed the existing treaties 
in 1999, enlarging the power of the European Parliament.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam (‘Amsterdam Treaty’) revising the Treaties of the European 
Union (‘EU’) - the EU’s "constitutional basis" - entered into force on May 1, 1999. The 
revisions include a strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament in decision-
making procedure. The revised Treaty of the European Community (ECT) put an end 
to the legislative procedure of co-operation in which the Council could overrule the Par-
liament. The procedure of cooperation has been replaced by the procedure of co-
decision which gives the Parliament substantial and equal legislative powers with the 
Council.  
As from May 1, 1999, the co-decision procedure, regulated by Article 251 of the EC 
Treaty, amongst others, applies to those legislative proposals regarding the environ-
ment which were formerly governed by the cooperation procedure (Article 175(1) of the 
ECT.  
All examination concerning applicability has to acknowledge the important priority of 
involvement of the European Parliament subsequent to the Amsterdam Treaty in legal 
decision procedures. On the basis of Article 10 ECT and the principle of loyalty, the 
Commission is obliged to carefully evaluate and weigh the main objectives of specific 
regulations before deciding whether the EURATOM Treaty is applicable or the ECT 
provisions. 
According to judgment of the Court of 4th of October 1991 (Case C-70/88) the choice of 
a legal basis does not simply depend on an institution’s conviction as to the objective 
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pursued but must be based on objective factors which are amenable to juridical review. 
Those factors are in particularly related to the aim and content of the measure in ques-
tion. 
The Member States as founders of the EURATOM treaty “clearly wished to retain tech-
nological control over the installations on their territories.” Therefore up to now the 
European Commission had never proposed legislation on the technological aspects of 
nuclear safety, (see opinion of Advocate General Francis Jacobs delivered on 13th of 
December 1999, RN 138, case C 29/99). The Member States have “exclusive compe-
tence over the technological aspects of nuclear safety” (Case C 29/99, par 138).   
Even if radiation protection must be understood broadly in the sense rendering tribute 
to the development of an integrated and scientifically more advanced radiation protec-
tion scheme, it is “nevertheless clear that the authors of the EURATOM Treaty did not 
intend the Community to interfere with safety of nuclear installations in strictu sensu” 
(Advocate General Francis Jacobs, Case C 29/99, par.195). An overlap between radia-
tion protection (Community task) and safety of nuclear installations (Member States’ 
task) could only lead to a limited competence of the Community concerning radiation 
issues having an impact in the field of safety of nuclear installations. 
5.2.7 Specific focus on key  provisions in the nuclear package proposal 
The following chapter will focus on some of the provisions in the nuclear package pro-
posed by the European Commission in order to evaluate them in the light of limits to 
interpretation of the EURATOM treaty and the applicability of ECT. 
Article 4 (independence of the safety authority) of the draft proposal setting out basic 
obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear installation (herewith named 
“Package Proposal 1”) nuclear package proposal obliges the Member States to estab-
lish a safety authority, on the legal basis of Article 30 EURATOM treaty.  
The draft proposal for a council directive on the management of spent nuclear fuel and 
radioactive waste (herewith named “Package Proposal 2”) of the nuclear package the 
Commission proposes the following Article 4 (General requirements for the manage-
ment of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste) outlining important and basic princi-
ples for financial resources for decommissioning:   
“… 
3.Member States shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with the  
implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework, and provided 
with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to 
fulfil its assigned responsibilities. 
4. Member States shall ensure that adequate financial resources are avail-
able to support the safe management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive 
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waste, including that from decommissioning activities, and that financing 
schemes respect the “polluter pays” principle. 
5. Member States shall ensure that there will be effective public information 
and, where necessary, participation in order to achieve a high level of 
transparency on issues related to the management of spent nuclear fuel 
and radioactive waste under their jurisdiction…” 
In its recent above mentioned draft recommendations the Commission proposes again 
measures in line with Nr. 3 and 4 of Article 4 of the package proposal. It is out of ques-
tion and clearly shown in this report that the Commission is right to propose such 
measures. From the general ECT law and further principles the Commission is even 
obliged to act. EURATOM fails to provide any correct legal bases in this respect.  
According to the explanatory remarks of the Commission in the Package Proposal 2, 
the list of general requirements in Article 4 specifies measures are to be observed by 
Member States in order to achieve the stated objectives in Article 1 of the proposed 
Directive. "These measures can be considered as constituting established international 
best practice in the field of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management, and 
cover such aspects as public health, environmental protection, nuclear safety, financing 
and governance. Many of these measures may be a part of current policy in many 
Member States." (ibid, p. 9). 
But rules on safety of nuclear installations and on decommissioning funding are not 
directly mentioned as responsibility of the EURATOM Community under the 
EURATOM Treaty and Article 30, 31 cannot serve as legal basis.  Decommissioning 
clearly is a question of safety of nuclear installations and thus not within the discretion 
of the EURATOM Community.  
Since there is no room for an application of EURATOM on the technical and organisa-
tional problems and tasks related to decommissioning, it is not necessary to examine 
whether Article 203 EURATOM treaty could apply. Article 203 allows appropriate 
measures for the Council on proposal by the Commission, but only if one of the objec-
tives of the EURATOM Community and the EURATOM Treaty is addressed. As shown 
above, the EURATOM treaty has no objectives for the Community to regulate the tech-
nical or financial aspects of decommissioning, EURATOM cannot be chosen as basis 
for a regulation of decommissioning in the proposed way. Therefore neither Article 30 
nor Article 203 could serve as basis. 
The same incompatibility of the EURATOM treaty provisions as basis for the regulation 
is valid for Article 13 (operating incidents) of the Package Proposal 1. Operating is 
linked to the technical running of the respective nuclear installations and thus excluded 
from the scope of the EURATOM treaty.  
Article 5 (Programme for the management of radioactive waste) of package proposal 2 
obliges all Member States to establish a “clearly defined programme for radioactive 
waste management” and gives a strict plan for “long-term management” and disposal 
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with a defined timetable without any concentration on basic standards for health or re-
lated issues. Article 7 (Investments) of the same proposal calls on specific investment 
securities for the assurance of the management according to Article 5.  
But financing and governance of the installations etc. for handling waste, information 
on issues related to the management are not covered by the Community competencies 
according to the EURATOM Treaty but have ample legal background in the ECT.  
The founders of the EURATOM treaty have clearly limited the scope of responsibility of 
the Community also in the context of EURATOM, this limits have to be respected.  
Article 31 EURATOM manifests these limits that EURATOM is not applicable as the 
basis for legal proposals for decommissioning funding following Article 30 EURATOM. 
The specific scientific committee following Article 31 EURATOM is established to give 
opinions on strictly direct radiation and safety issues. It has no competence to give 
such opinion on financial aspects of decommissioning, fund structures, availability and 
framework rules on decommissioning. It is a committee of highly qualified nuclear ra-
diation specialist not of experts on competition, energy markets and market compatibil-
ity and the financial consequences of different decommissioning rules in the European 
Union. The Committee can certainly evaluate basic safety standards and their scientific 
viability and has in the past fulfilled just this function. The group of experts has no le-
gitimate power to comment on proposals that regulate other questions than those 
strictly related to the correct scientific compliance of the respective rules with basic 
standards for health and safety, meaning maximum permissible doses compatible with 
adequate safety, maximum permissible levels of exposure and contamination, funda-
mental principles governing the health surveillance of workers, see Article 30 Par. 2 
EURATOM treaty. 
5.2.8 Internal market rules underline ECT as legal bases 
Any regulation concerning decommissioning funds for nuclear power stations will have 
to be based on the Article 175 ECT and on Article 95 ECT since they have direct im-
pact on the internal market for electricity.  
Even though the Commission does not explicitly make this link to the ECT it already 
laid the ground for this in its proposal. This is evident in the explanatory remark to the 
proposal and in the communication concerning nuclear safety:  
"On the basis of regular information from Member States, to be provided every three 
years, the Commission will produce a periodical report on the state of the funds and will 
undertake, if necessary, measures to address irregularities which could either com-
promise the completion of decommissioning or create distortions in the electricity mar-
ket.” (s. draft Directive proposal, p. 6). 
"While Member States which have nuclear power stations have made financial provi-
sions to ensure the availability of sufficient funds to cover the expense of decommis-
sioning such plants, their approach to the management of these funds varies 
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significantly from one Member State to another. In addition, the current situation in-
volves disparities which are a hindrance to the smooth functioning of the internal mar-
ket and undermine healthy competition in the electricity sector." (s. "Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Nuclear safety in 
the European Union"). 
The most recent link to the internal market rules comes from the draft recommendation 
“Commission Recommendation of … on the management of financial resources for the 
decommissioning of nuclear installations, spent fuel and radioactive waste”: 
 “In the context of the EC Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in 
electricity, nuclear decommissioning funding schemes within the EU became subject to 
high level political discussions between the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission.” 
Since liberalisation of the energy markets, especially since the Directive 96/92/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity became valid, subsequently replaced by Di-
rective 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 
96/92/EC, all regulations for the different sources of energy and all production of elec-
tricity from energy sources such as nuclear have to be coherent and in line with the 
internal market regulations, if they have an impact on the internal market. The Com-
mission proposals, especially the envisaged fund for dismantling and related provisions 
in the Directive proposal on the management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive 
waste will have an impact on the activities of the electricity market. Nuclear power sta-
tions have entered the general liberalised market for electricity and all regulations con-
cerning this market have to be balanced in view of the above directive. There is not 
exemption or special treatment foreseen for nuclear energy in this directive.  
Keeping the above Nuclear directive proposals and recent draft recommendations for 
decommissioning funding out of ECT by overstretching all established rules for inter-
pretation of international or supranational treaties the Commission discriminates the 
ECT and subsequent directives on the internal market.   
This is creating a situation where the European Commission itself is violating the effet 
utile principle in regards to the Directive 2003/54/CE by using a wrong legal ground for 
action the Commission risks further delay in achieving a reduction of possible market 
distortion based on different structures of decommissioning funds and their impact on 
the general energy market. 
Interpretation of treaties has to follow established rules as for example in the field of 
international law laid down in the Convention Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties from May 1969. A detailed analysis how the European Commission has used these 
established guidelines is obsolete. Since evidently financing issues in relation to de-
commissioning is not regulated in EURATOM first and foremost recourse to the ECT is 
necessary. And in the ECT Article 175 and article 95 ECT give the adequate framework 
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for legal bases. Only if those options were not regulated in the ECT either the Euro-
pean Commission may have needed to come back to interpretation rules.  
An active shift by the European Commission back to ECT as general treaty applicable 
also for ensuring market balance and availability of funds for decommissioning will earn 
the Commission and the European Union enormous argumentative power and en-
forcement clarity especially if based on competition law rules. 
ECT, its secondary legislation and introduced international law principles such as pol-
luter pays principle and precautionary principle concerning nuclear energy give the 
sufficient bases for legal action. 
Examples for clear applicability of ECT rules as legal basis in the field of nuclear en-
ergy provisions are manifold. The most recent acknowledgement comes from the 
European Court of First Instance’s judgment in the case T-92/02. 26 January 2006 
Judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-92/02 (Stadtwerke Schwäbisch Hall 
GmbH, Stadtwerke Tübingen GmbH, Stadtwerke Uelzen GmbH v Commission of the 
European Communities). In this case the main issue concerned the question whether 
the German scheme of tax exemption for the reserves set up by nuclear power stations 
does amount to State aid. 
Although the Court of First instance denied state aid in its judgment, the Court nonethe-
less states very clearly that the “examined tax exemption amounts to an economic ad-
vantage granted through State resources in so far as the State waives its right to levy a 
certain amount of tax revenue”8 and made no objection against the principal applicabil-
ity of competition rules also in the field of decommissioning funds for nuclear installa-
tions. 
And the European Commission has repeatedly applied competition rules to the nuclear 
sector. 
An interesting decision in view of decommissioning funds is certainly Commission De-
cision 2005/407/EC of 22 September 2004 (OJ L 142, 6.6.2005) on the State aid which 
the United Kingdom is planning to implement for British Energy plc. 
In the same context lies the Commission Decision (2006/643/EC) of 4 April 2006 (OJ 
27.9.2006, L 268/37) on the State Aid which the United Kingdom planned to implement 
for the establishment of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. 
These decisions support the herewith proposed legal analysis of cohabitation of the 
two treatises and fact that even though relations and principles of the EURATOM treaty 
are to be considered the evaluation of violation of competition rules is evaluated under 
ECT competition rules. The following reasons of the Commission in its decision 
206/643/EC are especially noteworthy:  
                                                
8  See press release No 06/06 of the Court of First Instance as of 26
th
 of January 2006 (CJE/06/6) 
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“The notified measure further reinforces the fulfilment of the Euratom Treaty objectives 
by ensuring that the public intervention will not be used for other purposes than the 
decommissioning of obsolete nuclear facilities and the safe management of radioactive 
waste in the context of the discharge of nuclear liabilities.” The Commission than 
evaluates the scheme without any questioning of applicability of ECT under competition 
rules: 
“In order to analyse whether the Measure includes State aid to BNFL and/or to the 
NDA, the Commission first assessed whether it provided an advantage to these enti-
ties.”  
The most recent decision with competition rules as background is the Commission’s 
decision for formal investigation in state export guarantees by French Export Agency 
Coface to French Nuclear construction company AREVA for the construction of a nu-
clear reactor for TVO in Finland.  
And the need to re-apply the ECT as bases for legislative proposals also for decom-
missioning fund matters can be underlined by previous important directives which in-
clude regulations on Nuclear without being subject to the EURATOM treaty but to 
general ECT law: 
• Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997 amending Directive 85/337/EEC on 
the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environ-
ment Nuclear power plants, including their decommissioning, and radioactive waste 
disposal and long-term storage sites are included in the scope of the Directive and 
must therefore be subjected to an assessment. There is no mentioning of 
EURATOM at all, but Annex I of the Directive which relates to project subject to Ar-
ticle 4 (1)  shall be subject to an assessment:  and Annex I (2) explicitly includes 
nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors including the dismantling or de-
commissions of such power stations or reactors 
• These nuclear installations are also included in the scope of the Espoo Convention 
on environmental impact assessment in the international context and, in the more 
general context of public information on environmental issues, the Aarhus Conven-
tion –( OJ L 073 14/03/97 p.5 cons amending OJ 175 05/07/85 p. 430 cons.   
• Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 
2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the en-
vironment Again Nuclear power plants, including their decommissioning, and radio-
active waste disposal and long-term storage sites are included in the scope of the 
Directive and have to be assessed accordingly therefore. 
• Council Directive 98/83/EC of 3 November 1998 on the quality of water intended for 
human consumption. 
• The Directive established the maximum permissible indicative dose from drinking 
water of 0.10 mSv/year excluding tritium for which there is a separate limit of 100 
Bq/l, potassium-40, radon and radon decay products), which could be important in 
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areas affected, for instance, by uranium mining activities or other sources of radio-
active contamination – see OJ L 330 5/12/98 page 32 cons. 
In using only ECT rules, the Council respectively Council and European Parliament on 
proposal by the European Commission clearly distinguished between legal acts which 
fall into the sole discretion of EURATOM rules and legal acts which have their basis 
under ECT.   
As summary it is proposed to apply only Article 95 and Article 174 for regulative 
directive proposal on decommissioning funding. Also the recent draft recom-
mendation would be based on ECT and not EURATOM. 
5.3 Secondary legislation and introduced international law principles 
5.3.1 European Commission is obliged to act 
During discussion of the Nuclear package and its above directive proposals, arguments 
were heard which expressed that since EURATOM treaty does not give any legal basis 
for the European Union to act; only Member States could act within their own discretion 
to reform for example the decommissioning sector and the financial background to it. 
Conclusion was formed by some Member States that the European level has no legal 
possibility to act in way of legislation. This is - in the light of ECT and settled principles - 
certainly not correct. The European level is - viewing its specific role of dismantling of 
some Eastern European Power plants and the role of the Commission as owner of fis-
sile material according to EURATOM - even obliged to act. 
As soon as the European Commission would follow the here presented ECT approach 
and would chose Article 95 and 175 as ground for drafting of legislation any such doubt 
would be removed, and the European Commission could set a framework which con-
tributes to harmonisation of the decommissioning financing approaches, thereby con-
tributing to harmonisation of the liberalised electricity market. 
5.3.2 Precautionary Principle 
The European Union represented by the European Commission has direct legal re-
sponsibility to secure an overall system for decommissioning funds and management 
of those funds following the principles laid down in Article 6 of ECT and subsequent 
development of the high standard of environmental protection in Europe. 
The most important principle in this context is the Precautionary principle. The precau-
tionary principle or the precautionary approach in international environmental law has 
become integrated part of customary international and European law. The precaution-
ary principle is part of many international declaration and conventions such as the 
OSPAR Convention. It is now well established in the European legislation and part of 
mainstream politics. 
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Several principles of international environmental policy, some first enunciated in the 
Stockholm Declaration, were crystallized through the Rio process. Among them, were 
the principles of precaution, polluter-pays, sustainable development, common but dif-
ferentiated responsibility, and environment impact assessment. Since Principle 15 of 
the Rio Declaration, which demands, that in cases when serious harm is threatened, 
positive action to protect the environment should not be delayed until irrefutable scien-
tific, proof of harm is available. The Precautionary principle requires in its strongest 
consequence a reversal of the normal burden of proof, so that a potential actor would 
need to prove that a proposed activity will not cause harm before it can be sanctioned. 
It has been endorsed by virtually all recent environmental treaties, including regional 
treaties such as the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, the 1992 Paris Con-
vention on the North East Atlantic, the Helsinki Convention on the Baltic, and global 
environmental treaties such as the UNFCCC, the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
and the 1995 United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migra-
tory Fish Stocks. A Member State or the European Union as such interested in under-
taking or continuing a particular activity has to prove that such activities will not result in 
any harm, rather than the opposite that others have to prove that it will result in harm. 
This principle opens towards the necessity of making efficient environment-related de-
cisions concerning the potential future harm of a particular activity.    
This principle and its application in European Union law since Maastricht obliges also 
the European Commission as guardian of the treaty to enforce its application in the 
field of decommissioning funding. The European Union cannot wait and see having 
obvious evidence of the inequality of funding schemes, risks for availability of sufficient 
funding and decommissioning tools, as outlined in this report.  
5.3.3 Polluter pays principle 
The Polluter Pays Principle is deeply integrated in the European environmental legisla-
tion, such as under the different waste regulations or the IPCC directive. The most re-
cent application of the principle in the field of nuclear energy can be found in the 
Commission Decision (2006/643/EC) of 4 April 2006 on the State Aid which the United 
Kingdom is planning to implement for the establishment of the Nuclear Decommission-
ing Authority. The analysis whether the polluter pays principle was sufficiently followed 
by the United Kingdom formed a major part of the decision process as to see whether 
the BNFL (British Nuclear Fuel Agency) would by modification of the organisational 
structure have as consequence that BNFL “could be relieved of charges that it might 
otherwise have had to bear under the polluter pays principle”. And the Commission 
came to the conclusion that “estimates show that about 12% of the pollution costs will 
not be covered by the polluters, which demonstrates that the Measure does not fully 
implement the polluter-pays principle”. 
In the case of decommissioning funds the importance of the Commission to act as 
guardian of the treaties is supported by its specific role in view of the EURATOM Treaty 
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and in view of established international and European legal principles introduced since 
1959. The Commission is co-responsible as polluter within the framework of the 
EURATOM treaty. 
In order to perform its tasks in line with the EURATOM treaty, the EURATOM Commu-
nity exercises  “the right of ownership conferred upon it with respect to special fissile 
materials”, Article 2 f. EURATOM Treaty.  Article 6 EURATOM underlines: 
“To encourage the carrying out of research programmes communicated to 
it the Commission may: …. 
supply, either free of charge or against payment, for carrying out such pro-
grammes, any source materials or special fissile materials which it has 
available;” and 
“place installations, equipment or expert assistance at the disposal of 
Member States, persons or undertakings, either free of charge or against 
payment.”  
Article 197 EURATOM defines special fissile materials as plutonium 239; 
uranium 233; uranium enriched in uranium 235 or uranium 233; and any 
substance containing one or more of the foregoing isotopes and such other 
fissile materials as may be specified by the Council, acting by a qualified 
majority on a proposal from the Commission.  
With the establishment of the specific Supply Agency the European Community has the 
ownership right beyond fissile material also for source material and ores, laid down in 
the Regulation of the Supply Agency of the European Atomic Energy Community 
amending the rules of the Supply Agency of 5 May 1960 determining the manner in 
which demand is to be balanced against the supply of ores, source materials and spe-
cial fissile materials (O.J. L 193 of 25.7.1975). With this regulation, the Euratom Supply 
Agency has the right of option on ores, source materials and special fissile materials 
produced in the territories of the Member States as well as an exclusive right to con-
clude contracts relating to the supply of nuclear materials both from inside and from 
outside the Community. 
Further regulations enforce the ownership authority of the European Community repre-
sented by the European Commission: 
• Regulation (Euratom) No 3137/74 of the Commission of 12 December 1974 
amending Commission Regulation No 17/66/EURATOM of 29 November 1966 ex-
empting the transfer of small quantities of ores, source materials and special fissile 
materials from the rules of the chapter on supplies (O.J. L 333 of 13.12.1974). 
• EAEC Supply Agency: Rules of the Supply Agency of the European Atomic Energy 
Community of 5 May 1960 determining the manner in which demand is to be bal-
anced against the supply of ores, source materials and special fissile materials 
(O.J. P 32 of 11.05.1960). This Regulation lays down provisions regarding users' 
notification of demand and producers' notification of supply. It also establishes pro-
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cedures relating to the Agency's role, such as the rules for informing interested par-
ties of supply options, market trends, etc. 
• EAEC Commission: Decision fixing the date on which the Euratom Supply Agency 
shall take up its duties and approving the Agency Rules of 5 May 1960 determining 
the manner in which demand is to be balanced against the supply of ores, source 
materials and special fissile materials (O.J. L 32 of 11.5.1960). The Agency began 
operating on 1 June 1960. Procedures for notification, demand, etc. were regu-
lated. 
Following the cradle to grave approach of the Polluter Pays Principle, the Community 
via the European Commission is thus as much responsible for the adequate and suffi-
cient set up, monitoring and management of decommissioning funds as each single 
Member State who has nuclear installations on his territory. Failure to act on the side of 
the European Commission to set enforceable rules for overall guidelines and principles 
for decommissioning could in principle lead to the same legal recourse as against 
Member States who fail to act to establish sufficient systems. In the case of the nuclear 
energy production chain, the Commission is part of the legally responsible core.  
5.3.4 Financing of Decommissioning in Lithuania and in Slovak Republic 
increases responsibility under the Polluter Pays Principle 
This direct responsibility of the European Commission is even more underlined for all 
nuclear installations which are covered under extensive financial support schemes from 
European budget for decommissioning.  
According to the draft recommendations of the European Commission on the man-
agement of financial resources for the decommissioning of nuclear installations, spent 
fuel and radioactive waste “ the European Community has, on its own initiative, taken 
part in the raising of financial resources and provides financial assistance, subject to 
certain conditions, to various decommissioning projects in the Member States (i.e. Ig-
nalina nuclear power plant in Lithuania and Bohunice V1 nuclear power plant in Slovak 
Republic) and in Bulgaria (Kozloduy nuclear power plant).” 
During the accession negotiations, Lithuania committed to closure of Unit 1 of the Ig-
nalina nuclear power plant before 2005 and of Unit 2 by 31 December 2009 at the lat-
est9. Slovak Republic committed to the closure of Unit 1 of the Bohunice nuclear 
power plant by 31 December 2006 and of Unit 2 by 31 December 2008 at the latest. 
While Bulgaria committed to the closure of Units 1 and 2 by the end of 2002 and Units 
3 and 4 by the end of 2006. 
Community support was installed as consequence in a form as to be “seamlessly con-
tinued and extended, including throughout the period of the next Financial Perspec-
                                                
9   These commitments formed part of Protocol No 4 to the Act concerning the conditions of accession to 
the European Union of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Po-
land, Slovenia and Slovak Republic. 
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tives.10” The financial assistance covers the decommissioning process “and its non-
nuclear consequences”11. 
Given the considerable funding needed for the decommissioning of the above-named 
installations, the European Union has also accepted that, for the period covered by the 
next Financial Perspectives, the overall appropriations should be appropriate and the 
programming of these resources should be based on actual payment needs and ab-
sorption capacity. As further explained in Chapter 3.1.7.4 and in the respective country 
reports in the Appendix to this final report, the European Union became the biggest 
spender under international aid programmes to finance decommissioning of these 
plants. The Commission estimates that a total Community contribution of 1.052 billion 
Euros will enable the European Union to meet its commitments for the period 2007-
2013.12 The Commission had proposed in 2004 the necessary legal framework to en-
sure Community support to be provided from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2013. 
In view of the above arguments deriving from the polluter pays principle and consider-
ing the enormous financial engagement of the European Union from its public budget in 
this venture in both new Member States the Commission is obliged to ensure a Euro-
pean harmonised legal system for decommissioning. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the need to propose a European legal framework on 
decommissioning funds, the ECT providing with a safe and reliable legal basis, and the 
special situation of the EURATOM community and the role of the European Community 
represented by the European Commission as owners of nuclear material and main 
sponsor of the most problematic decommissioning projects so far legally oblige for 
specific EC action (directives) in this respect. 
                                                
10 See: European Commisison, 29.9.2004, COM(2004) 624 final - Proposal for a COUNCIL 
REGULATION on the implementation of Protocol No 4 on the Ignalina nuclear power plantin Lithua-
nia, as annexed to the Act concerning the conditions of accession to the European Union of the  
Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovak Re-
public “Ignalina Programme” - Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION on the implementation of Pro-
tocol No 9 on the Bohunice V1 nuclear power plant in Slovak Republic, as annexed to the Act 
concerning the conditions of accession to the European Union of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cy-
prus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovak Republic (submitted by the 
Commission) 
11  COM(2004) 624 final 
12  COM(2004) 624 final 
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6 Conclusions and recommendations 
6.1 From the analysis of existing approaches to recommendations for 
future decommissioning financing on Member State and EU level 
In the following, overall conclusions and recommendations will be developed for both,  
• the national level (recommendations to the Member States and their decommis-
sioning financing systems), and, 
• the EU level (recommendations for measures to be initiated by the European Com-
mission / European Institutions).  
These conclusions are based on 
• the results of the analysis of financial consequences and risks (Chapter 4), which in 
turn is based on the country analyses (Chapter 3 and Appendix), 
• the stakeholder analyses on the national and the EU level (Chapter 1.1, 3.1.9, and 
as part of the country analyses and as EU stakeholder analyses in the Appendix), 
• the legal framework and the possibilities for changes in the legal basis of policies 
and measures on EU level (Chapter 5), and, 
• what can be learnt from decommissioning financing regulation in non-European 
countries and non-nuclear areas (Appendix). 
6.2 How Member States can improve their decommissioning financing 
systems 
6.2.1 Existing recommendations in literature 
In 2005, the decommissioning working group of the nuclear regulators in Europe 
(WGWD) declared that national regulatory requirements with regard to decommission-
ing financing would be important. However, WGWD did not develop such requirements 
or gave any detailed recommendations on this issue.  
More detailed recommendations on decommissioning financing can be found in other 
international documents. For example, some recommendations were given by partici-
pants in WPDD workshops (cf., e. g., Pfeifer/Gordelier/Drake 2004). Most important, 
an international expert committee assisting the IAEA (2005), the Technical Group on 
Decommissioning (TEGDE), published six pages of recommendations on decommis-
sioning financing, addressing private as well as public licensees. These recommenda-
tions cover 
• Recommendations with regard to long term planning, starting at the time of facility 
start-up or even earlier: preparation of cost estimates, funding plan, etc.; 
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• Recommendations with regard to short term planning: update of cost estimate, eva-
luating the existing trust fund balance, preparation of preliminary transition plan, 
etc.; and, 
• Specific recommendations for  
– Cost estimating following the proposed standardised list by (NEA/IAEA/EC 
1999) and including, among others, contingency in the estimate for unexpected 
costs that are likely to occur (without questioning how far unexpected costs are 
likely to occur); 
– Collection and Management of funds including, among others, earmarking of 
assets for decommissioning, and regular review of fund adequacy; 
– Reducing costs including, among others, the enforcement of a rigorous project 
cost and schedule control system to control costs; 
– Options of decommissioning fund expenditure, including, among others, moni-
toring of decommissioning fund performance and cost escalation, and adjust-
ment of collections accordingly; 
– Considering social impacts, including, among others, costs of job training for 
decommissioning, severance funds for redundant employees, and job re-
training for employees for future job opportunities. 
There are also general recommendations by NEA (2006a) based on underlying ethical 
considerations emphasizing the ‚Polluter Pays Principle’ and ‚intergenerational continu-
ity’. 
Wuppertal Institute has analysed some principal modes of financing future decom-
missioning and waste disposal expenditures (cf. Irrek 1996). Based on recommenda-
tions developed in this and other studies on this topic in the 1990ies, in 2003, 
Wuppertal Institute further developed the following list of criteria, which decommission-
ing and waste management funds should meet (cf. Irrek 2003): 
• All nuclear liabilities should be recognized. 
• The availability of the funds for all the future decommissioning and waste manage-
ment expenditures has to be ensured. The organisations which are responsible for 
the liabilities must have the capacity to pay when the actual expenditures arise. 
• Future generations should not have to pay for the present beneficiaries of nuclear 
power. General equity generations and the “Polluter Pays Principle” call for the 
establishment of measures ensuring that funds are set aside when the future 
liabilities are generated.  
• The annual provisions should reflect changes in estimated prices and costs. 
• The nuclear power plant operators should not have any access to these funds. At 
least, the access should be strictly limited. 
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• An independent body should effectively control how the accruals are set up, how 
and for what purpose they are reversed and how the funds are used in the mean-
time. 
• The constitutionality of the approach has to be verified. 
• Transaction costs should be minimized. 
• Transparency to the public should be ensured. 
Recently, KPMG and NRG (2006) analysed the financial risks of the existing internal, 
unrestricted decommissioning financing system of the nuclear licensees in the Nether-
lands. KPMG and NRG suggest three alternatives to increase financial security: 
• Bank guarantees 
• Dedicated fund (different types analysed: individual internal / central external / cen-
tral individual): “Een fonds dat juridisch is afgescheiden van de overige activa en 
passiva van de vergunninghouder is de vorm die de meeste zekerheid bidet.” 
• Other measures which ensure that decommissioning costs will be covered. 
With regard to investment of funding means, KPMG and NRG suggest different in-
vestment policies/rules for the first years of operation of a nuclear facility, for the years 
immediately before the final shutdown and for the years after the final shutdown, so 
that duration of investment in assets meets duration of liabilities. 
The following recommendations are based on the financial risk analysis presented in 
Chapter 4, which in turn is based on the country analyses in Chapter 3. However, when 
developing these recommendations, existing recommendations in literature like the 
ones described above, examples from non-EU countries and non-nuclear areas (Ap-
pendix), statements by stakeholders interviewed in the course of this project (cf. the 
results of the stakeholder analysis in Chapter 3) and the general legal framework for 
possible changes in decommissioning financing schemes on EU level and in the Mem-
ber States (Chapter 5) were taken into account. 
6.2.2 General recommendations based on the financial risk analysis 
6.2.2.1 Risks identified 
The objective of “Decommissioning Financing Systems” is to ensure the availability of 
an adequate amount of financial resources for decommissioning by the time decom-
missioning activities have to be carried out in order to assure the health and safety of 
workers and citizens. As analysed in Chapter 4, the complex field of decommissioning 
financing includes the following risks, which could adversely affect this objective: 
• risk of insufficient transparency and clarity of liabilities and how they are and should 
be covered; 
• risk of inappropriate recognition, measurement and disclosure of liabilities; 
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• risk of change in ownership; 
• strategic risks linked to inverse investment pattern, tempting private or public op-
erators or fund managers to conflicting use of financial resources, or for provisions 
lagging behind liabilities; 
• risks linked to further conflicting use of financial resources, particularly in the course 
of intensified competition and preparation of privatisation due to the process of lib-
eralisation/re-regulation of the energy markets; 
• risk of debt burden of governments (i. e. debt burden of future generations); 
• risks of early closure because of incidents or accidents or other unforeseen event; 
• risks of changes in decommissioning regulations, e. g. caused by new scientific 
knowledge gathered or new political decisions made, leading to increased decom-
missioning costs; 
• risks of changes in the general economic or political framework, in the behaviour of 
important stakeholders, or other unexpected changes leading to increased decom-
missioning costs. 
• risks of insecure investment; in particular, risk of correlation between nuclear and 
investment risks; 
• risk of investment not matching the duration of liabilities; 
• risk of insufficient investment performance; 
• risk of authorising payments in advance (before expenditures for decommissioning 
activities can be proven) or although not justified to their full extent; 
• risks of insufficient degree of independence of the different functions within the go-
vernance chain; 
• risks linked to inadequate competence and know how particularly of fund manag-
ers, but also of regulators, auditors, and other stakeholders; 
• risks of inefficient systems of checks and balances / inherent inefficiency of se-
lected regulations; 
• risks linked to the existence of two or more different decommissioning financing 
methodologies in one market; 
• risks linked to already existing under-funded situations; 
• risks of insufficient sanctions in case of non-compliance with decommissioning (fi-
nancing) rules. 
6.2.2.2 Key themes of any risk reducing recommendation  
A decommissioning financing scheme should be designed in such a way that it elimi-
nates or mitigates risks and uncertainties as far as possible. To achieve this, the follow-
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ing key themes have to be addressed (cf. Chapter 4 for the importance of these as-
pects): 
• How can it be assured that adequate provisions are set up according to the ‚Pol-
luter Pays Principle’, even in the case of early shutdown or unexpected events that 
lead to unplanned cost increase; 
• How can transparency be increased; 
• How can independence be assured (cf. Chapter 4.2 with regard to this particular 
aspect); 
• How can a uniform accounting treatment be introduced; 
• How can a possible misuse of funds be avoided, and, 
• How can a professional, risk adjusted investment policy be promoted? 
In the following sections, several “risk reducers” (possible measures, restrictions, “fen-
ces”) are described, which address these key themes and can be used to manage the 
risks identified. Risk reducing measures can be regarded as restrictions or „fences“ to a 
decommissioning financing system. Different methodologies need different „fences“.  
An effective and efficient system of authorisation, audits and sanctions, checks and 
balances, can ensure that the key themes mentioned above will be effectively ad-
dressed, and that risk reducers will be implemented contributing to reducing risks and 
uncertainties. In following, several important risk reducers are shortly described. 
6.2.2.3 Measures to increase transparency and clarity 
Transparency is a key issue for any internal and external solution. Chapter 6.3 and 
Chapter 7 contain detailed recommendations how to increase transparency, which 
should be pursued not only on the level of the Member States but on the European 
level. 
Experience shows that it is not always evident that adequate financial means are timely 
available to process decommissioning activities (cf., e.g., the case of THTR in Hamm-
Uentrop, Germany, the case of Bohunice A1 in Slovak Republic, or the case of the Ital-
ian NPP at the time of the decision to finally shut them down). Experience also shows 
that this failure is not only caused by the decommissioning financing methodology cho-
sen.  
This remark leads to the quality level of procedural organisation. Given a basic de-
commissioning funding methodology, an operator has to define and establish a proce-
dural organisation, which is effective, clear and transparent. The procedural 
organisation must contain any additional measure (restriction, „fence“) which is 
deemed to be necessary and it must be explained how the implementation is periodi-
cally monitored. 
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6.2.2.4 Measures to assure a high degree of independence in order to avoid 
possible conflicts of interests 
6.2.2.4.1 Independence criteria 
In general it can be observed that, given the many possible conflicts of interests, the 
highest degree of independence between all involved members of the governance 
chain (cf. Figure 2) is paramount. 
Independence means that independent criteria should be defined. Such criteria should 
cover  
• The organisational and structural independence between the operators (entity) and 
the authority, and, 
• The personal independence of the executive employees. 
6.2.2.4.2 Independent licensing authority 
In particular, the independence of the licensing authority is a key factor, as it has to 
align different objectives from different stakeholders. Independence criteria should be 
defined in general and for executive employees of an authority in particular.  
In this context, it could be recommended that executive employees of an authority 
should not have been employees of an operator (be it private or public) or, at least, that 
a cooling period should be met. Furthermore, it might be sensible to split technical and 
financial oversight on decommissioning within the nuclear authority. 
6.2.2.4.3 Independence of decommissioning fund manager from operator  
The governance analysis depicted that internal and external methodologies need se-
lected additional checks and balances measures. However, solutions should be strived 
for with a minimum of necessary additional measures. All additional measures cause 
additional costs and carry the inherent risk of inefficiency. Any control measure, which 
could be avoided, should be avoided. In principle, external approaches ensuring inde-
pendence of decommissioning fund management from operational tasks reduce the 
need of additional measures of checks and balances (cf. also KPMG/NRG 2006).  
Internal unrestricted decommissioning financing schemes even do not secure a mini-
mum degree of independence, and thus inhibit a high potential for possible conflicts of 
interest. This is both true for private as well as for public licensees. In addition, internal 
funds contain some risk with regard to the question if assets accumulated in this fund 
can be sufficiently claimed after decades of operation, given the assumption that there 
exists a risk of bankruptcy for all companies over a period of at least 60 years, which is 
a minimum operating life and time to complete decommissioning. 
Therefore, internal unrestricted decommissioning financing schemes should develop 
towards the direction of restricted funds, with at least some kind of separation of funds.  
TREN/05/NUCL/S07.55436 Final Report – EU Decommissioning Funding Methodologies 
152 Wuppertal Institute et al. 
This conclusion is valid both for private and for public licensees. Public licensees 
should not pay decommissioning costs from the current budget, but should build up 
provisions, too. Private as well as public licensees should ensure a minimum degree of 
independence of the functions (1) facility operation / technical decommissioning activi-
ties and (2) decommissioning fund management. 
6.2.2.4.4 Separating the power of authority to dispose of collected means of finance 
A main conflict potential always remains with the entity that disposes of the power of 
authority to use the funds set aside. Therefore, one concrete measure would be to 
separate the power of authority of disposal of decommissioning fund and the contribu-
tor of the payments to the fund (operator), while at the same time not reducing any in-
centives to reduce costs of decommissioning activities.  
If the power of authority to dispose is with a third party, the degree of independence 
between the third party and the operators can vary significantly. Therefore, in each 
case, the degree of independence has to be separately assessed. 
Example: „In France, private operators have to set aside internal restricted funds cov-
ered by dedicated assets. These assets seem to be well protected by the new waste 
law. The law stipulates earmarking of decommissioning funds (assets) and separate 
disclosure. In addition the law protects the assets and nobody, besides the state in 
execution of its right to enforce the operators’ obligations to decommission can claim 
any right over the assets“ (Source: Country report France in the annex to this final re-
port). Such a protection of the assets substantially improves the quality of a decommis-
sioning methodology applied. 
In order to ensure that the company owning the plant and being responsible for its de-
commissioning activities makes no unreasonable profit with its decommissioning unit, 
rules for transactions with related parties will have to be implemented, if the power of 
authority to dispose funds is not fully separated from the contributor to the fund. 
6.2.2.4.5 Independent national body providing expert judgement on fund management 
and decommissioning cost matters 
As recommended by the Commission in its recently published recommendations, a 
national body should be set up or appointed on a national level, where not already pro-
vided for, capable of providing an expert judgement on fund management and decom-
missioning cost matters. The members of this body should be independent from the 
licensees and the government. This body shall further contribute to increasing trans-
parency and enabling oversight. 
6.2.2.5 Introducing a uniform accounting treatment 
On the level of the Member States as well as on the European level, generally ac-
cepted accounting principles (GAAP) should be applied to all public and private licen-
sees in the same way in order to increase transparency and comparability of 
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decommissioning cost estimates and financing schemes. This report recommends ap-
plying the International Financial Reporting Standards IFRSs together with clarifica-
tions (EU interpretations and guidance) as outlined in Chapter 4.3.8 in order to improve 
the reliability and comparability. The scope of liabilities thereby taken into account 
could follow, e. g., the proposed standardised list by (NEA/IAEA/EC 1999). 
Applying the “current budget” methodology does not meet the qualitative characteristics 
of modern accounting and is a possible source of failure in decommissioning financing. 
6.2.2.6 Measures to avoid deviations from the ‚Polluter Pays Principle’ even in 
case of early shutdown or other unexpected events 
6.2.2.6.1 Operating license 
In some countries, the fulfilment of liabilities (operational and financial) related to nu-
clear decommissioning is an absolute condition for the continued validity of the operat-
ing licences of nuclear facilities. For instance, in Finland, according to the Nuclear 
Energy Act (section 26), the Government must cancel the operating licence wholly or 
partly, if the licensee is omitting to fulfil the financial provision obligation for nuclear 
waste management and decommissioning at the start of operation of the plant.  
In addition, it is important that operating licenses also contain requirements for the 
cases of bankruptcy and change in ownership of a nuclear power plant. It must be pre-
vented that the responsibility for decommissioning is separated from the nuclear power 
plant owner through a change in ownership. Therefore, it must also be assured that, in 
the case of a change of ownership, all decommissioning liabilities are transferred to a 
new owner or that the liabilities are secured by other measures. In no case should a 
situation evolve where no financially solvent legal entity remains responsible for the 
liabilities.  
6.2.2.6.2 Transparent and enforceable contractual agreements between mother and 
daughter companies and integration of such agreements as requirement into 
the licensing process 
 In this context, the relationship between mother and daughter companies has to 
be carefully examined. For example, in case the licensee is a limited company belong-
ing to a large corporate group, it should be ensured that contractual agreements be-
tween both are designed in such a way that the corporate group will cover all liabilities 
of the limited company in any case of bankruptcy of the daughter company („deep po-
cket liability“). Such contractual agreements should be integrated into the licensing pro-
cess at start of operation and should not be affected by any transfer of ownership. 
6.2.2.6.3 Two kind of guarantees 
Following particularly the Swedish example, in addition to the principle financing sche-
me providing for the „normal“ case of having to pay for decommissioning activities as 
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as expected and estimated, guarantees should be established to cover the following 
two kind of risks (unexpected events): 
• Risk of an early shutdown, to be covered by Guarantee I; 
• Risks of inadequate fund balance in the end after the final shutdown, e. g., due to 
unexpected cost increase or fund mismanagement, to be covered by Guarantee II. 
Figure 5: Guarantee I and Guarantee II covering financial risks related to decommissioning costs occur-
ring after final shutdown of the plant (dismantling, etc.) 
Source:  Wuppertal Institute, et al., 2006 
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However, Guarantee I is not or only partly needed in case the full amount of decom-
missioning liabilities related to activities after a final shutdown of a facility is already 
covered by provisions from the start of faculty operation, as it is required in Finland 
(undiscounted amount to be provided at start of operation) or partly in France (dis-
counted amount to be provided at start of operation). Therefore, as it can be seen from 
Figure 5, the size of Guarantee I depends on the way provisions are set up. It should 
be noted that, for reason of simplification, Figure 5 only refers to costs of dismantling, 
decontamination and demolition and other costs occurring after final shutdown, and 
neglects decommissioning (e.g., waste management) activities already taking place 
during operation. 
Guarantee II is not needed as far as additional means of finance are individually se-
cured in other ways, as it is partly done in Finland by supplementary securities which 
the Ministry has to require from the licensees covering up to 10% of the assessed liabil-
ity. 
There are several possibilities how to set up such guarantees in order to ensure ade-
quate and available financial resources at the time needed. However, in any case, ex-
treme cost increase due to major incidents or accidents, which should be covered by a 
Guarantee II scheme, cannot be fully accounted for on an individual plant base. It 
would be unreasonable to base the cost estimates for decommissioning on the as-
sumption that each nuclear facility will encounter a major accident during their opera-
tional lifetime. Therefore, for such a case, solidarity agreements between the operators 
of nuclear power plants, group insurances or similar approaches might be suitable so-
lutions. However, this is, of course, a problem for countries where only few nuclear 
facilities are under operation, or where those few nuclear facilities all belong to a single 
company. In these cases, with inclusion of an appropriate insurance or provision for 
such rare cases like accidents or major incidents or other unforeseen events, the facil-
ity might not be operated economically anymore. Another possibility would be some 
international pooling solution. Nevertheless, regulation should assure that the ‚Polluter 
Pays Principle’ will be followed also in such cases as far as possible. 
In particular, guarantee or similar solutions covering the two kind of risks mentioned 
above could be the following: 
• Pooling/Solidarity solution: All operators of nuclear facilities (in a country, or in case 
of countries with only few facilities, in a region) collectively finance a guarantee 
fund (solidarity fund) by paying a fraction of the total contribution, which they peri-
odically pay into their own decommissioning fund, into the guarantee fund. The 
amount paid in a common fund could be based on probabilities (benefit from the 
risk diversification effect). Whereas a single fund of an operator should not calcu-
late with probabilities because no risk diversification effect can be achieved with 
single solutions. Social insurance and pension fund systems undertake such com-
mon schemes. 
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• The guarantees can be insurance products, which are financially secured by gen-
eral insurance regulation. 
• The guarantees can be bank guarantees or special bank products as long as they 
are financially secured by general banking regulation (cf. KPMG/NRG 2006). 
6.2.2.7 Avoiding any misuse of funds and implementing a professional, risk ad-
justed investment policy 
Investment guidelines should be set dealing with the trade-off between high perform-
ance and high security and describing the required qualifications of investment 
managers. 
A professional asset & liability management should be implemented for all private 
and public facilities, with matching durations of liabilities and assets. Furthermore, in-
centives should be set for a high performance within the boundaries set by the invest-
ment guidelines, thereby trying to overcome any principal-agent problem. Special 
attention has to be paid to lending practices to related parties. 
A periodical evaluation of the financial risk rating (solvency) of the operators (mother 
and daughter/consolidated view) should be undertaken. Audits by certified auditors on 
the state of provisions, the state of the decommissioning funds and the investment pol-
icy should be carried out. 
6.3 Increasing transparency and oversight - First steps proposed at EU 
level 
6.3.1 Additional reporting requirements – Information rights 
One central problem is the many financial risks and uncertainties involved in decom-
missioning financing for a variety of reasons. A way towards better recognition of finan-
cial risks, more accurate cost estimates and improved learning how to deal with 
financial risks and uncertainties, is to initiate a steady process of discussion, regularly 
cost updates and data exchange on cost estimates, fund accumulation and fund man-
agement, and on further experiences with the different decommissioning financing sys-
tems on EU level. Such a process has already started: 
• The European Commission produces annual reports to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the use of financial resources earmarked for the decommission-
ing of nuclear power plants. 
• The European Commission has initiated studies leading to a better overview and 
understanding of decommissioning financing issues in the EU. 
• The Council has established a working group, and the Commission has initiated a 
Decommissioning Funding Group, in which country experts exchange information 
on decommissioning financing. The importance of this group has been further 
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strengthened by the recently issued recommendations of the Commission. The 
Commission sees the Decommissioning Funding Group as a lynchpin of future 
work on this issue.  
However, in order to have a further improved, regular and stable data and information 
basis for such a process of increasing transparency, additional reporting require-
ments should be set for the Member States and the European Commission’s own nu-
clear facilities. A benchmarking system looking at specific indicators could be based 
upon this. How such a reporting and benchmarking system could look is explained in 
detail in Chapter 7. 
A perceived barrier towards implementation of such a step might be the possible trade-
off between  
• the degree of detail of data and information needed to ensure sufficient transpar-
ency and oversight of the decommissioning financing system, and  
• the degree to which transparency affects competition of companies highly special-
ised in decommissioning activities.  
However, according to the experience of this project and discussions with stakeholders 
from decommissioning industry, the level of detail proposed in Chapter 7 will not affect 
competition at all. In contrast, the data and information gained will improve transpar-
ency in the market, and thus lead to a more competitive environment in the end. 
Furthermore, at the same time, such reporting requirements, if properly forwarded by 
the Member States to the nuclear operators and decommissioning fund managers in 
the course of the national implementation processes, could be understood as a right of 
the public for access to information. Such an information right should be implemented 
in order to ensure a minimum level of a participatory process and to lay a basis for ef-
fective protection of EU citizens. This is needed because of the substantial risks for 
health and environment of the back-end activities of nuclear installations having im-
pacts not only for todays but also for future generations of EU citizens. 
6.3.2 Council of European Nuclear Decommissioning Funds (CENDF) 
The whole process of increasing transparency could be further supported by the instal-
lation of a Council (of Trustees) of European Nuclear Decommissioning Funds 
(CENDF) on the EU or European level or a similar kind of committee. Like, for exam-
ple, the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER), such a board does not nec-
essarily have to be part of the European Commission. It can be an independent „not for 
profit association“, which  
• acts as a focal point for contacts between the national decommissioning fund man-
agers or trustees or other representatives of the national decommissioning financ-
ing systems in the different Member States, 
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• is their interface at the European level with the European institutions on nuclear 
decommissioning financing, 
• has strong linkages to the European Commission’s Decommissioning Funding 
Group advising and assisting the Commission in ensuring financial security of de-
commissioning funding in the EU, and 
• facilitates the process of increasing transparency on nuclear decommissioning fi-
nancing in Europe,   
• agrees on good practice and consequently contributes to improving the existing 
systems, and finally,  
• contributes to a higher degree of harmonisation of decommissioning financing me-
thodologies in the European Union.  
Members of CENDF could be the managers of external funds, representatives of man-
agers of internal funds, representatives of governments, and independent financial ex-
perts, i. e. that in this case independency of members of the council or committee from 
the licensees and governments is not ensured, because the exchange of best practice 
experience between the actors in practice is of high importance here.  
The CENDF should not question the existence of the Decommissioning Funding Group 
initiated by the European Commission which could further exist to accompany the 
whole process, and to advice the Commission in EU funding of decommissioning pro-
jects, with the European Commission having strong role in it compared to the CENDF 
or to the European Nuclear Decommissioning Oversight Board (ENDOB) proposed in 
Chapter 6.4.3. 
How far the CENDF could or should be further replaced or complemented by a Euro-
pean Public Oversight Board, with members independent of the licensees and the gov-
ernments, and with more competences, as suggested as a result of the financial risk 
assessment from the governance perspective (cf. Chapter 4.2.6.2), will be discussed in 
Chapter 6.4.3. 
6.4 Regulation of decommissioning financing at EU level? – Outlook on 
possible future steps 
6.4.1 Justification of possible further regulation 
According to the experiences with the European Commission’s draft directive of 2003 
under Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty on nuclear safety (“nuclear package”) and dis-
cussions with stakeholders in the course of this project, further legal steps on the Euro-
pean level appear not feasible at the moment. The political window for additional 
regulations concerning decommissioning financing on the European level seems to be 
currently rather narrow. This is why the European Commission (2006) has recently 
issued only recommendations and not a new directive on this issue.  
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However, if the European institutions not only considered the Euratom Treaty as the 
most important legal basis for dealing with decommissioning financing issues, but 
moved back to the ECT rules and especially Article 95 together with Article 175 on en-
vironmental grounds like it has been argued in Chapter 5, further regulation of decom-
missioning financing at EU level would be justified. In this context, the Commission 
should not base its action on safety issues only, but should focus more con competition 
aspects, which have not been subject of analysis in this project. 
Nevertheless, the study has confirmed that there are significant differences in the ac-
cumulation, management and accessibility of decommissioning and waste manage-
ment funds in Europe. Therefore, the European Commission (2006) claimed, that 
„without prejudice to the general principle of subsidiarity, a certain degree of harmoni-
sation should be suggested with regard to the concepts used in decommissioning mat-
ters“. Economists like Hensing et al. (1997) already analysed in the 1990s that these 
differences explained a significant part of the differences in power generation costs 
between countries in Europe. Following this argumentation - without having the possi-
bility to analyse these aspects in more detail here - would mean that a distortion in 
competition between different NPP operators but also in competition between NPP 
operators and electricity generation from other energy sources, as well as the heat 
market, as far as heat produced from electricity is concerned, could be assumed. Fol-
lowing the argumentation in Chapter 5, and concentrating more on these competition 
aspects, further regulation on EU level could be justified. 
6.4.2 Elements of a possible EU Directive 
A possible future regulation could be a European Directive addressing general re-
quirements with regard to decommissioning financing like the ones described in Chap-
ter 6.2.2. This regulation should particularly concentrate on issues of transparency and 
independency („unbundling“) of the different functions with regard to decommissioning 
activities, their financing, their authorisation, and their monitoring and control, because 
conflict of interest leads to pressure to compromise safety in a competitive environ-
ment. Thereby, the possible Directive should take the different historical developments 
and future planning for the nuclear sector in the different countries into account, not 
prescribing any specific „ideal“ type of decommissioning financing scheme, but leading 
to an improvement of the existing schemes. The Annex of such a possible Directive 
could include specific recommendations with regard to good practice of decommission-
ing financing schemes. 
However, such a possible Directive would only be needed if the following steps failed 
or did not lead to substantial improvements: 
• The ongoing process of increasing transparency and learning from each other 
within the Council’s working group and the Decommissioning Funding Group, 
• The recommendations on decommissioning financing issued by the European 
Commission in October 2006, and 
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• The steps of increasing transparency and oversight described in Chapter 6.3. 
6.4.3 From CENDF to a European Nuclear Decommissioning Oversight 
Board (ENDOB)? 
6.4.3.1 Possible fields of activity of the ENDOB 
After experiences with the proposed Council of European Nuclear Decommissioning 
Funds (CENDF) have been made, it should be evaluated how far such a CENDF 
should be replaced or completed a European Nuclear Decommissioning Oversight 
Board (ENDOB), consisting of persons being independent from the licensees and the 
governments, and with more competences, being able to set general principles and 
framework guidelines and monitoring their implementation (e. g., proposing the ele-
ments of the possible Directive described before, and monitoring its implementation).  
Fields of activity/responsibility of such a board or committee could be: 
• Definition of accounting and auditing rules in order to adequately recognise, meas-
ure and disclose relevant liabilities and the assumptions and methodologies of es-
timating decommissioning costs; 
• Setting decommissioning financing principles and framework guidelines and moni-
tor their enforcement 
• Developing and proposing „good practice“ of decommissioning funding methodolo-
gies according to recent developments (preferred solution). 
• The general principles and framework guidelines should  
– improve the good functioning of systems and have the purpose of enabling any 
decommissioning methodology, which meets the agreed standards (subsidiarity 
principle)., 
– enforce transparency in all matters,  
– enforce independence of all involved parties,  
– improve accounting and auditing rules (by proposing accounting clarifications) 
– set framework guidelines for investment practices which guarantee a safe in-
vestment system and which define the acceptable risk levels. 
• Moreover, the board or committee should propose methodology-specific additional 
measures („good practice“ of additional restrictions or „fences“ for different types of 
decommissioning financing schemes). 
In this context, this board could become a key element embracing all possible decom-
missioning financing solutions (to oversee and regulate different solutions) meeting the 
agreed standards, and enforcing the highest possible safety of different methodologies. 
Final Report – EU Decommissioning Funding Methodologies TREN/05/NUCL/S07.55436 
Wuppertal Institute et al. 161 
Such an organisation could also be compared with the state supervision in other indus-
tries where safety, reputation and confidence are key. A typical example is the banking 
sector, which will be explained in the following subchapter. 
6.4.3.2 Experience of financial markets with oversight boards 
The overwhelming meaning of independence between all involved parties has been 
clearly outlined. In this context, financial markets can provide a deeper insight into the 
concrete implementation of strategies aiming at strengthening the well functioning of 
systems.  
The US regulators have enacted the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002 (SOX) as a reaction 
of severe accounting and auditing problems/failures (Enron and WorldCom cases). The 
aim of SOX is to enforce and strengthen the independence of the control system and 
thus to better protect shareholders and all other important stakeholders from possible 
accounting errors or even fraud. The SOX establishes detailed standards for corporate 
boards and audit committees, new standards for the independence of external auditors. 
In addition, the SOX follows a fourth avenue by establishing a “Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board” (PCAOB) under the SEC (Security and Exchange Commis-
sion). The SOX is very stringent as it also entails various sanctions including fines and 
imprisonment in case of non-compliance. 
Similar legislation exists in Germany where the APAG law (Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung 
der Berufsaufsicht der gesetzlichen Abschlussprüfer) has been enacted in 2004. The 
aim is also to strengthen/sustain the confidence of the public in the auditing profession. 
The APAG aims, analogous to the PCAOB, to improve the quality of external auditing 
and entails a Commission (Kommission für die Aufsicht über die Abschlussprüfer in 
Deutschland). This Commission is exclusively composed of non-auditors in order to 
guarantee independence (Source: Corporate Governance in Deutschland; Rasche 
Entwicklung und hohe Regelungsdichte by Funk, Rossmanith and Alber in: Der 
Schweizer Treuhänder 2006/9). 
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7 Reporting requirements – Data and information needed for 
comparison of different approaches in the EU 
7.1 Overview 
Transparency is seen as an essential part of ensuring market, environmental and secu-
rity of supply protection in all areas of the energy sector. In relation to decommissioning 
and radioactive waste management funds, transparency is of even more importance, 
due to the size of funds involved, the impact on the market and environment, the lack 
of certainty over all the technical and therefore financials details and the fact that funds 
are collected decades prior to their use. 
The sharing of experiences and expertise can help to remove some of the uncertainties 
around the financing of decommission. In order to increase the confidence in and value 
of the information provided, information needs to be provided on a regular basis. In 
2003, the European Commission stated that it “intends, within the scope of its respon-
sibilities of the Euratom Treaty to publish an annual report on the use of decommission-
ing and waste management funds”. To ensure that accurate and upto date information 
is used Member States should  be asked to provide annually data and information to 
the Commission for report.  
The following proposal contains elements of such a report by the Member States. Ho-
wever, looking at benefit-cost relation of reporting, it might be sufficient to collect parts 
of this information [especially those relating to the tertiary level] biannually or triannually 
instead of annually. The reporting requirements proposed are divided into three levels: 
• Primary level  
The six primary indicators enable a rough comparison or benchmarking. The indi-
cators should reflect the overall financing of decommissioning and waste manage-
ment activities in each Member State. This information will allow comparison 
between Member States as to the degree in which funds are being collected and 
guarantees provided and measured against the expected final costs. Furthermore, 
it will indicate the measures taken by Member States to ensure that funds are sepa-
rated from the regular activities of the utility and the measures taken to ensure that 
the funds will be adequate. 
• Secondary level  
Secondary data will demonstrate the state of financing for each individual nuclear 
facility (including the JRC facilities of the European Commission). This may reflect 
both the differences between different types of facility (for example between re-
processing plants and power stations) and between different designs (for example 
between gas cooled reactors and light water reactors). This could also function as a 
basis for facility type-specific benchmarking. 
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• Tertiary level  
Finally, on the tertiary level, more detailed information on the framework, proce-
dures and rules for the financing of decommissioning is given, with respect to the 
five main categories of the first and the secondary level, i. e. (estimation of) costs, 
(setting up of) provisions, additional guarantees or similar financial securities, as-
set (fund) management and use of funds for payment of decommissioning expen-
ditures. In addition, information on fund oversight will be provided. 
By providing information on all three levels, the Member States will increase the trans-
parency in the sector and increase confidence that the necessary funds will be avail-
able when needed.  Furthermore, it will highlight the areas of commonality between 
Member States and those areas where different approaches are taken. 
7.2 Primary level  
Information needs to be provided on the extent of the expected costs of decommission-
ing and the scope of the current funds and guarantees in each country: 
1.1 Sum of those estimated undiscounted (overnight) decommissioning costs of all 
nuclear installations in each Member State that are expected to occur after the 
final shutdown of the installations; this includes all civil and dual use facilities. 
1.2  Sum of the provisions in each Member State accumulated to cover the costs 
collected for decommissioning, as outlined in point 1.1. 
1.3 Sum of the possible costs in each Member State covered by guarantees or 
similar financial securities exceeding the sum of provisions, as outlined in point 
1.2. This should detail the mechanisms to cover the estimated decommissioning 
costs in the event of early closure or expected or unexpected increase in costs. 
1.4 Sum of assets in separated (segregated, internal or external) dedicated funds 
in each Member State. 
1.5 Average sum of payments per year for decommissioning activities for all nu-
clear installations in each Member State over the previous three years.  
7.3 Secondary level 
Information needs to be provided on the extent of the expected costs of decommission-
ing and the scope of the current funds and guarantees for each nuclear facility. This 
information on the secondary level will already be needed when compiling the  aggre-
gated figures on the primary level. 
2.1 Sum of those estimated undiscounted (overnight) decommissioning costs of 
each civil and dual use nuclear installation in each Member State that are ex-
pected to occur after the final shutdown of the installations.  
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2.2 Sum of the provisions accumulated to cover the costs collected for 
decommissioning for each facility, as outlined in point 2.1. 
2.3 Sum of the possible costs covered by guarantees or similar financial securities 
exceeding the sum of provisions for each facility, as outlined in point 2.2. This 
should detail the mechanisms to cover the estimated decommissioning costs in 
the event of early closure or expected or unexpected increase in costs. 
2.3 Sum of assets in separated (segregated, internal or external) dedicated funds 
for each facility. 
2.4 Average sum of payments per year for decommissioning activities for each 
nuclear installation over the previous three years. 
7.4 Tertiary level 
These questions ask for more detail with regard to the data collected on the primary 
and secondary level. They can be answered by country if the answers are the same for 
all facilities, by licensee or type of facility if the answers are the same for all facilities of 
a specific licensee or type, by facility if the answers differ between facilities. 
3.1 Cost estimates 
3.1.1 What was the date of the cost estimate? 
3.1.2 Who has done the estimate? 
3.1.3 What was the methodology applied to estimate costs? 
3.1.3 Has the estimate been reviewed? If yes, by whom? 
3.1.4 How is the scope of costs to be estimated defined and by whom? 
3.1.5 What is the decommissioning strategy, and what are the time horizons as-
sumed for this cost estimate? 
3.1.6 How have risks and uncertainties been taken into account? Is the degree of 
reliability of the cost estimate indicated? 
3.1.7 How much of expected costs are private licensees/public licensees liable 
for? 
3.1.8 What was the reason for changes in cost estimates compared to last report, 
if any? 
3.2 Setting up provisions 
3.2.1 Will decommissioning funds be required to be collected prior to start up of 
new facilities, if so how much of the final decommissioning costs are they 
expected to cover (either overnight or discounted costs estimates)? 
3.2.2 What are the accounting rules applied for setting up provisions? 
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3.2.3 Are costs discounted for calculating provisions to be made? If yes, what no-
minal and what real rate of discounting are deployed? 
3.2.4 Are funds collected via: 
o Implicit inclusion in electricity prices 
o Separately visible part of electricity bill 
o Taxation 
o Government fee 
o Other? 
3.2.4  How is the rate of collection altered in light of changes in the cost estimate, 
reduced operating output/lifetime or other changes in circumstances? 
3.3 Guarantees or similar financial securities 
3.3.1 Will the licensee have to provide any kind of guarantee, insurance or similar 
financial security, if decommissioning funds are not required to be collected 
prior to start up of new facilities up to the full amount of those undiscounted 
decommissioning costs that are expected to occur after the final shutdown of 
the installation (Guarantee I)? Please describe the guarantee system. 
3.3.2 In how far does the licensee have to provide any kind of guarantee, insur-
ance or similar financial security for any kind of unexpected event that leads 
to unexpected increase in cost after the final shutdown of the facility (Guar-
antee II)? Please describe the guarantee system. 
3.4 Asset Management / Fund Management 
3.4.1 Which body is responsible for managing the funds, utility, government, inde-
pendent body? 
3.4.2 How is the fund separated from the regular accounts of the opera-
tor/Government? 
3.4.3  Are there separate funds for each nuclear facility or for each com-
pany/facility, a common fund with sub accounts for each company/facility, or 
a common solidarity fund with no separation between companies/facilities? 
3.4.4  Is it possible for the fund to be transferred to an alternative bo-
dy/management system?  
3.4.5  Are there investment rules for the funds, and who sets these rules? In par-
ticular, are there any liquidity requirements? 
3.4.6 How are risks of investment managed? 
3.4.7 What was the return on investment received on average during the last three 
years? 
3.4.8 Who benefits from investment performance? 
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3.5 Payments 
3.5.1  Who has the power to authorise payment? 
3.5.2 Are payments possible in advance of occurrence of expenditures or only ba-
sed on proven expenditures? 
3.6  Fund Oversight 
3.6.1  What body is responsible for ensuring provisions are made and the fund is 
managed correctly according to national or European regulation? 
3.6.2  Is the oversight body independent of the operators/Government, how is it 
appointed? 
3.6.3  Does this body assess the funds and/or the suitability of the fund managers? 
How and how often is this done? 
3.6.4  How often does the oversight body report and who too? Parliament, Licen-
see and/or Government? 
3.6.5 Are there any requirements with regard to decommissioning financing im-
posed in the operating licenses? 
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Appendix 
• EU stakeholder report 
• 16 country reports with annexes 
• Report with examples of regulation of decommissioning financing in non-EU coun-
tries and non-nuclear areas 
• Technical overview on dismantling of nuclear facilities in the European Community 
